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Abstract 
For English merchants, planters and politicians, colonizing Newfoundland required 
learning the limitations and opportunities afforded by the island’s natural environment. The 
crucial period for this learning process took place from 1610, the first English effort to colonize 
the island, to the 1699 passing of the Act to Encourage the Trade to Newfoundland, which 
defined the cod fishery as the island’s only viable industry. During these eighty-nine years, 
English enterprises and policies consistently failed to meet the expectations of their backers, and 
new information challenged accepted ideas about Newfoundland’s climate and natural resources, 
pressuring the supporters of those decisions to reassess the island’s economic value and role as a 
colonial possession. This reflexive cycle of ideas, implementation and feedback shaped the 
creation of a series of policies and practices that guided English efforts to colonize and profit 
from Newfoundland by altering what industries were prioritized and how they were regulated. 
As a result of this process, English efforts in Newfoundland shifted away from developing an 
economically diverse colony with little government oversight to maximizing the fishery through 
government management. The challenges encountered by the English in Newfoundland, 
specifically how to adapt to the island’s natural environment and defining what the role of a 
colony with a single major industry was, shaped the development of the political, social and 
economic institutions and questions that influence the island to this day. This dissertation’s 
original contribution is its examination of this reflexive process and how the methods employed 
by policymakers, planters and merchants to learn about Newfoundland defined English 
colonization efforts and policymaking during the seventeenth century. This approach differs 
from previous studies, which have focused on how the English inhabitants in Newfoundland 
adapted to the island, by examining how perceptions of the island’s natural environment changed 
in England, and how that affected business ventures and policies during the seventeenth century. 
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Introduction 
 This dissertation studies English perceptions of Newfoundland’s natural environment and 
its political and economic value during the seventeenth century, and how changes in those 
perceptions influenced the interactions of colonists, merchants and politicians with the island. By 
focusing on how people in England understood Newfoundland, this study diverges from the 
recent literature about early modern Newfoundland, which has centred on the growth of the 
English colonial society and economy on the island. The approach taken here addresses 
questions about the means employed by individuals and organizations in England to profit from 
and control distant lands, including how those methods influenced policy and business 
development in regards to Newfoundland. By exploring the ways in which ideas of 
Newfoundland’s natural environment and value as a colonial possession changed over time, this 
dissertation focuses on individuals and groups in England, particularly government bodies, 
merchants and companies, whose only contact with the island was through reports, maps and 
stories. Despite rarely visiting Newfoundland, these decision-makers shaped its history by 
formulating and implementing policies and practices that they concluded were suited to the 
island’s natural environment.1  
English planters, politicians and merchants used changing evaluations of Newfoundland’s 
natural resources and climate in their considerations to determine the island’s potential economic 
value, how best to extract that value and how to manage the people who either resided there or 
visited to fish. These questions defined the period from 1610, when the first English colony in 
Newfoundland was established, to 1699, when The Act to Encourage the Trade to 
                                                          
1 Sean Cadigan, Hope and Deception in Conception Bay: Merchant-Settler Relations in Newfoundland, 1785-1855 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1995), 162–66; Jerry Bannister, The Rule of the Admirals Law, Custom and 
Naval Government in Newfoundland, 1699-1832 (Toronto: Osgoode Society for Canadian Legal History by 
University of Toronto Press, 2003), 17–25; Jeff Webb, “Revisiting Fence Building: Keith Matthews and 
Newfoundland Historiography,” Canadian Historical Review 91, no. 2 (March 2010): 335–38. 
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Newfoundland, better known as King William’s Act, officially recognized the cod fishery as the 
island’s only viable industry. Over this eighty-nine year period, perceptions of Newfoundland’s 
economic and political value developed through a recursive cycle of formulating ideas about 
how to use the island’s natural environment, testing them as policies and practices, and adjusting 
them when resistance was encountered. Consequently, English efforts in Newfoundland shifted 
away from creating economically diverse plantations with little government oversight to 
maximizing the fishery through government management. This process manifested first in the 
inability of colonies engaged in multiple industries to become profitable, and later as 
policymakers attempted to develop policies suited to Newfoundland’s natural environment and 
the practices adopted by residents and fishers to succeed there.2 
This dissertation focuses on English colonization efforts, but these enterprises were not 
the only European ventures in Newfoundland. The migratory cod fishery, which developed 
during the sixteenth century, was the primary English economic activity in Newfoundland 
throughout the seventeenth century. Despite its economic importance, the migratory fishery did 
little to enforce English claims to Newfoundland or keep out competitors. Although the 
adventurer Humphrey Gilbert claimed Newfoundland for England in 1583, the fishery remained 
an international industry: Basque, Portuguese, Spanish, Dutch and French fishing and trade ships 
often used the same harbours that English ships did. Colonization offered a means to secure 
Newfoundland’s status as an English possession by cultivating its soil, building houses and 
stopping interlopers, but colonists also competed with fishing ships for natural resources, such as 
shore space and wood. English colonization efforts in Newfoundland were closely connected to 
                                                          
2 “William III, 1699: An Act to Incourage the Trade to Newfoundland. [Chapter XIV. Rot. Parl. 10 Gul. III. p. 3. 
n.5.],” in Statutes of the Realm: Vol. 7, 1695-1701, ed. John Raithby, (London: Great Britain Record Commission, 
1820), 515-518; Patrick O’Flaherty, “King William’s Act (1699): Some Thoughts 300 Years Later,” Newfoundland 
Quarterly XCIII, no. 2 (2000): 21–22. 
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the migratory fishery, and policymakers throughout the seventeenth century often discussed 
colonies as tools for protecting the migratory fishery and worked to ensure that colonists did not 
interfere with fishing ships.3 
 In Canadian environmental history, the topic of how Europeans learned about and 
adapted to remote regions, particularly when those areas did not match their original 
expectations, has been the subject of significant scholarship. The historical geographer Cole 
Harris, seeking to find a common theme with which to study Canada as a whole, termed the 
country “the reluctant land,” a place that people defined through their adaptations to its regions’ 
climates and natural environments.4 Studies about the learning methods employed by Europeans 
in Canada’s west and north, such as historian John Sandlos’s and geographer Arn Keeling’s 
work on the development of mines in northern Canada, have discussed a process similar to the 
one examined by this dissertation. Politicians, businesspeople, scientists and others tested their 
expectations for the natural environments of those regions and the industries they could support 
through scientific missions or by learning from the experiences of those who went there. These 
considerations informed new conceptions of Canada’s geographic and economic makeup that 
shaped government policies and business practices.5 The English experience in Newfoundland is 
similarly one of building expectations and responding when they did not align with what 
                                                          
3 Edward Hayes, “A Report of the Voyage and Success Thereof, Attempted in the Yeere of Our Lord, 1583. by Sir 
Humphrey Gilbert,” in Principall Navigations, ed. Richard Hakluyt (London: George Bishop and Ralph Newberie, 
1589), 679–97; Patricia Seed, Ceremonies of Possession in Europe’s Conquest of the New World, 1492-1640 (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 16–31; Gillian Cell, English Enterprise in Newfoundland 1577-1660 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1969), 108–114; Peter Pope, Fish into Wine : The Newfoundland Plantation 
in the Seventeenth Century (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2004), 65–72. 
4 Cole Harris, The Reluctant Land: Society, Space, and Environment in Canada before Confederation (Vancouver: 
UBC Press, 2008), xv–xviii. 
5 Doug Owram, Promise of Eden the Canadian Expansionist Movement and the Idea of the West, 1856-1900 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1992), 4–6; Suzanne Zeller, Inventing Canada: Early Victorian Science and 
the Idea of a Transcontinental Nation (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1987), 5–7; Arn Keeling and John 
Sandlos, “Claiming the New North: Development and Colonialism at the Pine Point Mine, Northwest Territories, 
Canada,” Environment and History 18, no. 1 (2012): 5-12. 
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colonists, merchants and explorers found there. This history and the difficulties encountered 
while colonizing Newfoundland places it as an early example of the learning processes explored 
by Canadian environmental historians. The English experience in Newfoundland demonstrates 
the longer history of this process of European efforts to understand and expand into lands with 
unfamiliar, and often difficult to adapt to, climates and natural environments.6 
Although Newfoundland constituted only a small part of England’s overseas empire, the 
process of colonizing the island and adapting to its natural environment provides insight into the 
ways in which English merchants and politicians envisioned their empire, attempted to bring that 
vision into reality and responded to setbacks. The English experience in Newfoundland reflects 
what historian Richard Grove described as an overarching theme of Europeans using 
expectations of plentiful natural resources to motivate colonization efforts in unfamiliar lands, 
and adjusting policies and practices to deal with flaws in those expectations. Grove’s assessment 
provides a broad overview of changing perceptions of colonial spaces and their natural 
environments, but he does not examine the impact of cyclical knowledge-gathering processes on 
the European understanding of colonial spaces. Revised plans often featured new flaws or 
perpetuated uncorrected flaws that undermined their objectives. The responses to these repeated 
failures created a repetitive system of assessing unsuccessful efforts to formulate new plans until 
the goals of decision-makers in Europe aligned with a more accurate assessment of the natural 
resources, climate and other characteristics of the lands they sought to control.7  
                                                          
6 Cell, English Enterprise in Newfoundland 1577-1660, 34-52. 
7 Richard Grove, Green Imperialism: Colonial Expansion, Tropical Island Edens, and the Origins of 
Environmentalism, 1600-1860 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 24–26; for a similar take on Grove’s 
argument see: Bernard Bailyn, Atlantic History, Concept and Contours, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
2005), 73-101. 
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This recursive process follows what the economic philosopher George Soros terms 
“reflexivity, fallibility and the human uncertainty principle.”8 Soros’s concept builds on the 
works of philosopher Karl Popper and sociologist Malcolm Ashmore, specifically on how 
preconceptions affect the development of scientific knowledge, by studying how groups assess 
external objects, such as lands, companies and products, to construct expectations of their value. 
Soros, writing about economic disruptions, argues that groups make decisions using agreed-upon 
perceptions of an asset’s value, such as its price or potential to produce trade goods. This 
perceived value is often flawed by incomplete information, prejudices or other outside 
influences, creating dissonance between the asset’s expected value and its actual value, resulting 
in unpredictable outcomes and disruptions. These unexpected results cause decision-makers to 
re-evaluate the object to align its perceived and real values.9 
Although Soros’s understanding of reflexivity originates in economics, philosophy and 
sociology, his emphasis on studying the ways in which groups conceptualize, test and rethink the 
value of a place or object is useful in historical analysis. English planters, merchants and 
politicians had difficulty determining the economic and political value of Newfoundland’s 
natural environment, and how best to use that value. Distance and communication challenges 
obscured Newfoundland from people in England, although it was known for its extensive cod 
stocks since John Cabot’s 1497 voyage. Fishers and traders, the most common English visitors to 
Newfoundland during the sixteenth century, rarely overwintered there before 1610 and reported 
                                                          
8 George Soros, “Fallibility, Reflexivity, and the Human Uncertainty Principle,” Journal of Economic Methodology 
20, no. 4 (2013): 309–10. 
9 Malcolm Ashmore, The Reflexive Thesis: Wrighting Sociology of Scientific Knowledge (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1989), 32; Mark Notturno, “Soros and Popper: On Fallibility, Reflexivity, and the Unity of Method,” 
Journal of Economic Methodology 20, no. 4 (2013): 421–22; Emile Grunberg, “Predictability and Reflexivity,” 
American Journal of Economics and Sociology 45, no. 4 (October, 1986): 475–76; Soros, “Fallibility, Reflexivity, 
and the Human Uncertainty Principle,” 309–15; Yi-Cheng Zhang, “Broader Scopes of the Reflexivity Principle in 
the Economy,” Journal of Economic Methodology 20, no. 4 (2013): 446–48; Karl Popper, Conjectures and 
Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge (London: Routledge, 1969), 215–22. 
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information based on observations made in spring and summer.10 Late sixteenth-century writers, 
such as Anthony Parkhurst and Edward Hayes, described Newfoundland as a place with a 
thriving fishery, temperate climate and the potential to host land-based industries that required 
fertile soil, forests and mineral deposits.11 In addition to these accounts by explorers and 
merchants, promoters in England estimated the climates of regions in America based on that of 
areas at corresponding latitudes in Europe to claim that Newfoundland’s climate resembled that 
of northern France and southern England. This practice fell out of favour during the seventeenth 
century as accounts by explorers, colonists, merchants and naval commanders provided more 
nuanced information about climate in America.12  
Failed enterprises and ineffective policies repeatedly challenged these expectations of 
abundant land-based resources and favourable climates. These setbacks did not stop colonization 
efforts. Instead, they pushed merchants and policymakers to change the methods they used to 
collect information and make decisions about Newfoundland. The government implemented new 
methods of gathering information to amass firsthand accounts reported in formats that allowed 
for analysis and comparison, such as censuses, making it easier for policymakers in Europe to 
manage efforts in Newfoundland. By the end of the seventeenth century the English government 
narrowed its definition of Newfoundland’s economic and political value by identifying the cod 
                                                          
10 Pope, Fish into Wine, 47-50 
11 Cell, English Enterprise in Newfoundland 1577-1660, 22–33; Ian Steele, The English Atlantic, 1675-1740: An 
Exploration of Communication and Community (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), 82–84; Peter Pope, The 
Many Landfalls of John Cabot (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997), 26–30; Pope, Fish into Wine,15–20. 
12 Richard Hakluyt, The Original Writings and Correspondence of the Two Richard Hakluyts, ed. E.G.R. Taylor, 
vol. 2 (London: The Hakluyt Society, 1935); Karen Kupperman, “The Puzzle of the American Climate in the Early 
Colonial Period,” The American Historical Review 87, no. 5 (December, 1982): 1262–65; Sam White, “Unpuzzling 
American Climate: New World Experience and the Foundations of a New Science,” Isis 106, no. 3 (September 
2015): 556–62. 
7 
 
fishery as its sole viable industry, and enacted policies that better reflected how that fishery 
operated.13 
Historian of science John Pickstone referred to these new methods of gathering and 
analyzing information collectively as “Natural Historical Ways of Knowing.” These Ways of 
Knowing encompass the techniques developed during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries to 
record, collect and classify animate and inanimate natural objects. Practitioners of natural history 
employed these methods to assess regions by developing inventories of natural objects upon 
which larger conclusions and plans could be built. 14 America was important for developing this 
approach. The plants, animals and people of these regions often differed in form, quantity or 
place in the natural environment from those familiar to Europeans. These differences disrupted 
European ways of understanding the natural world. As art historian Victoria Dickenson notes, 
prior to the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the predominant method had been to rely on 
descriptions provided by classical texts, such as the Roman naturalist Pliny the Elder’s Natural 
History.15 In contrast to older methods, Natural Historical Ways of Knowing focused on 
recording observations and collecting and cataloguing specimens to process and communicate 
information that did not align with prior European experiences and expectations. These new 
methods created a body of knowledge based on accrued physical evidence. This methodical 
approach to gathering information about the natural world did more than increase European 
                                                          
13“The commission directed by the Council to John Guy for government in Newfoundland,” 1610, NU Middleton 
Mi X 1/1, 14-15a; Samuel Pepys to send their lords a draft of the instructions given to the convoys,” April 8 1675, 
TNA, CO 391/1, 11a; “William III, 1699: An Act to Incourage the Trade to Newfoundland,” 515-518. 
14 John Pickstone, Ways of Knowing: A New History of Science, Technology, and Medicine (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2001), 10–11. 
15 J. L. Heilbron, “History of Science,” in The Oxford Companion to the History of Modern Science, ed. J. L. 
Heilbron (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 372–73; J.L. Heilbron, “Natural Philosophy,” in Wrestling with 
Nature: From Omens to Science, ed. Peter Harrison, Ronald Numbers, and Michael Shank (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2011), 173–82; Peter Harrison, “Natural History,” in Wrestling with Nature: From Omens to 
Science, ed. Peter Harrison, Ronald Numbers, and Michael Shank (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011), 
118–34; Victoria Dickenson, Drawn from Life: Science and Art in the Portrayal of the New World, (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 2006), 19-41. 
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knowledge of the natural world. Merchants, policymakers and others employed it to identify 
goods with commercial, medical and political value.16  
Although the Caribbean Sea and Hudson Bay attracted more attention from scholars and 
practitioners of natural history, English planters, promoters, merchants, ship captains and 
politicians applied the same principles to evaluate Newfoundland’s natural environment and its 
economic value.17 Individuals who visited or lived in Newfoundland recorded information about 
the island’s natural environment and climate to correct mistakes and identify strategies for 
creating and managing an economically viable colony there.18 As merchants, planters and 
politicians collected, analyzed and used information about Newfoundland, English colonies and 
policies conformed to a changing understanding of the possibilities and limitations presented by 
the island’s climate and natural resources.19   
Myth and the Writing of Newfoundland History 
The writing of Newfoundland history reflects a complex past tied to the creation and 
persistence of foundational myths to explain perceived historical injustices and contemporary 
issues. These myths are ingrained in Newfoundland culture and politics. Newfoundlanders as 
different as novelist Wayne Johnston and politician Danny Williams use them to reinforce 
narratives of loss, such as the undermining of Newfoundland’s political self-determination in 
                                                          
16 Antonello Gerbi, The Dispute of the New World; the History of a Polemic, 1750-1900, trans. Jeremy Moyle, 
(Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1973), 29–32; Richard Drayton, Nature’s Government: Science, 
Imperial Britain, and the “Improvement” of the World (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000), 3–24; Alix 
Cooper, Inventing the Indigenous: Local Knowledge and Natural History in Early Modern Europe (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2007), 5–10; Dickenson, Drawn from Life, 19-41; Pickstone, Ways of Knowing, 60–82. 
17 Londa Schiebinger, Plants and Empire: Colonial Bioprospecting in the Atlantic World (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2004), 23–30; Theodore Binnema, “Enlightened Zeal”: The Hudson’s Bay Company and 
Scientific Networks, 1670-1870 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2014), 47–74. 
18 Hayes, “A Report of the Voyage and Success Thereof, Attempted in the Yeere of Our Lord, 1583,” 679–97; 
Kupperman, “The Puzzle of the American Climate in the Early Colonial Period.” 
19 Peter Pope, “Outport Economics: Culture and Agriculture in Later Seventeenth-Century Newfoundland,” 
Newfoundland and Labrador Studies 19, no. 1 (May 2005): 157–63; Sam White, “Unpuzzling American Climate: 
New World Experience and the Foundations of a New Science,” Isis 106, no. 3 (September 2015): 556–62. 
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entering Confederation, but also to fight for more favourable terms for the province within 
Canada. The history of the first English settlements in Newfoundland and the difficulties they 
encountered provide a powerful tool for understanding the origins of the social, economic and 
political issues facing the province. The depletion of the cod stocks, lack of other economic 
opportunities and perceived cultural injustices are explained through a long-running myth of 
Newfoundland’s history being shaped, mostly to its detriment, by hostile economic and political 
actors located either in England or in Canada. Historian Jerry Bannister, examining cultural 
memory in Newfoundland, notes that this myth builds on a perception of the province as “not 
just a place but a time: it is forever on the cusp of going somewhere, becoming something, 
fighting someone” but held back by factors beyond its control.20 
The idea of a hostile merchant and political class in England that opposed the economic 
and social development of an English colony persists as a root of this conception of 
Newfoundlander’s history and identity, although academic historians have refuted the idea. 
Judge John Reeves was the first to articulate this idea in his 1793 History of the Government of 
the Island of Newfoundland, by blaming merchants in England for resisting any changes that 
threatened their domination of the fishery. According to Reeves, this resistance manifested in a 
series of policies that increased merchant authority over Newfoundland’s natural resources and 
slowed the island’s social and political development in comparison to that of other English 
colonies such as New England and Upper Canada.21  
                                                          
20 Jeff Webb, “Confederation, Conspiracy and Choice: A Discussion,” Newfoundland and Labrador Studies 14, no. 
2 (October 1998): 169–74; Jerry Bannister, “Making History: Cultural Memory in Twentieth-Century 
Newfoundland,” Newfoundland and Labrador Studies 18, no. 2 (October 2002): 175–76; Jerry Bannister, “A River 
Runs Through It: Churchill Falls and the End of Newfoundland History,” Acadiensis 41, no. 1 (May 2012): 211–14. 
21 John Reeves, History of the Government of the Island of Newfoundland with an Appendix, Containing the Acts of 
Parliament Made Respecting the Trade and Fishery (London: Printed for J. Sewell, 1793), 5–31. 
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 The judge and historian Daniel Prowse is the most influential proponent of Reeves’s idea 
that hostile politicians and merchants, particularly those from the West Country of England, the 
region most involved in the migratory fishery, slowed Newfoundland’s economic and political 
growth. Prowse’s 1892 History of Newfoundland remains a foundational text for popular 
interpretations of the island’s history that inform political rhetoric. Prowse examined the period 
from Cabot’s 1497 voyage through the nineteenth century to demonstrate that West Country 
merchants controlled the fishery by opposing any economic, social or political developments that 
did not directly enrich them. This analysis relies on the assumption that Newfoundland had 
natural resources other than fish, such as fertile soil and minerals, left unused because a more 
diversified colony threatened to end fishing merchants’ status as the primary source of provisions 
and buyers of goods in outport communities. Prowse found this lack of diversification especially 
notable since, as geographer Graeme Wynn confirms, by 1850 Newfoundland was the only 
colony in eastern North America without an agricultural sector. Prowse’s work guided much of 
the scholarship about the island during the early- and mid-twentieth century.22   
Prowse’s influence is seen in the work of political economist Harold Innis and historian 
Alexander McLintock.23 In 1940, before Newfoundland joined Canada, Innis published The Cod 
Fisheries as a follow-up to his seminal 1930 study The Fur Trade in Canada. The Fur Trade 
argued that the staples trade, in this case the extraction and export of beaver pelts, concentrated 
business and political activity along the St. Lawrence-Great Lakes waterway and built the 
centralized government and economic institutions necessary for creating a transcontinental 
                                                          
22 Daniel Prowse, A History of Newfoundland (London: Macmillan and Co., 1895), 225–26; Jerry Bannister, “Whigs 
and Nationalists: The Legacy of Judge Prowse’s ‘History of Newfoundland,’” Acadiensis 32, no. 1 (October, 2002): 
84–90; Graeme Wynn, Canada and Arctic North America: An Environmental History (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 
2007), 125. 
23 Harold Innis, The Cod Fisheries: The History of an International Economy (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 
1940), 95-111; Alexander McLintock, The Establishment of Constitutional Government in Newfoundland, 1783-
1832: A Study of Retarded Colonization (London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1941), 1-25. 
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Canada as the fur trade extended its search into the hinterland. The Cod Fisheries complicated 
Innis’s initial findings by demonstrating that the staples trade could also slow the political and 
economic development of a region if there was no concentration of trade goods in a central 
region before their transport to Europe. According to Innis, the cod fishery did not create the 
same opportunities for building economic and political institutions because it did not require 
goods to pass through a central region, and without these centres merchants maintained greater 
control over the fishery and supply of provisions to Newfoundland. This lack of a developed 
central region and institutions, as well as the power that English fishing merchants held over 
Newfoundland’s economy, created the conditions that led to the island’s economic and political 
underdevelopment in comparison to Canada prior to its joining Confederation.24  
Alexander McLintock, in his 1941 The Establishment of Constitutional Government in 
Newfoundland, took an approach similar to Prowse’s. McLintock, a historian of English imperial 
policy who studied Newfoundland to compare to his home country New Zealand’s political 
history, viewed the lack of economic diversification as key to understanding Newfoundland’s 
slow political development in comparison to other contemporary colonies, such as New England. 
Examining the interplay between metropolitan centers and rural outports, McLintock accused 
merchants first based in England, and later in St. John’s, of discouraging the establishment of 
new industries that threatened their control over the provisioning trade, and using abusive 
business practices to keep fishers indebted to them. These merchants, through their economic 
clout and involvement in politics either directly, as politicians, or indirectly by leveraging their 
influence, were allegedly able to ensure that political decisions favoured them, a trend that 
deprived residents in Newfoundland of the opportunity to advance their own interests. According 
                                                          
24 Innis, The Cod Fisheries, 449-83; Harold Innis, The Fur Trade in Canada: An Introduction to Canadian 
Economic History (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1930), 383-90; Alexander Watson, Marginal Man: The 
Dark Vision of Harold Innis (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2006), 10–11. 
12 
 
to McLintock, the policies and practices preferred by these merchants slowed Newfoundland’s 
economic and political development from its first colonization to the twentieth century and 
created the unstable political situation that led to the end of self-government in 1934.25  
Beginning with the work of historian Keith Matthews and geographer Grant Head in the 
1970’s, Newfoundland history entered a period of revisionist scholarship based on re-assessing 
the relationship between the island’s English residents and merchants and politicians in England. 
Matthews’s article “Historical Fence Building” constituted the most influential challenge to the 
perception that a hostile merchant and political class purposefully slowed the development of 
English society in Newfoundland. By re-evaluating archival documents from the seventeenth 
century, Matthews argued that earlier historians either misinterpreted or ignored key sources to 
reinforce a narrative that offered convenient, but incorrect, explanations for Newfoundland’s 
political and economic lag behind other English colonies. To make his case, Matthews identified 
a series of events used by Prowse, Innis and McLintock to explain English hostility towards 
Newfoundland’s residents, and demonstrated that the sources did not support their findings.26   
Grant Head, who independently arrived at the same conclusion as Matthews did about 
Newfoundland’s historiography, examined the island’s natural resources and geography to 
explain why its economic and political history diverged from those of other English colonies. 
Head found that English practices, rather than adhering to any ideological opposition to 
diversifying Newfoundland’s economy, conformed to the availability of natural resources, 
leading to the growth of a widely dispersed English population that produced a single trade good 
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and was difficult to govern.27 This insight informed later historians and works, such as Sean 
Cadigan’s study of how Newfoundland’s natural environment influenced social, political and 
economic patterns previously attributed to oppression by politicians and merchants.28  
Following Matthews’s and Head’s work, historians challenged the traditional 
understanding of Newfoundland’s history by studying how English society and trade adapted to 
the island’s limited natural resources and position in the Atlantic Ocean. Since the 1970’s, these 
inquiries have tended to examine either the development of legal and political institutions in 
Newfoundland or the economic and cultural lives of the island’s English inhabitants. To do this, 
historians have studied the actions of English residents and fishers in Newfoundland to correct 
the prescriptive interpretations of legislation such as King William’s Act used by Reeves, 
Prowse, Innis and McLintock.29 
 The dearth of surviving primary sources created by Newfoundland’s residents presents a 
further challenge to historians. The fact that authorities in England produced most of the 
seventeenth-century records about Newfoundland, and that legislation rarely reflected the actions 
of those tasked with enforcing it, obscures the realities of life on the island. Historian Jeff Webb, 
investigating the use of the philosopher and statesman John Locke’s work by residents of St. 
John’s in 1723, provides one of the first insights into how Newfoundland’s English residents 
expressed their concerns about legal and political issues. Although historians knew of these 
documents at least since 1931, Webb was the first to argue from them that Newfoundland’s 
residents created legal customs to resolve disputes and punish crimes, as opposed to relying 
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solely on legislation from England. The existence of a local political community demonstrates 
that the English population in Newfoundland was interested in shaping regulations and 
enforcement practices to fit local needs, unlike prior studies which rarely considered the agency 
of English residents in Newfoundland.30  
Legal historian Jerry Bannister’s Rule of the Admirals advanced Webb’s work by 
examining how local legal customs in Newfoundland developed after King William’s Act. 
Bannister’s work exemplifies changes in the analysis of the legal and political history of 
Newfoundland since the 1970’s. Examining how legal institutions developed in Newfoundland, 
Bannister argued that logistical challenges contributed to the creation of laws and customs 
tailored to govern a widely dispersed fishery and resident population. Accordingly, English 
legislators delegated legal authority to fishing ships and naval commanders in order to adapt to 
the challenges of enforcing laws among a population often connected only by sea, not to stop the 
development of local political and legal institutions. Bannister demonstrated that not only was 
there a complex political and legal culture in Newfoundland, but English authorities openly 
acknowledged that policies that worked in other colonies were unsuitable for Newfoundland, 
contributing to the differences between its development patterns and those of other contemporary 
English colonies.31 
While historians revisited traditional documentary sources, archaeological finds in 
Ferryland in the 1980’s and 1990’s fuelled new scholarship about the economic and social lives 
of fishers and planters who had left few written records.32 Historical archaeologist Peter Pope’s 
                                                          
30 Jeff Webb, “Leaving the State of Nature: A Locke-Inspired Political Community in St. John’s, Newfoundland, 
1723,” Acadiensis 21, no. 1 (October 1, 1991): 156–57. 
31 Bannister, The Rule of the Admirals, 280-286. 
32 James Tuck and Douglas Robbins, “A Glimpse at the Colony of Avalon,” Archaeology in Newfoundland and 
Labrador Annual Report 6 (December 1986): 237–49; Barry Gaulton and James Tuck, “The Archaeology of 
15 
 
Fish into Wine used material culture and documentary sources to argue that Newfoundland’s 
English society was part of a growing Atlantic community of consumers and producers. Pope 
found that residents in Newfoundland traded cod for items they could not produce locally, 
including wine and provisions, encouraging English residents to focus on the fishery rather than 
on developing other industries.33 Since Fish into Wine’s publication, other researchers’ works, 
such as archaeologist Barry Gaulton’s study of commercial development in Ferryland, have 
taken similar approaches by examining how Newfoundland’s English inhabitants used cod to 
access larger trade networks.34  
Webb, Bannister, Pope and others have provided valuable insights into Newfoundland’s 
history, but gaps remain in these works. There are few considerations of the ways in which 
legislators, merchants and others in England accounted for the island’s natural environment in 
their decisions and adapted to changing circumstances there. Studies of Newfoundland by 
Atlantic historians provide an important starting point for investigations of this topic by 
contextualizing Newfoundland as part of England’s colonial expansion in America, an approach 
that requires an understanding of the island’s place in the English colonial consciousness.35  
One of the most influential scholars of Newfoundland in terms of England’s colonial 
expansion was David Quinn, an Atlantic historian who advocated the island’s importance for 
understanding both early English colonization efforts in America and English economic history. 
In his 1982 article “Newfoundland in the Consciousness of Europe in the Sixteenth and Early 
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Seventeenth Centuries,” Quinn stated that the yearly economic value of Newfoundland’s cod 
fishery was comparable to the gold and silver output of Spain’s South American possessions. 
However, Newfoundland’s fishery never achieved the same status in Europe because English 
investors viewed fishing as a “poor and smelly” occupation whose product did not have the same 
appeal as gold and silver. While gold and silver were presented by Elizabethan writers such as 
Richard Hakluyt as justifying the colonization of America, fishing was portrayed as a merely 
pragmatic, if unambitious, venture.36 As a result, Newfoundland received less attention from 
writers, governments and businesses than other regions in America during the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries did. The comparatively smaller number of sources and lack of colourful 
stories proved less attractive to historians.37 Quinn attempted during the 1960’s and 1970’s to fill 
this gap in the scholarship by publishing primary sources about the English colonization of 
Newfoundland in New American World, The Voyages and Colonising Enterprises of Sir 
Humphrey Gilbert and The New Found Land of Stephen Parmenius.38 
Quinn’s efforts yielded results. Since the 1990’s, academic interest in Newfoundland’s 
place in the Atlantic world has grown. In “The Poetics of a Cold Climate,” Mary Fuller, a scholar 
of colonization literature, used promotional texts about Newfoundland to compare English 
perceptions of northern and southern regions of America. Newfoundland’s marginality in 
English colonial thought is, according to Fuller, an advantage for comparative scholarship since 
writers focused on attracting attention to the island rather than pleasing existing investors. These 
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dynamics saw writers “less constrained by the demands of reference and plausibility,” and more 
likely to make broad claims about the importance or dangers of specific environmental 
attributes.39  
Fuller built upon this approach in “Images of English Origins in Newfoundland and 
Roanoke” and Remembering the Early Modern Voyage by exploring how Newfoundland, as one 
of the first English colonies in America, “offers the story of an origin not only rejected, but never 
really proposed.”40 Examining the gap that Quinn identified between economic importance and 
cultural awareness, and advancing Innis’s argument about the lack of a central trade hub, Fuller 
argued that the fishery and lack of a dominant town limited opportunities for the development of 
local writers and politicians who could promote the island. This lack of local development and 
the perception of fishing voyages as less prestigious investments limited both historical and 
current awareness of Newfoundland.41 
 Anne Prescott, a specialist in English Renaissance literature, takes a different approach 
from Quinn’s and Fuller’s by studying how Renaissance literature influenced the promotion of 
the island. In “Relocating Terra Firma: William Vaughan’s Newfoundland,” Prescott examines 
how the promotional works by the lawyer and colonial investor William Vaughan, particularly 
The Golden Fleece, fit into a wider literary trend of using classical myths and symbols to 
promote colonization schemes. Rather than defining Newfoundland by its differences from 
neighboring regions, as Quinn and Fuller did, Prescott uses Vaughan’s texts as an example of the 
style and imagery used by Europeans to promote America. Additionally, Prescott presented a 
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counterpoint to Quinn’s and Fuller’s arguments that Newfoundland attracted little interest from 
politicians, merchants and writers beyond those involved in the fishery. She points out that 
Vaughan was connected to prominent lawmakers and merchants to whom he promoted 
Newfoundland or whose efforts to colonize the island he praised. Prescott’s analysis raises 
questions about whether fishing reduced English interest in Newfoundland, or whether the island 
received less attention from writers since fishing was a familiar industry in England that was not 
seen as a risky or unusual investment compared to newer ventures in other regions in America, 
such as New England.42 
Quinn’s, Fuller’s and Prescott’s works are uninterested in whether English policymakers 
and merchants actively resisted Newfoundland’s colonization. Instead, all three scholars present 
Newfoundland’s fishery and natural environment as the reason that it differed from 
contemporary English colonies. These findings support Matthews’s and Head’s argument that 
the concept of an oppressive merchant and political class that slowed Newfoundland’s economic 
and political growth is without merit. Quinn, Prescott and Fuller found that English actions in 
Newfoundland were motivated by an interest in either developing colonies or investing in the 
fishery, not limiting the island’s English population’s economic or social growth. Although there 
were efforts to establish economically diverse colonies in Newfoundland, the fishery’s long 
history, value and the lack of excitement it inspired meant that the island was both an important 
part of England’s growing empire and a place that did not attract the same amount of attention 
other region did.43  
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Although historians have criticized the idea that English politicians and merchants 
opposed economic and political development, their findings lead to another question: how did 
merchants and politicians in England perceive Newfoundland? Many events during the 
seventeenth century, such as the failed 1675 attempt by the government to evict Newfoundland’s 
English inhabitants, have received little detailed scholarly attention, making it difficult to 
decipher the purpose and reasoning behind these actions. This dissertation seeks to resolve this 
issue by focusing on the seventeenth century as a period of learning regarding Newfoundland. A 
focus on how English merchants and politicians, from 1610 to 1699, developed ideas about 
Newfoundland’s natural environment and economic value and reassessed those ideas when they 
encountered resistance, offers new perspectives into the English colonization of the island and 
understandings of the Atlantic World. 44   
Newfoundland’s Natural Environment 
 Some background about Newfoundland’s natural environment is necessary to clarify the 
challenges it posed to English efforts during the seventeenth century. Newfoundland, a 108,000 
km2 island off the eastern coast of Canada, represents an area of geological and geographical 
convergence. Newfoundland’s landscape developed from the meeting of four tectonic zones that, 
after the Ice Age, emerged as a rocky land with shallow acidic topsoil.45 The land is covered in 
boreal forests, barrens, peat and scrublands, with forests along the shoreline giving away to 
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barrens and bogs inland, particularly on the Avalon Peninsula, the area that English fishers and 
colonists used the most during the seventeenth century.46  
Shallow surface soil reduces the area suitable for European-style agriculture, with few 
regions capable of sustaining grains, legumes or other staple crops. Soil conditions allow small-
scale farming, such as kitchen gardens containing root crops, but make large-scale agriculture 
difficult.47 As detailed by Head and Wynn, the lack of arable soil or other natural resources that 
could be developed by colonists encouraged the creation of small, widely dispersed settlements, 
since natural resources upon which the viability of a community relied, could not be increased 
through development. Newfoundland’s harbours contained a limited amount of shore space, and 
fishing grounds could become crowded or overfished, precluding the type development seen in 
lands with fertile soil or minerals, where new land could be cleared for agriculture or mining. 
These limitations encouraged fishers to spread out along the coast to ensure that they had 
sufficient space and access to fishing grounds.48  
In the seventeenth century, Newfoundland had thirteen indigenous mammal species 
(including black bear, beaver, wolves, caribou, pine marten and mink), a smaller number than its 
neighboring regions on the continent, such as Labrador, with thirty-six. Aquatic birds, such as 
Atlantic puffins, common murres and the now-extinct Great Auk, nested along the coast, and 
harp seals used the spring ice floes as breeding grounds.49 Europeans hunted these species 
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opportunistically during the seventeenth century for furs to sell and meat to use as bait and 
food.50 
Another convergence accompanies the landscape: the Gulf Stream meets the Labrador 
Current near the eastern coast of Newfoundland over a series of underwater plateaus, the largest 
of which is the Grand Banks. This ocean region supports a marine food chain fuelled by the 
meeting of nutrients from the cold Labrador Current and the warm waters of the Gulf Stream. 
Atlantic cod is the best-known species to benefit from this convergence. Capelin and crustaceans 
thrive in the waters surrounding Newfoundland, providing enough food to support a large 
population of cod. Marine biologist George Rose estimates that during the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries the cod population around Newfoundland had a total mass between six and 
seven million tons.51 
Expectations of Newfoundland’s climate and challenges to those preconceptions played a 
central role in shaping early colonization efforts. Because of its latitude, which runs between 51° 
and 46°, promoters expected Newfoundland to have a temperate climate similar to that of 
southern England and northern France. This idea, applied by Europeans in the sixteenth- and 
seventeenth centuries to make sense of the climate and geography of regions about which it had 
little firsthand information, proved incorrect.52 Although there are yearly fluctuations based on 
ocean and air currents and other trends, the winters in Newfoundland tend to be long and cold, 
with ice extending off much of the island’s coast. During the summer, fog and storms are 
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frequent along the Avalon Peninsula, with high precipitation and cool temperatures being 
common.53  
The English Fisheries in Newfoundland 
 Newfoundland’s cod stocks drove European interest in the island after Cabot’s reports 
about the island in 1497. Beginning in the early sixteenth century, English, Portuguese, Basque, 
French, Dutch and Spanish fishing ships began to visit Newfoundland in the spring and summer 
to catch cod. The initially smaller English fishery increased in size and proportion of European 
fishers in Newfoundland during the latter half of the sixteenth century when economic 
disruptions and wars, such as the defeat of the Spanish Armada, reduced the number of 
Portuguese, Basque and Spanish ships. England and France were the two largest participants in 
the Newfoundland fishery by the seventeenth century.54  
The English fishery used three methods of catching and trading cod: the migratory, 
inhabitant and by-boat fisheries. The migratory fishery, the oldest of the three, developed during 
the sixteenth century. The inhabitant fishery followed the establishment of Cuper’s Cove in 
1610. The by-boat fishery first appeared in government records in 1660, but likely developed 
during the Interregnum from 1649 to 1660. All three methods focused on producing dry-salted 
cod, which used a combination of dehydration and salting to preserve fish. This technique, which 
produces a product that is easy to store and long-lasting, requires space on shore or platforms 
called flakes to spread fish out to dry, but requires less salt than other preservation techniques do. 
Once the cod was preserved, merchants shipped and sold it in fifty-kilogram bundles called 
quintals. Dry-salting was not the only method of preserving cod. The off-shore bank fishery, 
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dominated by the French during the seventeenth century, used a wet-cure method involving large 
quantities of salt and no dehydration. Wet-cured cod was not as widely consumed as dry-salted 
cod, with Paris being the main market. The English fisheries typically did not use the wet-cure 
method since dry-salted cod was more marketable in Iberia, Italy and the Caribbean. They did, 
however, use this method if there was not enough time to dry the fish before leaving 
Newfoundland, often with the intention of drying it once it arrived at market.55  
The differences between the three English fisheries lie in how they transported 
themselves to Newfoundland and their fish to market, and their relationship with merchant 
capital in England. The migratory fishery, made up of ships financed by merchants, with most 
ships and crews originating in the West Country, was the largest of the three fisheries in the 
seventeenth century. The exact size of the English migratory fishery during much of the 
seventeenth century is unclear. The number of ships engaged in the fishery fluctuated yearly in 
accordance with changing economic, environmental and political conditions. Keith Matthews 
estimated that in 1620 around 200 English ships participated in the fishery. In 1675, a year when 
fishing fleets were reduced by wartime losses and poor catches, John Berry, the naval 
commander in Newfoundland, reported 174 English fishing ships. Migratory ships carried 
fishing boats, supplies and labourers from England to Newfoundland each year in spring to catch 
and cure fish until they filled their cargo holds, leaving in the late summer or early fall to sell 
their fish. In addition to being the most extensively practiced of the three methods, the migratory 
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fishery began to operate in Newfoundland during the early sixteenth century, a century before 
the other two methods developed.56 
The inhabitant and by-boat fisheries both developed during the seventeenth century as the 
population of English inhabitants grew and the number of trade ships travelling to and from the 
island increased. English residents in Newfoundland operated the inhabitant fishery, often in the 
hierarchical structure of planters who owned the buildings, boats and supplies needed for fishing, 
and servants employed by planters to catch and cure cod. As the English population in 
Newfoundland grew during seventeenth- and eighteenth century, women became increasingly 
important sources of labour for the inhabitant fishery, often replacing hired servants in the 
management of the curing process. Rather than transporting their fish to market themselves, 
planters sold their catches to migratory fishing ships or trade ships, but there were cases of 
planters owning and hiring trade ships for their own use. Planters also developed niche industries 
that served the migratory fishery, such as selling alcohol and provisions to fishers, storing salt 
and tackle for ships, and building shore facilities and fishing boats.57 
The by-boat fishery was a variant of the migratory fishery. Rather than operating from a 
dedicated ship that transported the crew, supplies and catch to Newfoundland from England, as 
was typical in the traditional migratory fishery, by-boat fishers bought passage to Newfoundland 
on trade ships and worked independently once there. Instead of transporting their catches to 
market themselves, as the traditional migratory fishery did, by-boat fishers sold their catches to 
trade ships in Newfoundland before returning to England. The owners of these boats, called by-
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boat keepers, were often experienced fishers who hired their crews in England and worked 
alongside them in Newfoundland, leveraging their knowledge of the fishery to find good fishing 
grounds, keep their operating costs low and sell their catches. By-boat keepers often worked with 
little or no financial backing from fishing merchants because of their lower overhead costs. 
Although the exact origins of the by-boat fishery are unknown, it appears to have been developed 
during the Interregnum by entrepreneurial West Country fishers who had previously worked on 
migratory fishing ships.58 
 
Figure 1 The Equipment, Facilities and Labour Employed by the English Cod Fishery 
 
Herman Moll, “A View of a Stage and Also of the Manner of Fishing For, Curing and Drying Cod at New Found 
Land,” (London, 1718), Library and Archives Canada, NMC 8931. 
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The migratory, inhabitant and by-boat fisheries all used the same basic method to 
produce dry-salted cod, using small boats and curing the fish on shore. Typically, three people 
manned a fishing boat: a boat’s master who had several years’ experience fishing in 
Newfoundland, a midshipman who typically had two or more years’ experience, and a freshman, 
also referred to as a greenman, who had little or no prior experience fishing in Newfoundland. 
During the seventeenth century, cod was caught using handlines with weighted hooks and nets 
were used to catch baitfish. It was not until the nineteenth century that English fishers used cod 
traps and other net-based methods for catching cod. On shore, workers processed the fish by 
gutting it, removing the spine, laying it out flat on beach stones or flakes and salting it. Of these 
on-shore workers, splitters, who removed the cod’s spine and ribs, and salters, who managed the 
salting process, were skilled workers. James Yonge, a surgeon from Plymouth who spent several 
summers in Newfoundland during the 1660’s, wrote that an experienced splitter could process 
four-hundred and eighty cod in half an hour, and was a necessary part of an efficient fishing 
operation. Salters ensured that cod received the right amount of salt, a delicate process: too little 
salt caused the fish to spoil quickly while too much burned the flesh and caused discolouration, 
reducing its value.59 
Research and Methodology 
 Archival research for this dissertation was conducted in the United Kingdom and Canada, 
with additional sources collected from online repositories and published documents, such as 
promotional pamphlets. The goal of this research was to find discussions about Newfoundland 
between merchants, government officials, fishers and others involved in colonizing the island, 
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fishing there or developing policies to govern it. A focus on discussions about Newfoundland in 
England provides insight into the changing understanding of the island’s natural resources and 
climate, and their contribution to policy and business development during the seventeenth 
century.  
 The majority of the primary sources analyzed come from the National Archives in Kew, 
the British Library in London, the University of Nottingham’s Department of Manuscripts and 
Special Collections and the Plymouth and West Devon Record Office collected during a research 
trip in 2014. At these archives, I gathered sources by merchants, investors, colonists, members of 
the Navy, government officials and others involved in colonizing, fishing and governing 
Newfoundland. Additional primary sources come from the Maritime History Archive located at 
Memorial University of Newfoundland’s St. John’s campus. This archive contains investor 
records, legal documents, manuscripts and other specialized collections regarding Newfoundland 
history. I accessed sources in St. John’s in 2009-2010 as part of my master’s research at 
Memorial University and also during a visit in 2013.  
 Not all of the research comes from archives. Facsimile copies of promotional works, such 
as the colonist and writer Richard Whitbourne’s Discourse and Discovery of the New-Found-
Land were also used. Memorial University’s Digital Archive Initiative hosts digitized copies of 
promotional texts such as the lawyer and promoter William Vaughan’s The Golden Fleece.60 
Edited collections of primary sources, particularly the Calendar of State Papers Colonial, 
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America and West Indies series and historian Gillian Cell’s collection Newfoundland Discovered, 
are especially important sources of documents outside of the scope of this archival research.61 
 These sources were catalogued in a database by keywords, such as names, places, topics 
and dates, to identify documents for further analysis and trace relationships between sources in 
separate archives. After cataloguing the sources, additional layers of information were created by 
locating clusters of documents that contained similar keywords and examining the issues and 
events discussed within them. This keyword analysis provided insight into the relationship 
between specific individuals, issues and events by connecting documents in separate series and 
collections. Although every chapter uses this method, chapter four, which examines the 
development of the 1675 order to evict all English inhabitants from Newfoundland, epitomizes it 
by identifying and connecting individuals, ideas and issues from multiple series of sources to 
explore a previously under-studied event. 
 In addition to the database, analyses of texts and the transcription and analysis of 
documents were required. Discourse analyses provide in-depth information about specific 
sources, individuals and topics. These approaches were often complemented by database analysis 
to contextualize documents. This method is best seen in chapter two, which uses a discourse 
analysis of promotional texts to guide its study of how writers depicted Newfoundland’s natural 
environment to potential investors and database analysis to link those works to specific 
enterprises and individuals. 
Limitations 
There are constraints and other issues related to the source base used here. The 
documentary evidence about Newfoundland, while extensive, is almost entirely the product of 
                                                          
61 Gillian Cell, ed., Newfoundland Discovered : English Attempts At Colonisation, 1610-1630 (London: Hakluyt 
Society, 1982). 
29 
 
merchants, government officials or the military. The majority of fishers, planters and others who 
went to Newfoundland yearly or resided there did not leave behind written documents. There are 
exceptions, such as depositions by fishers, but these are mostly legal documents designed to 
answer questions about specific issues, limiting their ability to address general topics about how 
those who fished and lived in Newfoundland perceived the island. As a result of these 
limitations, this dissertation should be viewed as an account of upper-class English merchants’, 
writers’ and politicians’ perceptions of Newfoundland, although when possible the perspectives 
of planters, fishers and sailors are considered.62  
There are also significant gaps in the records resulting from political events that reduced 
the number of sources produced or surviving. One such gap lies in the sources during the 
Interregnum of 1649 to 1660. The lack of government-led efforts to examine the island that 
defined later periods, as well as the lack of investor and promotional networks that backed earlier 
ventures, resulted in fewer sources being written about English experience in Newfoundland 
during the Interregnum. During this period, the English population of Newfoundland grew, with 
residents using new practices to profit and survive there, but they did so without receiving formal 
charters or grants to establish their plantations. Many of the residents who arrived in 
Newfoundland during this period left few written records of their own, and the chaotic political 
situation in England meant that those people and the practices they employed received relatively 
little attention in comparison to the periods of 1610 to 1640 and 1660 to 1699.63 Depositions, 
wills and other sources produced during and after this period provide some information, but the 
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number of sources available in total is smaller than the period preceding and following these 
eleven years.64 
 The absence of written documents by fishers, planters and sailors, and periods are not the 
only gaps in the sources regarding Newfoundland. The Beothuk, Inuit and Mi’kmaq are 
underrepresented and often absent from the surviving documents, reflecting both the infrequent 
contact between the English and the indigenous peoples of Newfoundland and that the same 
fishers and sailors who left few written records were the Europeans most frequently in contact 
with those peoples. The Beothuk resided mostly along the northern coast of Newfoundland 
stretching from Conception Bay westward. Historian Ralph Pastore estimates that by 1500 there 
may have been 1000 Beothuk in Newfoundland. The Beothuk interacted with English ships and 
residents throughout the sixteenth- and seventeenth centuries through trade, competition and 
conflict, but those relationships seem sporadic with few instances recorded of English merchants 
or writers contacting either people.65 When John Guy, the governor of Cuper’s Cove, met a 
group of Beothuk traders in 1612, he found evidence of trade with other Europeans, such as the 
presence of a copper kettle and sail canvas, indicating a history not reflected in the surviving 
written sources. However, conflict and competition for resources led to the Beothuk moving 
away from the areas used by European fishers, a trend that contributed to a decline in awareness 
of them in England over the seventeenth century.66 English interactions with the Beothuk were 
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either so infrequent or unreported that English merchants claimed in 1639 that only European 
fishers and colonists lived in Newfoundland.67  
The Mi’kmaq concentrated along the southern coast of Newfoundland and maintained 
closer relationships with the French than the English. There are few English accounts about the 
Mi’kmaq in Newfoundland other than those regarding the French commander Pierre Le Moyne 
d’Iberville’s Avalon campaign in 1696-1697, which included a detachment of Mi’kmaq allies. 
The absence of written records regarding the Mi’kmaq in Newfoundland during the sixteenth- 
and seventeenth centuries is so severe that historian Charles Martjin notes it has created “a 
tendency in some quarters to automatically interpret scarcity of evidence as signifying the 
absence of the Mi’kmaq at an early date.”68  
The Inuit resided in Labrador and the Great Northern Peninsula, and were frequently in 
contact and conflict with Basque whaling and French fishing ships during the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries. Pressure for control over natural resources in those regions resulted in 
what Pope called a nearly two-hundred-year guerrilla war between the Inuit and the French. 
English fishing ships rarely travelled in these regions from 1610 to 1699, and there were no 
English plantations on the Great Northern Peninsula during the seventeenth century, leading to 
little discussion about the Inuit by the English in this period.69 
 These gaps in the sources demonstrate not only the difficulty of researching seventeenth-
century Newfoundland but also how the political and social structure of early-modern England 
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obscured certain experiences from upper-class English merchants, writers and politicians. The 
dearth of sources by migratory fishers and English residents in Newfoundland, the two groups 
with the most experience regarding Newfoundland’s natural environment and the Beothuk and 
Mi’kmaq, reflected the lower social and economic status of these fishers and residents in English 
society. The observations about Newfoundland that influenced policymakers, investors and 
merchants came mostly from explorers, naval commanders or successful traders, reflecting what 
Pickstone identifies as a tendency among early practitioners of Natural Historical Ways of 
Knowing to be composed mostly of “pedigree people.”70 Although there are opportunities to 
overcome these gaps by using depositions and archaeological records, English trade with the 
Beothuk and Mi’kmaq, as well as how English fishers, ship captains and others perceived 
Newfoundland, remain difficult to study. 
This dissertation does not examine documents about the English in Newfoundland 
written by other Europeans. Spanish, Portuguese, Basque, French and Dutch ships all went to 
Newfoundland to catch and trade cod during the sixteenth- and seventeenth centuries, and France 
established colonies there from 1662. Sources written by government officials, merchants and 
others from these regions could provide valuable information about the English colonization of 
Newfoundland, but linguistic barriers limited opportunities to explore primary sources related to 
these issues. Additionally, historians have concentrated either on how other European fisheries 
operated, such as Laurier Turgeon’s work on the French fishery, or how Newfoundland cod was 
traded within Europe, as seen in Darlene Abreu-Ferreira’s study of English merchant 
communities in Portugal. Although both of these approaches offer insight into the ways in which 
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Europeans interacted with early-modern Newfoundland, they do not examine European 
perceptions of the island’s natural environment or resident population.71 
Structure of the Argument 
 This dissertation is divided into two parts composed of three chapters each. Part One 
covers the period from 1610, the first English colonization effort in Newfoundland, to 1674, 
when the government began to take a direct role in managing the island. During this period 
English efforts concentrated on determining what industries could succeed in Newfoundland, 
starting with ventures focused on developing multiple land-based industries, such as farming and 
mining. By 1674, planters, policymakers and others had tested and discarded early assumptions 
that Newfoundland had abundant terrestrial natural resources and identified the fishery as the 
island’s sole major industry. Chapter One examines the Newfoundland Company’s establishment 
of Cuper’s Cove in 1610, the first English colony in Newfoundland, and shows how the 
Company promoted Newfoundland to investors as a place with many natural resources and a 
temperate climate, and how reports about the colony changed as early efforts to establish 
agriculture, mines and trade with the Beothuk failed. Cuper’s Cove was the first colony to test 
the idea that Newfoundland’s climate and natural resources could be used to create a profitable 
and self-sustaining colony.72 The failure of these experiments to create an economically diverse 
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colony caused disruptions in the Company. Its inability to adjust its practices to the conditions it 
encountered caused investors and colonists to leave Cuper’s Cove.73  
 To compensate for Cuper’s Cove’s inability to become profitable, its backers sold titles to 
land in Newfoundland to individuals interested in establishing their own colonies. This second 
wave of colonization efforts, stretching from 1616 to 1630, and the promotional literature that 
influenced it, form the subject of Chapter Two. These promotional texts, written by merchants 
and sailors with experience either in Newfoundland or investing in colonies, advocated a plan 
similar to the one used at Cuper’s Cove based on the same assumptions that the island’s natural 
environment could support an economically diverse colony. Instead of changing their 
expectations for Newfoundland, these writers blamed the failure of Cuper’s Cove on 
organizational problems within the Newfoundland Company, and prescribed plans to colonize 
Newfoundland that encouraged investors to manage their efforts personally, rather than relying 
on a corporation to colonize the island. However, as with Cuper’s Cove, promises of fertile soil, 
mineral deposits and a temperate climate did not reflect reality. None of the colonization projects 
launched during this period met the expectations of their backers. By 1629, English investors and 
planters had abandoned these efforts to create economically diverse colonies.74  
 Following the failure of these colonization efforts, government policies and private 
ventures shifted their efforts to managing and maximizing the catching and trading of cod. This 
change demonstrated the flexibility of English assumptions about Newfoundland’s natural 
resources as expectations of abundant and varied terrestrial resources were replaced by practices 
that targeted a single marine resource. Chapter Three examines the period from 1634, when the 
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Western Charter, the first set of government regulations for Newfoundland, was created, to 1674, 
the year before the government attempted to evict all English inhabitants from the island. During 
this period, planters, fishers and merchants created new methods of using the transatlantic cod 
trade to make Newfoundland both habitable and profitable year-round. These developments, 
demonstrated by the merchant and planter David Kirke’s tenure as governor of Ferryland, 
contributed to a series of disputes about the regulation of Newfoundland, who had authority over 
the fishery, and what benefits the island created for England. The actions taken by policymakers, 
planters and merchants during this period re-imagined Newfoundland’s natural environment and 
its value as a colonial possession in response to the failure of prior expectations that the island 
could host multiple industries.75 
 Part Two focuses on the period from 1675 to 1699. During these twenty-four years, the 
English government became active in managing the island and collecting information about its 
residents and natural environment, and focused on developing policy solutions to problems of 
lawlessness and economic instability in Newfoundland. This approach differed from the period 
preceding 1675, when the government delegated authority to fishing ships and private ventures, 
rather than dedicating its resources to managing the island. Throughout these efforts, 
Newfoundland’s natural environment and the colonization practices that succeeded there 
challenged policymakers. These practices, while successful in making Newfoundland habitable 
and profitable for Europeans, also made it difficult to control.76  
The fourth chapter analyzes the creation and failed implementation of the 1675 order to 
evict all English inhabitants from Newfoundland. This order represented the government’s 
largest intervention in Newfoundland to that point and marked the introduction of a series of new 
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information collection and analysis techniques for managing the island. Working from the 
assumption that the fishery was the main industry in Newfoundland, policymakers sought to 
develop a new means of managing the island that accounted for both the difficulties of governing 
it and created the most benefits from the fishery for England. However, the methods used to 
learn about Newfoundland led to inaccurate conclusions about English colonists, how they used 
the island’s natural environment and the relationship between the resident and migratory 
fisheries. These complications caused the commander in charge of the eviction to disobey his 
orders and allow the inhabitants to remain.77  
 Chapter Five examines the government’s response to the failure of the eviction order and 
its efforts to learn about the island’s natural environment, economy and English residents and 
resolve issues there. Following the failure of the 1675 eviction order, and continuing until 
d’Iberville’s invasion of the Newfoundland in 1696, colonial administrators developed new 
processes of examining social and economic issues in Newfoundland and creating regulations 
that better reflected the challenges of managing the island. These inquiries used new sources of 
information collected directly from Newfoundland, such as reports by naval commanders and 
planters, to give administrators more control over what data they collected and reduced their 
reliance on merchants in England to inform their decisions. Throughout this process, officials 
sought to learn about Newfoundland, test their assumptions about how residents and fishers used 
the island’s natural environment and determined how to deploy their resources to protect and 
grow the fishery effectively. 
Chapter Six examines the French invasion of the English shore in the winter of 1696-
1697 and its influence on the creation of King William’s Act. This attack offered an opportunity 
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for English authorities to reshape England’s involvement in Newfoundland. With 
Newfoundland’s English inhabitants forcibly removed by the French, English merchants, naval 
commanders and policymakers considered how they could address high crime rates, 
deforestation and other chronic issues in Newfoundland by changing the distribution of 
inhabitants and the governance of the island. King William’s Act’s creators took these questions 
into account by defining the fishery as Newfoundland’s sole valuable industry and creating a 
series of regulations to protect and grow that industry. The Act dealt with questions about land 
rights, forest use, shore access and law enforcement by considering how Newfoundland’s 
terrestrial natural resources were used to extract marine resources, and how the use of the island 
made standard approaches to governing colonial spaces, such as a centralized governor, 
unsuitable there. In answering these questions, policymakers enshrined the idea that while the 
cod fishery was Newfoundland’s main industry, the land was vital for the fishery’s success and 
needed to be managed to ensure that English fishers had access to the shore space, natural 
resources and protection required to carry out the fishery.78 
The learning process that defined the English experience in Newfoundland during the 
seventeenth century frustrated the ambitions of merchants and policymakers more often than it 
provided clear answers. Early plans to transform Newfoundland into an economically diverse 
colony gave way to more accurate ideas about what sorts of industries it could support, their 
value to England and the challenges of both colonizing and managing the island. By 1699, 
English perceptions of Newfoundland’s natural environment and its economic value had 
undergone a dramatic change. Writers, politicians and merchants no longer portrayed 
Newfoundland as a land to be shaped into an economically diverse colony by waves of colonists 
and investors; nor was it merely a convenient place for fishing ships to land and cure their 
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catches. Instead, Newfoundland was something between a fishing station and colony, a place 
with a permanent English population but whose greatest perceived benefits to England came 
from its ability to support the seasonal migratory fishery. By the end of the seventeenth century, 
English merchants, politicians and planters understood the limitations and opportunities afforded 
by Newfoundland’s natural environment better than they had previously done, but they had 
gained that knowledge through eighty-nine years of hard-earned experience.79 
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Part 1  
Encountering Newfoundland: Testing Assumptions about Newfoundland’s Climate, 
Natural Environment and Economic Value, 1610-1674 
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Chapter 1 
When Words are not Enough: The Promotion of Cuper’s Cove, Newfoundland, 1610-1621 
In 1610, the Bristol and London Company of Merchant Adventurers, better known as the 
Newfoundland Company, established a plantation in Cuper’s Cove, now named Cupids, on the 
southern shore of Conception Bay. The Company based its plans for colonizing Newfoundland 
on preconceptions about its natural environment established during the sixteenth century. Those 
assumptions led the Company’s planners to believe that Newfoundland had a temperate climate 
and abundant natural resources that could support farms and mines. These ideas made Cuper’s 
Cove appealing to English investors, but by 1621 the Newfoundland Company’s investors and 
colonists realized that they did not translate into a viable business. The Company’s strategy of 
growing crops, finding minerals and trading with the Beothuk precluded it from focusing on the 
cod fishery, leading to its inability to become profitable when these anticipated industries and 
trades failed. By following the idea that Newfoundland could support farms and other on-land 
industries, Cuper’s Cove initiated a period that continued until 1674, of English politicians, 
merchants and planters testing assumptions about the island’s climate and natural resources and 
then interpreting the feedback. The knowledge about Newfoundland gained from these efforts 
shifted English colonies and policies to shift away from developing land-based industries to 
focus on the fishery.1 
This chapter examines the Newfoundland Company’s efforts in Newfoundland and the 
portrayal of its actions to English investors in four sections. The first section discusses the 
Company before the colonization of Cuper’s Cove in 1610, and why Newfoundland attracted 
investment from English merchants, tradespeople and others. The second section follows the 
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establishment and early years of Cuper’s Cove from 1610 to 1612. During this period, the 
Company pursued a program of planting crops, searching for minerals and fishing, reporting 
some successes. The third section examines the Company’s exchange with Beothuk traders in the 
fall of 1612. Although the exchange was the most widely publicized action that the Company 
undertook, it brought attention to reports of failed crops, harsh weather and mismanagement. The 
fourth section begins with the winter of 1613, a severe winter which marked the beginning of the 
decline in the Company’s efforts and number of investors. Although the Company existed until 
1631, by 1621 its operations had largely ended with the departure of John Mason, its second 
governor. Throughout its efforts to colonize Newfoundland, the Company based its operations on 
investors’ belief in assumptions formed during the sixteenth century about the island’s natural 
environment and the industries that could succeed there.2 
By 1610, England was still a new participant in the European colonization of America. 
Roanoke, founded in 1585, had failed in 1590, and Jamestown, established in 1607, was three 
years into its existence. Unlike Roanoke’s and Jamestown’s planners, who portrayed their 
colonies as designed to create collective social, political and economic benefits for England, the 
Newfoundland Company’s leaders depicted their enterprise solely as a business venture meant to 
profit its investors.3 This focus, particularly in its promotional efforts, contrasts what historian 
Andrew Fitzmaurice identified as the humanist motivation for English colonization: the creation 
of social, political and economic benefits for England as a whole, an argument supported by the 
promotional efforts of Jamestown’s and Roanoke’s backers. These advantages, which 
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Fitzmaurice defined as “greatness,” were not the only motives for colonization, but colonial 
promoters and planners often avoided the topic of personal profitability in the early seventeenth 
century because it conflicted with the message that colonization served England’s collective 
interests.4 The Newfoundland Company’s charter, as granted by King James I, did include social 
and political goals, such as expanding the English realm, but these objectives did not enter into 
the Company’s depictions of its efforts. Instead, the Company offered a different view of the 
promotion of America, one that aligns with historian Kenneth Andrews’s argument that 
European expansion was “fundamentally a commercial movement,” in which investors 
prioritized the economic potential of a venture over other perceived benefits.5  
In the Company’s view, Newfoundland resembled England, in that could host industries 
familiar to English investors, making it a potentially profitable place to colonize. This tactic was 
not unique to the Newfoundland Company. Other colonial ventures and promoters, such as the 
explorer, soldier and admiral of New England John Smith’s portrayal of Virginia, used similar 
ideas to promote projects, but they often layered their depictions with arguments for the social 
and political benefits of colonization, something the Company did not do.6 By focusing on the 
development of familiar industries, as well as similarities between Newfoundland’s and 
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England’s natural environments, the Company worked to assure its investors that Cuper’s Cove 
was a safe and profitable venture.7 
Although the Newfoundland Company focused its efforts on turning a profit for its 
investors, English government officials still expected it to advance their colonial goals. The 
migratory fishery operated outside of the system of colonial charters that defined early 
colonization efforts in Newfoundland, making it an essential part of the English presence in 
Newfoundland, but limited its ability to advance English officials’ interests in solidifying their 
claim to the island. The charter granted to the Newfoundland Company by King James I was 
predicated on the idea that Newfoundland was an English possession, an idea supported by 
Humphrey Gilbert’s claim of the island in 1583 and his failed attempt to establish a colony in 
America. However, as historian Patricia Seed argued, for English politicians and advocates of 
colonizing America, the act of cultivating crops and building houses were central to the actual 
act of possessing colonial lands. The physical alteration of local environments to accommodate 
English practices and people, more so than a single ceremony, gave colonists and policymakers a 
permanent claim to that land and prevented others from encroaching upon it.8  
The English migratory fishery, although well-established by 1610, built only temporary 
structures and ships rarely used the same harbours from year to year, making it a poor method for 
maintaining England’s claim to the island, something that the Newfoundland Company’s 
plantations would rectify. The Newfoundland Company’s focus on developing land-based 
natural resources made it well suited for enforcing England’s claim to Newfoundland. Unlike the 
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migratory fishery, the Company’s efforts, while directed at profiting its investors, were meant to 
create a permanent English presence that could both defend against interlopers and support 
England’s claim to the island. This meeting of private interest in colonization and official interest 
in asserting England’s right to possess that space was not unique to Newfoundland. As Seed 
noted, similar trends emerged in Ireland, New England and other regions where cultivating, 
enclosing and building on land became symbols of English ownership.9 
As one of the first English colonies in America and the first settlement in Newfoundland, 
Cuper’s Cove, and its influence on English colonial policies and practices, has been a subject of 
study by both Atlantic historians and Newfoundland historians. For Newfoundland historian 
Gillian Cell and geographer Alan Williams, Cuper’s Cover marked the beginning of the 
transition from a seasonal fishery to a permanent onshore English population, and both explored 
how merchants and politicians in England conceptualized and established it.10 Atlantic historians 
have argued that English merchants’ and politicians’ knowledge of Newfoundland’s fishery 
made Cuper’s Cove an often-forgotten contemporary of Jamestown and Roanoke, and they have 
studied it in the wider context of the colonization of America. David Quinn and Mary Fuller note 
that fishing and trade routes between England and Newfoundland during the sixteenth century 
made Newfoundland a known space to English political and economic elites without generating 
the same amount of attention from colonial promoters that Roanoke or Jamestown received. This 
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familiarity made Newfoundland seem a land of great wealth for English investors but a poor 
source of compelling narratives or ambitious plans.11  
This chapter bridges the two approaches by examining how the Newfoundland Company 
based its efforts on the idea that Newfoundland’s climate and natural resources resembled 
England’s. This depiction of Newfoundland made colonization appear to be a practical plan with 
a high chance of success but was based on faulty assumptions that prevented the Company from 
focusing on the island’s one established industry, the fishery. The familiarity of the fishery, 
combined with the Newfoundland Company’s failure, made the colonization of Newfoundland 
an important event in England’s colonial history that challenged assumptions about the island’s 
natural environment, but also one that failed to attract the same amount of attention from 
contemporaries and later writers.12 
 The most extensive surviving sources regarding the Newfoundland Company are the 
letters of Percival Willoughby, one of the company’s major investors, held at the University of 
Nottingham. Willoughby sent his own agents and son to Newfoundland to oversee his 
investments, giving him access to multiple sources of information about the venture, including 
the Company’s own portrayal of its efforts, reports from his agents and comments from other 
investors. Outside of Willoughby’s letters, there are few surviving sources about the 
Newfoundland Company. A journal kept by John Guy, the Newfoundland Company’s first 
governor, during his voyage to Trinity Bay is in the Lambeth Palace Library in London and was 
published in full by Gillian Cell in Newfoundland Discovered. Additionally, the publisher 
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Samuel Purchas included descriptions of Cuper’s Cove and the exchange with the Beothuk in 
Purchas his Pilgrimage or Relations of the World. In 1620, Mason wrote the Brief Discourse of 
the New-Found-Land, the only promotional tract about Newfoundland to come from one of the 
Company’s members. An examination of these sources reveals that the Company worked to 
promote itself and placate investors by focusing on the development of familiar industries in 
Newfoundland and the potential for profits from its efforts.13 
The Newfoundland Company 1609-1610 
 In 1609, James I granted the Newfoundland Company a charter to establish plantations in 
Newfoundland. Rather than focusing on the cod fishery, the Company’s backers expected these 
plantations to support a range of land-based industries such as agriculture, mining and trade with 
the Beothuk. The Company did not neglect the cod fishery, but expected fishing to supplement 
provisions and provide a trade good while other industries developed, instead of forming the 
basis of the plantation’s operations. This approach utilized the received knowledge about 
Newfoundland and built upon expectations that the island could host an economically diversified 
plantation. Although these expectations had, to an extent, familiarized Newfoundland to English 
observers, for whom the island did not offer any unknown resources, the Company used these 
preconceptions to engage investors.14  
As a joint-stock company, the Newfoundland Company depended on attracting investors 
to fund its operations, a task that it succeeded at early in its existence. In 1610, the 
Newfoundland Company had fifty known investors, but efforts to retain them profoundly 
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affected its plans.15 The Company’s investors came from multiple social and economic groups, 
and their backgrounds created expectations for its operations and the types of industries it would 
develop. The Company’s treasurer, John Slany, a Bristol-based merchant and lawyer, used these 
expectations to appease investors. He promoted the development of an economically diverse 
colony at Cuper’s Cove, often by promising to develop industries in which investors were 
already involved or which held significant appeal in England, such as mining.16 Mining held an 
especially important place in English arguments for colonizing America in the late sixteenth and 
early seventeenth centuries. The silver and gold that Spain extracted from America pushed 
sixteenth-century English colonial promoters to emphasize the importance of mining for English 
colonization efforts. In 1577, the explorer Martin Frobisher shipped ore samples that he 
incorrectly thought contained gold to England from Baffin Island, and he led a failed attempt to 
establish a colony there in 1578. In 1584, the colonial promoter and publisher Richard Hakluyt 
proposed mining as a major benefit of colonizing America.17 Slany was not the first to promise 
an economically diverse colony in Newfoundland, but unlike Anthony Parkhurst, Stephen 
Parmenius or Edward Hayes, he succeeded in attracting backers. Using his extensive social and 
business network, Slany recruited shareholders by promising reliable profits from a land similar 
to England that was, as yet, undeveloped by Europeans.18  
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A significant number of the Company’s investors had prior experience in the 
Newfoundland cod trade as merchants or tradespeople. Grocers and fishmongers, while not 
directly involved in fishing, were all professions who brought participants into contact with the 
fishery either by supplying provisions or trading fish. Additionally, Williams notes that eleven of 
the investors with no listed professions were merchants from Bristol already involved in the 
Newfoundland fishery, making Cuper’s Cove an extension of their existing investment in the 
island. Not all of the Company’s merchant investors had experience in Newfoundland or 
connections to the fishery. The Company’s shareholder list includes four haberdashers and eight 
merchant tailors. Neither of these professions had any traditional connection to the fishery, but 
they did develop overseas resources and trade connections to supply their businesses, such as 
engaging in the fur trade, making the Newfoundland Company an opportunity to diversify their 
holdings.19 
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Table 1 Investors in the Newfoundland Company, 1610
 
(*) Indicates members of the Company’s Council, (+) indicates merchants from Bristol. Source: "Names of the 
Adventurers to the Newfoundland," 1610, NU, Middleton Mi X 1/1; Williams, Handcock and Sanger, John Guy of 
Bristol and Newfoundland, 287-289 
 
In addition to merchants, the Company listed twelve investors as earls, knights, lords or 
gentlemen, representing twenty-four percent of the total. Percival Willoughby, who held 
extensive farming and mining interests around Nottingham, was the most involved in the 
Company’s operations. Willoughby employed three agents to manage his efforts at 
Newfoundland: Henry Crout, Bartholomew Pearson and Thomas Rowley. Willoughby sent both 
Crout and Pearson to Newfoundland in 1612 to report on the Company’s activities and assess the 
island’s natural resources. Rowley originally went to Newfoundland in 1610 as one of the 
Investor's Name Profession Investor's Name Profession
Henry Howard Earle of Northampton, Keeper of the Privy Seal Phillip Gifford Gentleman
Sir Lawrence Tanfield Knight, Lord Chief Barron of our Exchequer John Whittington Grocer
Sir John Doddridge Knight Edward Allen Fishmonger
Sir Francis Bacon Knight Roberd Alder [Unlisted]+
Sir Daniell Dun Knight Richard Bowdler Merchant Taylor
Sir Walter Coape Knight Mather Haveland [Unlisted]+
Sir Percival Willoughby [Unlisted]* Thomas Jones Merchant Taylor*
Sir John Constable Knight Thomas Allworte [Unlisted]+
John Weld Esquire, Gentleman* Symon Stone Gentleman
William Freeman Clothmaster William Lewis [Unlisted]+
Ralph Freeman Clothmaster* Thomas Allen Gentleman
John Slany Merchant Taylor [Company Treasurer]* John Guy [Unlisted]+
Humfry Slanie haberdasher* William Diggens Mariner
William Turner Salter* Ritchard Hath Wor [Unlisted]+
Robert Kertan Gentleman Thomas Knighton Fishmonger
John Wilde Gentleman* John Langton [Unlisted]+
Richard Fishborne Mercer* John Short Ironmonger
John Bironne Merchant Taylor Humfree Hoocke [Unlisted]+
Humphrye Spencer Haberdasher John Vigars Merchant Taylor
Thomas Juxon Merchant Taylor* Phillip Guy [Unlisted]+
Ellis Crispe Salter John Jaxon Merchant Taylor
Thomas Allport Merchant Taylor William Merideth [Unlisted]+
Francis Nedlilham Haberdasher Ritch Hobbye Haberdasher
William Jones Mariner* John Daughte [Unlisted]+
Thomas Laughton [Unlisted] Abraham Gennings [Unlisted]
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Company’s colonists, and was hired by Willoughby in 1618. Willoughby also sent his son, 
Thomas Willoughby, to the island in 1612 in an effort to reform him after he stole silver from 
Wollaton Hall. Little is known about Thomas outside of his time in Newfoundland and 
transgressions in England, which may have led to him being disowned in 1621, when he 
disappears from the family papers and pedigree.20 
Cell argues that Slany’s influence was likely the reason for Percival Willoughby’s 
investment in the Company. According to Cell, Willoughby joined the Newfoundland Company 
for the dual purpose of pursuing his interest in overseas expansion and to service debts from the 
construction of Wollaton Hall. Slany’s promises of mining and farming in Newfoundland 
attracted Willoughby, who was also influenced by the fact that he owed money to Slany. This 
leverage resulted in a long investment in Newfoundland. Willoughby sent agents to the island to 
search for farmland and ore deposits as late as 1631, making him the last known investor in the 
Company.21 
There is little surviving evidence detailing why other investors joined the Newfoundland 
Company or their involvement in its operations. Cell, examining the Company’s 1610 subscriber 
list, stated that many investors joined the Company to build their social capital as supporters of 
English colonial expansion and to bolster their finances, but often had little interest or influence 
in its activities. Although research into the letters of prominent political figures may yield new 
sources regarding their engagement in the Newfoundland Company, little is known about their 
involvement beyond their purchasing and selling shares. While there is no evidence that these 
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investors directly participated in the Company’s operations, some information about their interest 
in Newfoundland can be gleaned from other sources.22 
One of the most prominent investors in the Newfoundland Company was the statesman 
and philosopher Sir Francis Bacon, and his writings provide some insight into why the Company 
attracted interest from investors. There is no known source by Bacon stating exactly why he 
invested in the Newfoundland Company, but its plan did adhere to his own ideas about how to 
colonize America. Bacon’s 1625 essay “Of Plantations” outlined a plan that matched Slany’s 
portrayal of Newfoundland. Writing nine years after he sold his shares in the Newfoundland 
Company, Bacon argued that colonial ventures, no matter how promising their locations, 
experienced years of losses before becoming profitable and self-sufficient. These rough 
beginnings required companies to develop survival strategies, such as fishing and growing crops, 
before engaging in more lucrative industries.23 Rather than arguing for the need to locate gold, 
silver and other exotic resources, as Hakluyt had done, Bacon emphasized the value of staple 
goods such as salt, furs, pitch and tobacco and minerals such as iron and lead. These goods 
allowed colonists to develop wealth through trade while reducing their reliance on imports from 
England. Bacon’s plan fit the Newfoundland Company’s portrayal of Newfoundland well, 
especially its emphasis on developing agriculture and mines while supplementing its provisions 
and income with cod.24 
The Company’s expectations that Newfoundland could sustain mines and farms did not 
lack support. Parkhurst, Parmenius and Hayes described Newfoundland as having a temperate 
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climate, fertile soil, promising mineral deposits and an abundance of fish, forests and fur-bearing 
animals. There was a significant English fishery in Newfoundland before 1610, but seasonal 
ships were ill-equipped to establish mines or other industries that required permanent shore 
facilities. A permanent English population could develop such resources, and expectations of 
good soil, as well as the proven fishery, meant that a colony could reduce its reliance on 
imported provisions, lowering the Company’s operating costs.25   
Preconceived ideas about Newfoundland’s climate also made it attractive to English 
investors. Using latitude as an indicator of climate, sixteenth- and early seventeenth-century 
writers expected Newfoundland’s climate to resemble that of southern England and northern 
France.26 Guy and Willoughby also perceived the presumed climatic similarity between 
Newfoundland and England as an indicator that the colony would not experience many unusual 
health challenges. Colonists, explorers and investors expected unfamiliar climates, particularly 
tropical climates, to pose greater health risks to English colonists than temperate climates would 
do, since their bodies were unaccustomed to the temperature, humidity and biota of those 
regions. This presumption of climatic similarity increased Newfoundland’s appeal to investors 
by suggesting that crops would grow and that residents would be healthy.27 
 Accounts of Newfoundland’s similarity to England, as well as expectations of fertile soil 
and mineral deposits, allowed the Company to portray its efforts as a logical expansion of the 
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existing seasonal fishery. This focus on similarity supports Quinn’s and Fuller’s argument for the 
familiarity of Newfoundland in the English colonial consciousness. However, instead of making 
Newfoundland uninteresting to investors, the Company used this similarity to emphasize the 
potential for profits from industries familiar to its investors. The cod fishery offered Cuper’s 
Cove both a trade good and a source of food while the colony established other industries and 
trades. This food source was important for the Company since reports of starvation and 
cannibalism in Jamestown were well known in England by 1610, dissuading potential colonists 
and investors from joining ventures. Depictions of Newfoundland’s climate as similar to 
England’s persuaded investors that the Company would not face the hardships that Jamestown 
had experienced during the winter of 1609-1610. With a charter to plant, govern and use 
Newfoundland as well as expectations of agriculture, mining and trade, the Company seemed off 
to an auspicious start in 1610. Unfortunately for the Company, its assumptions about 
Newfoundland would undermine its success. 28 
Establishing Cuper’s Cove, 1610 to 1612 
Although the idea of Newfoundland as a place with great agricultural potential had 
existed in England since the sixteenth century, the Cuper’s Cove colonists were the first to test 
it.29 In the summer of 1610, Guy arrived at Cuper’s Cove with thirty-nine colonists, provisions 
and livestock, and established the plantation in accordance with the instructions issued by the 
Company’s Council. Guy selected Cuper’s Cove for the site of the Company’s colony during a 
voyage to the island in 1609. The harbour, located on the southern shore of Conception Bay, was 
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sheltered from storms, close to a supply of wood and fresh water, reportedly had good soil and 
was unused by migratory fishing ships. English fishing ships already used many of the harbours 
between Cape Race and Trinity, the region visited the most frequently by English ships during 
the seventeenth century. According to Williams, Guy chose Cuper’s Cove since a colony there 
would not disrupt migratory fishers. Staying away from harbours already in use allowed the 
Company to uphold its charter’s provision banning it from interfering with the fishery and to 
avoid conflict with fishing merchants in England.30  
The instructions issued to Guy included directions for setting up the plantation, 
prescribed economic and exploratory activities, and encouraged Guy to take advantage of any 
business opportunity that presented itself. The activities recommended to Guy included building 
salt-stills, planting grains and pulses, hunting for furs and food, and looking for raw materials for 
manufacturing valuable goods around Cuper’s Cove, particularly metallic ores such as iron or 
lead, and sand suitable for producing glass. The Company also instructed Guy to send an 
expedition to Trinity Bay to establish trade with the Beothuk and locate valuable plants, minerals 
and animals. This voyage did not take place until 1612. The Company’s instructions focused on 
developing profitable industries on land, but also provided a guide for using two small fishing 
boats to catch cod to supplement the colony’s food supply. From 1610 to 1612, Guy worked to 
fulfill these instructions with some success, but unexpected challenges regarding 
Newfoundland’s natural environment and piracy challenged Cuper’s Cove’s growth and the 
Company’s revenue.31  
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During the first two years of Cuper’s Cove’s existence there were signs that agriculture 
was succeeding. In spring 1611, Guy reported that crops planted at Cuper’s Cove were growing 
well, but the provisions left with the colonists that year consisted primarily of foodstuffs, 
indicating that the crops were insufficient to feed the entire plantation.32 Although there was still 
a need for imported foodstuffs in 1612, Slany reassured Willoughby that the seeds planted in 
Newfoundland were growing better than England’s crops, and would soon supply enough food to 
end Cuper’s Cove’s reliance on imports.33 
In addition to promising crop growth during this early stage, colonists reported that 
Cuper’s Cove’s climate was similar to England’s, a point that Slany used to convince investors 
that the colony would not experience the harsh weather and starvation that Jamestown had 
endured. Guy wrote to the Company that the winter of 1610-1611 was mild and that colonists 
had little trouble surviving, confirming the Company’s expectations of Newfoundland’s climate 
and distinguishing the island from Virginia. The weather journal for the winter of 1611-1612 
kept by William Colston, Guy’s second-in-command at Cuper’s Cove, reported another mild 
winter.34 Slany relayed Guy’s and Colston’s reports to investors, and stated in a letter to 
Willoughby not only that Newfoundland’s climate was appealing, but also that its inhabitants 
experienced less sickness than those in England, reassuring investors that Cuper’s Cove would 
not suffer from any significant illness or starvation.35 
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The Company’s first real opportunity to generate revenue came in 1612, when Guy 
established a cod fishery for export. In the summer of 1612, Guy built a fishing station in 
Renews to supplement Cuper’s Cove’s provisions and give the Company a supply of fish to trade 
in Europe. Located on the Eastern Avalon Peninsula, Renews was closer to the epicenter of the 
Newfoundland cod fishery than Cuper’s Cove, giving the Company access to rich fishing 
grounds and the trade ships that visited the island each summer. Slany wrote to Willoughby that 
the fishing station was successful and the supply ships sent to Newfoundland that year returned 
to England with cargoes of cod, which he planned to store until Lent when it would fetch a 
higher price.36   
The Company’s success at Renews did not last. The Newfoundland fishery was an 
attractive target for pirates, a threat that caused Guy to abandon the fishing station during the 
same year it was established. In 1612, the English pirate Peter Easton raided Newfoundland with 
a squadron of ten ships, causing an estimated £20,400 in damages by capturing fishing ships and 
seizing their cargoes and crews.37 Easton represented an immediate threat to the Company since 
its supplies and colonists in Renews and Cuper’s Cove made appealing targets. There are two 
known altercations between Guy and Easton, one of which ended violently when a member of 
Easton’s crew shot one of the Cuper’s Cove colonists. Guy, worried about the possibility of a 
larger attack, withdrew from Renews and constructed a fort in Cuper’s Cove. Easton did not 
attack Cuper’s Cove, but the Company did not return to Renews after 1612.38   
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Besides piracy, the Newfoundland Company experienced other problems in 1612. 
Thomas Cowper, Edward Barton and John Harrington, three planters to whom the Company 
granted land in Newfoundland, wrote to Willoughby asking for assistance in convincing the 
Company to change their land allotments. According to Cowper, Barton and Harrington, the 
fifty-acre parcels of land they received consisted of rocky soil unsuitable for growing crops. 
These three planters had not given up on Newfoundland as a whole, but they issued an ultimatum 
to the Company that either it provide them with better land, or they would leave.39 There are no 
known sources about the settlement of this dispute, but in 1616 a Mrs. Browne of Hereford 
inherited Cowper’s shares in the Newfoundland Company, indicating that, of the three planters, 
at least Cowper remained with the Company following the incident.40 
Cowper’s, Barton’s and Harrington’s problems indicated a bigger issue for the Company: 
Newfoundland’s agricultural potential had been overestimated, a concern that was confirmed by 
Willoughby’s agents. In 1612, Pearson reported that most of the fowl sent to Newfoundland 
lacked sufficient feed and that the available ground was either too rocky or too wet, undermining 
Slany’s claims that the crops planted there were succeeding.41 Pearson’s accusations added to a 
growing tension between Willoughby and Slany in 1612. In a letter sent in August that year, 
Slany asked Willoughby for forgiveness for an unnamed offense.42 Willoughby forgave Slany, 
but signaled that he knew more about Newfoundland than Slany thought. Using Pearson’s 
reports, Willoughby told Slany that he should have relied more heavily on hunting caribou than 
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raising crops and livestock to feed Cuper’s Cove, a step that could have reduced the Company’s 
expenses.43   
Leading into the fall of 1612, investors had reason to be both optimistic and concerned. 
Guy had planted crops, but they were mostly unsuccessful, and other hoped-for goods, such as 
minerals, had not been found. The fishery, while successful in 1612, was hindered by piracy.44 
Yet in comparison to Jamestown, which suffered from starvation and conflict with its 
neighbours, Newfoundland was doing well.45 By 1612, Cuper’s Cove had experienced two mild 
winters with few deaths, little sickness and no starvation.46 However, a healthy plantation did not 
placate investors. The Company needed a success to demonstrate its ability to become profitable, 
and in the fall of 1612 John Guy delivered just that by contacting and trading with the Beothuk.47  
Encountering the Beothuk, Fall 1612 
On October 7, 1612, John Guy led nineteen people in two boats from Cuper’s Cove to 
Trinity Bay to locate mineral deposits, collect plant samples and initiate trade with the region's 
indigenous peoples, the Beothuk. Newfoundland’s other indigenous peoples resided elsewhere 
on the island, with the Mi’kmaq primarily on the island’s southern and western coasts and the 
Inuit on the Great Northern Peninsula. Guy launched this expedition to fulfill both the 
instructions issued in 1610 and the Company’s promise to its investors that it would develop an 
economically diversified venture. The Company expected Trinity Bay to hold iron and lead 
deposits, especially valuable since no mineral deposits had been found near Cuper’s Cove; and 
medicinal plants for treating scurvy, an ailment against which colonists depended on imported 
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foods and medicines. The expedition’s most ambitious goal was to contact and trade with the 
Beothuk. For Guy and the Company, trade with the Beothuk presented an opportunity to secure a 
supply of pelts for markets in Europe and to promote their efforts to a larger European 
audience.48 
In contrast to Roanoke and Jamestown, Guy focused on trading with, rather than 
dominating, the neighbouring people. Both Roanoke’s and Jamestown’s colonists sought to 
establish what historians Jean Russo and J. Elliott Russo describe as tributary relationships with 
their neighbours.49 Roanoke’s planners, particularly Ralph Lane and Thomas Hariot, expected 
supplies provided by the Pamlico people to form a central part of the colony’s survival and 
business plans, and used diplomacy, deceit and coercion to acquire those supplies.50 Jamestown’s 
planners similarly expected the Powhatan Confederacy to supply them with food, labour and 
trade goods, freeing English colonists to develop mines and other industries. This expectation 
contributed to violent conflicts between Jamestown and the Powhatan.51 Although Slany and 
Guy hoped to establish a trade relationship, they did not plan to depend on them for provisions or 
labour and had no stated social goal, such as converting indigenous peoples to Christianity. 
Instead, the Company’s leadership hoped to acquire pelts, castoreum and other goods. This focus 
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on trade allowed the Company to frame Guy’s exchange as part of its programme of developing 
multiple profitable enterprises.52  
While Guy’s plan diverged from those of his English peers, it resembled that being 
enacted by the French at the time in New France, especially along the St. Lawrence-Great Lakes 
waterways. French explorers, traders and soldiers, such as Samuel de Champlain, worked to 
establish political and economic connections with peoples throughout the region by building 
trade relationships and supporting allies in military conflicts, actions that reflected both their own 
business interests as well as the needs of the French for allies in that region. There is no known 
link between the Newfoundland Company’s plans and those being carried out in New France 
detailed in the sources. However, Champlain’s actions in New France, specifically his efforts to 
build relationships throughout the region as a means of expanding and protecting French 
interests, were known in Europe by 1612, and as noted by Peter Pope, the Atlantic merchant and 
explorer community was a small one in which individuals followed each other’s actions. The 
success experienced by French traders and explorers contrasted with the ongoing Anglo-
Powhatan War in Virginia and may have influenced Guy’s and the Company’s decision to focus 
on developing peaceful trade relationships with the Beothuk.53 
 On November 6, Guy experienced a breakthrough near Bull Arm, in the southwestern 
corner of Trinity Bay: Beothuk traders contacted the expedition. Displaying what archaeologist 
William Gilbert calls significantly more knowledge of trading with Europeans than Guy’s 
company did with them, these traders approached the expedition waving a white wolf pelt to 
                                                          
52 Castoreum is extract from the beaver’s castor sacs used to manufacture perfume and medicine: “Instructions 
Directed by the Council for the Plantation in Newfoundland to John Guy,” 1610, NU, Middleton Mi X 1/1, 12-14; 
Ingeborg Marshall, A History and Ethnography of the Beothuk (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1996), 
28–32. 
53 “Instructions Directed by the Council for the Plantation in Newfoundland to John Guy,” 1610, NU, Middleton Mi 
X 1/1, 12-14; Guy, “Journal of a Voyage to Trinity Bay,” 73–76; Horn, “The Conquest of Eden,” 42-48; Pope, Fish 
into Wine, 79-81; David Hackett Fischer, Champlain’s Dream (Toronto: Vintage Canada, 2009), 281–290. 
61 
 
signal their peaceful intentions. Following negotiations between the two parties, the Beothuk 
traded pelts and shell necklaces for knives and beads from Guy, shared food and drink, and 
arranged to meet and trade the next year. Guy took no priest and mentioned no bible in his 
account of the encounter, indicating his desire to establish a strictly economic relationship, an 
action consistent with the Company’s focus on developing profitable trade.54  
This meeting became the Newfoundland Company’s most publicized action. Guy’s 
exchange with the Beothuk increased European interest in Newfoundland, particularly among 
proponents of American colonization, as indicated by two depictions of this encounter by 
colonial promoters in Europe. Purchas included an account of Guy’s encounter in Purchas his 
Pilgrimage, published in 1613. Purchas’s description repeated much of the information in Guy’s 
journal. Purchas differed from Guy by contextualizing Newfoundland with reports from eastern 
North America by comparing the Beothuk’s bark canoes with the explorer Jacques Cartier’s 
account of the canoes he saw in Canada, both of which shared common building materials and 
shapes, according to Purchas.55  
Matthäus Merian, an engraver from Frankfurt who inherited the publishing business of 
Johann de Bry, son of the renowned traveler and engraver Theodor de Bry, included two 
engravings of Newfoundland in his 1628 Dreyzehender Theil Americae. The first engraving 
depicts Guy’s exchange with the Beothuk while the second depicts scenes from the promotional 
writer Richard Whitbourne’s 1620 book Discourse and Discovery of the New-Found-Land.56 
Historian Shane O’Dea states that Purchas served as the source for Merian’s woodcut, but 
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Merian includes details from Guy’s journal that are not in Purchas’s account. Details of the 
meeting, such as the waving of the white wolf pelt and the exchange of knives for shell 
necklaces, match Guy’s journal but are not included in Purchas’s text. These differences indicate 
that Merian may have had access to Guy’s journal rather than just Purchas’s book.57 
 
Figure 2 John Guy's Exchange with the Beothuk 
 
Source: Matthäus Merian and Theodore de Bry, Dreyzehender Theil Americae (Frankfurt: Gedrucht bey 
Caspar Rotel, 1628), 7 Memorial University of Newfoundland, Digital Archive Initiative (Accessed 
December 5, 2015, http://collections.mun.ca/cdm/singleitem/collection/cns_images/id/35/rec/5).  
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The public awareness implied by Purchas’s use of Guy’s journal and Merian’s engraving 
was not accidental. Slany and Guy promoted this exchange to demonstrate the success of their 
venture, and its descriptions of the Beothuk enjoyed a wide appeal in Europe.58 Guy’s journal 
offered new material for a European audience fascinated by the peoples of America. Unlike 
Virginia and other colonial ventures, the Company did not try to take any of the Beothuk captive 
to send to England. Instead of bringing captives to England to display, Guy’s reports offered a 
glimpse into a potentially profitable and peaceful relationship with the Beothuk. This emphasis 
on trade reflected the Company’s pragmatic approach to Newfoundland. Imprisoned Beothuk 
might have brought the Company attention in England, but a stable trading relationship was 
more profitable.59  
While Guy’s journal is the most detailed account of the trade with the Beothuk, it was not 
the only account of the expedition. Both Crout and Pearson participated in the voyage and sent 
reports to Willoughby. Unlike Guy’s journal, Crout’s and Pearson’s letters remained private, 
with Willoughby using them to inform his actions. The differences between Guy’s, Crout’s and 
Pearson’s accounts offer insight into the encounter with the Beothuk and the dissonance between 
the Company’s public portrayal of Newfoundland and the concerns of individual investors.60 
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Guy was keen to portray the expedition as a major success, but it caused Crout and 
Pearson to doubt his leadership and raised concerns about the dangers of navigating in 
Newfoundland. Guy’s journal discusses some hazards when travelling in Newfoundland, such as 
foul weather, but presents them as risks of exploration rather than indicating that the island’s 
coast was dangerous to navigate. Crout and Pearson both emphasized Newfoundland’s 
navigational hazards, particularly its frequent storms and rocky shores, points that Guy 
downplayed. An incident during the expedition’s return to Cuper’s Cove illustrates this 
difference. Guy’s entry for November 14 reports that a storm caused him to lose contact with one 
of the expedition’s boats. Outside of the fact that he lost the boat, Guy provides no details about 
the incident or what happened to its crew.61 Crout’s report reveals that the boat was not just out 
of contact, but that it was “drived ashore against the rocks,” putting its crew in danger.62 Pearson, 
one of the lost boat’s crew, provides the most detailed account of this incident. According to 
Pearson, the boat took on water during a storm and hit a rock, causing it to sink. All of the crew 
survived, but lost their clothing while swimming to shore. Following the wreck, Guy refused to 
aid Pearson or the boat’s crew, forcing them to hike overland, naked and freezing, back to 
Cuper’s Cove.63 
The intended audiences of these documents explain the differences among those 
accounts. Guy wrote to attract and retain investors by advertising the potential for profitable 
trade with the Beothuk. Crout, employed to oversee Willoughby’s interests, focused on 
opportunities and issues associated with his employer’s investment. In Crout’s letter regarding 
the encounter with the Beothuk, this interest is seen in his focus on launching a second trade 
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expedition and his concern that the Company was losing too much money from piracy and poor 
weather. Pearson’s interest in the island was similar to Crout’s, although he was on the 
expedition to assess the island’s agricultural capacity. As a result, Pearson focused on the 
wildlife encountered during the voyage, which he saw as a plentiful source of food, and raised 
concerns that the soil at both Trinity Bay and Conception Bay was unsuitable for agriculture.64  
These differences illustrate not only the goals of their writers, but also the networks of 
individuals they engaged in. Guy, as governor, needed to maintain a positive outlook or else risk 
endangering both his own position and the Company’s ability to attract and retain investors. 
Crout and Pearson provided their employer, Willoughby, with direct reports to inform his 
actions, a role in which an honest assessment of the situation was more valuable than a positive 
outlook.65 A similar dynamic emerged in Jamestown during this period. Colonists in Jamestown 
sent letters to their families and associates in England detailing hardships they encountered, such 
as starvation, that were not included in the promotional works by the Virginia Company’s 
planners and major investors.66 
Trading with the Beothuk was an achievement the Newfoundland Company would not 
repeat. Crout attempted to contact them in the spring of 1613 but failed, and the Company 
missed its planned meeting in the fall of that year. In 1616, Mason, who succeeded Guy as 
governor of Cuper’s Cove, searched for the Beothuk, but he too failed. Ethnographer Ingeborg 
Marshall, in A History and Ethnography of the Beothuk, speculates that this difficulty resulted 
from competition between the Beothuk and fishing ships. During the seventeenth century, the 
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Beothuk, who spent the summer months along Newfoundland’s coasts, increasingly competed 
with fishing ships for shore access, causing them to move away from Trinity Bay to areas with 
less European traffic. A report written by David Kirke in 1639 supports Marshall. Kirke states 
that after Guy left Bull Arm, a fishing ship passed by the same group of Beothuk and fired at 
them. According to the report, after this incident the Beothuk avoided Europeans except to harass 
and steal from fishing ships and plantations.67   
Although the Company was unable to establish a regular trade with the Beothuk, the 
exchange brought attention to the Company and Newfoundland. However, Guy’s account was 
not the only information coming from Newfoundland about this event, and Crout and Pearson 
presented a very different idea of Newfoundland and the Company. Rather than reporting a land 
of opportunity, Crout and Pearson expressed doubts about both Newfoundland’s agricultural 
capacity and Guy’s leadership. The Company planned for more trade with the Beothuk, but by 
the winter of 1612-1613, it was becoming apparent to investors that the Newfoundland Company 
would be unable to achieve its early promises of steady profits based on agriculture and mining.68  
Disillusionment and Disruption, 1613 to 1621 
The winter of 1612-1613 marked the beginning of the Newfoundland Company’s decline. 
Unlike the previous two winters, the winter of 1612-1613 was long, cold and harsh. Twenty-two 
of the sixty-two inhabitants in Cuper’s Cove fell ill, and eight perished from scurvy, hypothermia 
and other ailments. Additionally, Crout reported that most of the livestock died during the winter 
because of the cold weather and lack of feed. Guy’s relationship with the Company also began to 
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deteriorate in 1613, with Guy complaining that the Company would not pay him his wages, 
while Slany accused Guy of supporting pirates and sending misleading information about the 
success of crops.69 Beginning in 1613, the Company’s unprofitability, as well as disputes with its 
shareholders and migratory fishing merchants, led to a decline in the number of investors. This 
decrease did not motivate the Company to change its approach. As late as 1621, when Mason left 
Newfoundland, Cuper’s Cove remained focused on developing land-based industries. The 
Company continued to exist until 1631, but it did not recover from the decline that began in 
1613.70  
Starting in 1613, Willoughby took a much more active role in the Newfoundland 
Company. Clashes with Slany, and the failure of the Company to live up to its early promises, 
motivated Willoughby to seek a greater say in the Company’s operation and start a plantation of 
his own. Investors appear to have become widely dissatisfied with the Company in 1613, 
presenting opportunities for Willoughby to buy shares from disillusioned shareholders and act as 
a confidant to those who felt cheated by Slany. In this role, he received letters from Guy 
regarding unpaid wages and helped Bacon to negotiate the sale of his shares back to the 
Company in 1616.71  
While others were selling their shares in the Newfoundland Company, Willoughby 
bought more, but he deliberately attempted to avoid attracting Slany’s attention while doing so. 
In 1616, Mrs. Browne of Hereford was looking to sell her shares in the Newfoundland Company. 
Willoughby, leading Browne along by stating that he was also disappointed with the Company, 
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encouraged her to sell her shares to Edward Willoughby, one of his sons, and then to reinvest by 
purchasing land in St. John’s in partnership with Edward. Browne sold half a share to Edward 
Willoughby for £35, a sum that Cell notes was very high given that Percival Willoughby had told 
Browne that he had failed to sell his shares at £10 each. There are few known sources regarding 
Edward Willoughby’s interest in Newfoundland, but given his father’s involvement, it is likely 
that this arrangement was meant to obscure the purchase from Slany. Percival Willoughby’s 
attempted deception was apparently necessary, as Slany had blocked Edward from purchasing 
land in St. John’s directly.72  
Slany, seeking new ways to make money from Newfoundland, had already sold or 
granted land around St. John’s harbor to individuals trying to establish their own plantations. St. 
John’s did not come under the control of any single English governor during the seventeenth 
century, and instead was occupied from the 1610’s on by English planters. Little is known about 
the St. John’s planters of this period, although they succeeded in establishing a long-lasting 
presence on the island. In a 1679 petition, Thomas Oxford, a St. John’s-based fishing merchant, 
stated that his family and several others had lived there for seventy years, suggesting that they 
were descendants of the planters who purchased land from Slany.73  
 St. John’s was not the only site the Newfoundland Company sold. At Bristol’s Hope, now 
named Harbour Grace, Robert Hayman, an English merchant and poet, established a plantation 
on behalf of a group of merchants from Bristol on land purchased from the Company. Unlike 
Cuper’s Cove, Bristol’s Hope appears to have focused exclusively on the fishery. Hayman 
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reported that Bristol’s Hope was profitable, but following his departure from the island in the 
early 1620’s there is no known information about whether the plantation continued to operate.74 
William Vaughan, a Welsh lawyer and writer, purchased land on the southern Avalon Peninsula 
from the Newfoundland Company in 1616 and established a plantation at Renews in 1617. 
Although Vaughan’s plantation failed in 1619 because of poor organization and harsh weather, 
he continued to promote Newfoundland with the publication of The Golden Fleece in 1626 and 
The Newlander’s Cure in 1630. Land sales offset some of the Company’s costs, but selling land 
represented a temporary source of income that limited any future expansion.75  
With Willoughby’s plans for St. John’s stymied by Slany, he attempted to develop 
plantations at Trinity Bay and Bell Island.76 Bell Island appealed to Willoughby since it 
purportedly had good soil, fields for livestock and iron ore deposits. However, Willoughby’s 
request for Bell Island led to further clashes with Slany, who blocked him by claiming that a 
plantation there would compete with the Company because of its proximity to Cuper’s Cove.77 
Willoughby did succeed in acquiring a parcel of land extending fifty-six kilometers north of what 
is now Carbonear and Heart’s Content. Thomas Willoughby and Crout attempted to develop a 
plantation there, but by 1616 they had concluded that neither mining nor agriculture could 
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succeed in the area.78 In 1616, Thomas Willoughby wrote to his father that “if ever you look for 
money again in this country, you must send fishermen, or else there will be no good done.”79 
 The Newfoundland Company also attracted criticism from migratory fishing merchants. 
In 1618, merchants from Dorset, Devon and Hampshire petitioned the Privy Council that the 
Newfoundland Company restricted access to fishing grounds, stopped migratory fishers from 
hunting birds, charged ships taxes and provided shelter to pirates.80 The Company’s charter 
forbade it from taxing or obstructing the migratory fishery, and the Company denied that it 
interfered with fishing ships in any way.81 This rebuttal did not placate the petitioners who, in 
reply, insisted that the Company was too inexperienced in the fishery and knew too little about 
Newfoundland to warrant any say in the fishery’s conduct. The Privy Council decided in favour 
of the merchants and ordered the Company to adhere to its 1610 charter. The Company did win a 
ruling in 1619 for Mason to be appointed to suppress pirates in Newfoundland, asserting the 
Company’s role as the island’s protector.82   
Although Daniel Prowse interprets the merchants’ complaints as the start of a long-
standing conflict between West Country merchants and Newfoundland’s English inhabitants, his 
argument is not supported by the evidence.83 Rather than targeting Newfoundland’s English 
residents, the merchants’ 1618 petition sought security from an organized body based in England 
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that they perceived as a threat to their livelihood, an approach that historian Ken MacMillan 
notes was common in other regions of America. During the early seventeenth century, 
merchants, colonists and others who had businesses and trade in America often disputed the 
rights of companies or colonies because the expansive powers often given in their charters hurt 
pre-existing trades.84 Additionally, the merchants directed their complaints at the Newfoundland 
Company and did not include any other plantations, such as Bristol’s Hope or Vaughan’s 
Renews, in their petitions. The complaints against the Company were not isolated cases. English 
joint-stock companies attracted suspicion from both planters and merchants during this period 
because of fears that these enterprises pushed out smaller competitors. In the case of 
Newfoundland, this suspicion is seen in a 1628 manuscript by Hayman titled A Proposition for 
Profit and Honour. Hayman argued that joint-stock companies, particularly the Newfoundland 
Company, were ineffective because investors were interested only in returns on their 
investments, not in increasing knowledge about Newfoundland or creating broader political and 
economic benefits for England.85 
John Mason worked to address accusations that the Company knew little about 
Newfoundland by focusing on exploring the island during his tenure as governor from 1615 to 
1621. While little information survives about Mason’s time in Newfoundland, Rowley dismissed 
Mason’s work and complained that he neglected Cuper’s Cove and spent too much time 
exploring the island.86 Mason wrote about the result of his explorations in A Brief Discourse on 
the New-Found-Land (1620), which he distributed in Scotland to individuals interested in 
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launching colonization projects, such as William Alexander, a poet and courtier involved in the 
colonization of Port Royal, Nova Scotia and Long Island, New York. Rather than promoting the 
Newfoundland Company to potential investors, Mason’s Brief Discourse encouraged others to 
start their own colonies, with only one reference to the Newfoundland Company. Neither Slany 
nor Willoughby contributed to Mason’s publication, nor are there any references to his Brief 
Discourse in Willoughby’s letters.87 
In his Brief Discourse, Mason assessed Newfoundland’s natural environment based on 
his own observations, and used that information to describe the island’s potential economic value 
if colonized. The text includes inventories of plants, animals and fish found in and around the 
island, and describes the industries Mason believed worth developing. Like Slany, Mason saw 
potential for agriculture and mining, but he did not present a plan for developing either industry. 
Mason also insisted that Newfoundland had a temperate climate, with the land being warmer 
than England in summer because of its southerly position but colder in winter because of cold air 
and water currents from the north.88 
Mason does provide some insight into the Company’s operations during his tenure as 
governor. Near the end of the text, he states:  
Likewise of the managinge of our businesse in our plantations with the descripsions 
of their situation in 2 places 16 miles distant from other, on the northside the bay of 
conception; of the manner charge and benefite of our fishings with the several 
strange formes, and nature of Fishes, projects for making Yron, Salt, Pitch, Tarre, 
Tirpintine, Frank-Incense, Furres, Hope of trade with saluages and such like, with 
many accidents and occurences in the time of my government thee, but there may 
suffice as Verbum sapienti.89 
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This passage is Mason’s only reference to Cuper’s Cove or the Newfoundland Company, 
and the only mention of a second site used by the Company in 1620, although this could 
refer to Willoughby’s attempt at establishing a plantation. Like Guy, Mason focused on 
developing land-based industries at Cuper’s Cove. Cod supplied a reliable trade good, but 
the potential for land-based industries was at the centre of Mason’s depiction of the 
island.90  
Despite his apparent enthusiasm for Newfoundland, Mason left the Company in 
1621 for New England, where he undertook a series of ventures in cooperation with 
Ferdinando Gorges, who directed the establishment of the Province of Maine. 91 Following 
Mason’s departure, the Company’s efforts to expand Cuper’s Cove stopped. The Company 
did not have a dramatic end. Instead, it experienced a long decline as failures to find 
minerals, grow crops and trade with the Beothuk added to the financial burdens on 
investors to supply provisions. While Willoughby and Slany continued to promote the 
plantation throughout the 1620’s, there is no indication that they attracted any new 
investors.92   
The Newfoundland Company’s problems were apparent to investors as early as 1612, but 
it still existed as late as 1631. In 1631, Percival Willoughby sent provisions to Cuper’s Cove, 
although whether there were any other investors at that point is unknown. There are no more 
references to Cuper’s Cove or the Newfoundland Company in Willoughby’s letters after 1631. 
Slany, who continued to try to attract investors to the Company into the late-1620’s, disappears 
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from Willoughby’s correspondence in 1628 and died in 1632. Following 1631, Cuper’s Cove 
operated without the backing of the Newfoundland Company.93  
The Newfoundland Company, while successful at establishing a lasting plantation, failed 
as a business venture. Reflecting George Soros’s concept of reflexivity, fallibility and human 
uncertainty, the assumptions about Newfoundland’s natural environment and economic value the 
Newfoundland Company based its plans upon were flawed by inaccurate information that led to 
unachievable expectations. Newfoundland could not match Slany’s promises, but the cod fishery 
could support an English population, albeit one that did not produce the profits expected by its 
original backers. If backers measured success as the ability to create a continuing English 
presence in America, exploring and contacting new people, the Company succeeded, but these 
were not their goals. The Company did not present Newfoundland as a place that would create 
benefits for England as a whole in its communications. Instead, Slany, Guy and Willoughby 
focused on Cuper’s Cove as a business venture meant to profit its investors, and without profits, 
the Company could not survive.94 
Expectations that Newfoundland could host a profitable venture based on farming, 
mining, fishing and trade did not lack supporters, and Newfoundland was not an unknown land 
to England. Parkhurst, Hayes and Parmenius all supported the idea that Newfoundland could 
host such a colony. Despite this prior knowledge, Newfoundland was still not the land Slany 
promoted or investors expected. Harsh weather and poor soil made Cuper’s Cove more 
expensive to colonize than anticipated while piracy, a lack of minerals and the failed trade with 
the Beothuk deprived it of the riches the Company promised its investors. These setbacks and 
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Slany’s insistence on developing land-based natural resources prevented Cuper’s Cove from 
focusing on the fishery, its best chance of success, as measured in terms of the Company’s goal 
of becoming profitable.95  
The Newfoundland Company’s failure did not mark the end of the concept of 
Newfoundland as a land with rich agricultural and mineral resources. Beginning in 1620, a new 
series of writers and investors used these ideas to promote and organize their ventures. However, 
unlike the Newfoundland Company, these promoters and colonists used literature to attract 
investors and portray colonizing Newfoundland as a venture meant to benefit the whole of 
England, rather than simply profit investors. These writers, while learning some lessons from the 
Newfoundland Company’s experience in Newfoundland, still adhered to the same idea of the 
island’s natural environment used to plan and promote Cuper’s Cove.96 
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Chapter 2 
Promoting Newfoundland: Literature and Colonization Efforts, 1616 to 1630 
The Island of Newfoundland is large, temperate and fruitful, the fruitfulness of it 
consisting not only in things of sustenance for those that shall inhabit it, but in 
many sorts of commodities likewise, of good use and value to be transported.  
Richard Whitbourne, Discourse and Discovery of the Newfoundland (1620).1 
I am determined to commit this place to fishermen that are able to encounter 
storms and hard weather.  
George Calvert to King Charles I (1629).2 
Beginning in 1616, a series of investors and writers attempted to colonize Newfoundland 
using a set of assumptions about the island’s natural environment resembling those promoted by 
the Newfoundland Company. Rather than learning from the difficulties that the Newfoundland 
Company encountered in growing crops and finding minerals, these writers and investors blamed 
the Company’s struggles on its business practices, not its plans for developing Cuper’s Cove. 
Unlike the Newfoundland Company, the writers promoting these ventures claimed that 
colonizing Newfoundland would create social, political and economic benefits for England 
beyond what the migratory fishery created, and that investors had to manage their operations 
personally, rather than delegating their authority using corporations.  
Three writers gained prominence during this period: William Vaughan, Richard 
Whitbourne and Robert Hayman, all of whom used similar depictions of Newfoundland’s natural 
resources and climate in their texts. 3 However, every venture associated with the plans of these 
three writers failed, culminating with George Calvert, the first Lord Baltimore, leaving his 
Ferryland plantation in 1629. This chapter argues that colonies and promotional literature created 
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from 1616 to 1630 were the most extensive expression and test of the idea that Newfoundland 
could support an economically diverse colony. Calvert’s departure from Newfoundland 
invalidated these perceptions, and English efforts in Newfoundland began to shift away from 
developing land-based industries to focus on the cod fishery.4  
This chapter is divided into three sections to examine how promotional writings shaped 
colonization efforts, and how the depictions of Newfoundland’s natural environment contributed 
to the failure of those colonies. These sections are organized by topic to investigate the strategies 
that Whitbourne, Vaughan and Hayman employed to persuade readers that their depictions of 
Newfoundland’s natural environment and economic value were accurate, and the influence of 
their arguments on ventures launched during the 1620’s. The first section examines how 
Whitbourne, Vaughan and Hayman used their personal experiences and education to gain the 
trust of their readership and persuade them to colonize Newfoundland. The second focuses on 
how these three writers depicted Newfoundland’s natural environment and the similarities and 
differences in their portrayals of the island. The third section discusses how the colonies 
established by George Calvert, the First Lord Baltimore, and Henry Cary, the Viscount Falkland, 
in 1621 and 1623 respectively, employed the ideas presented by Whitbourne, Vaughan and 
Hayman and how these writers later described these colonies.5 
Vaughan, Whitbourne and Hayman were not the only people writing about 
Newfoundland during this period, but their publications gained the widest audience and had the 
most significant impact on colonization efforts. John Mason published A Brief Discourse on 
New-found-land in 1620, but he distributed it to only a few peers, and he left Newfoundland in 
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1621.6 Edward Wynne, the governor of Calvert’s Ferryland plantation, and T.C., whose full 
name is unknown but was likely Thomas Cary, the cousin of Henry Cary, also wrote tracts 
promoting Newfoundland.7 T.C.’s, A Short Discourse of the New-Found-Land (1623) and 
Wynne’s The British India (1630) reiterated information from Whitbourne, Vaughan and 
Hayman’s texts. Mason’s, T.C.’s and Wynne’s writings did not directly influence any ventures in 
Newfoundland, and so are not discussed at length in this chapter.8 
The promotional works by Vaughan, Whitbourne and Hayman, and documents associated 
with the enterprises they influenced, make up the primary source base of this chapter, 
particularly Whitbourne’s Discourse and Discovery (1620), Vaughan’s The Golden Fleece 
(1626) and The Newlander’s Cure (1630), and Hayman’s Quodlibets (1628) and A Proposition 
of Profit and Honour (1628). Letters regarding these writers and the enterprises they influenced 
are in London at the National Archives and the British Library. An examination of these sources 
reveals that the idea of Newfoundland as a land with abundant natural resources was successful 
at attracting investors, but created unrealistic expectations that led to colonies being unprepared 
for Newfoundland’s natural environment and failing to become profitable.9 
 Vaughan’s, Whitbourne’s and Hayman’s promotional tracts offer insight into both the 
colonization of Newfoundland and the strategies used by writers to make their proposals 
appealing to readers. Reflecting these opportunities, studies of Vaughan, Whitbourne and 
Hayman have examined them as either figures whose interests and actions were limited to 
Newfoundland or as participants in a larger literary trend advocating the colonization of 
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America. Gillian Cell’s study of the relationship between promoters and the colonization of 
Newfoundland exemplifies the first approach. In English Enterprise in Newfoundland, Cell 
examined how promoters and investors enacted plans to move the English presence in 
Newfoundland inland by developing farms and mines, and away from focusing solely on the 
fishery.10 Andrew Fitzmaurice’s Humanism and America follows the second by analyzing how 
promotional writings about Newfoundland advertised the island’s social and political worth to 
England, rather than just its financial value, similar to the methods used by other English 
colonization efforts, such as Virginia. Both Cell and Fitzmaurice examine the methods 
Whitbourne, Hayman and Vaughan used to make their plans appealing to the English investors’ 
desire to grow its social standing and wealth by establishing profitable colonies that created 
social and political benefits for England. 11 
 Anne Prescott synthesizes Fitzmaurice’s and Cell’s approaches by exploring how 
Vaughan’s humanist education shaped his efforts to colonize and promote Newfoundland. In 
“Relocating Terra Firma: William Vaughan’s Newfoundland,” Prescott studies Vaughan’s use of 
classical myths, especially the Greek epic Argonautica by Apollonius Rhodes, to promote 
Newfoundland and his efforts to colonize the island. Prescott’s combination of Fitzmaurice’s 
literary approach with Cell’s focus on the ventures themselves opens an important avenue of 
study by considering the influence of the educations and motivations of promoters on 
colonization efforts.12 
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This chapter examines how promoters used their experiences and education to present 
Newfoundland to their readership and these writers’ impact on subsequent ventures. While 
influenced by Prescott, it differs by focusing on identifying commonalities between the methods 
and descriptions of Newfoundland used by promoters. Vaughan, Whitbourne and Hayman 
created an interrelated body of literature, one that shared many ideas and interpretations, with 
only minor changes in their arguments over time, but still made separate cases for 
Newfoundland’s social, political and economic value to England.13  
Building Trust and Conveying Knowledge 
Historian Eric Ash, examining the role of expertise in Elizabethan England, argued that 
individuals seeking to represent investors or encourage them to join complex ventures, such as 
colonies, attempted to occupy the dual role of “knowledge broker and facilitator.”14 An 
individual’s expertise needed to be proven to potential employers before they could be trusted to 
provide advice and execute projects, a process that often required them to display either their 
knowledge of the subject in question or cite relevant experience. Without adequately depicting 
themselves as trustworthy sources, experts could not expect people to hire them, join their 
ventures or use their advice.15  
Vaughan, Whitbourne and Hayman each confronted this issue by citing either their 
personal experiences or educations as giving them the knowledge needed to provide practical 
advice for colonizing Newfoundland. While all three writers relied on similar depictions of 
Newfoundland’s climate and natural resources, their arguments differed from one another based 
on how they conveyed their knowledge about the island and established their trustworthiness. 
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This self-referential method, to which historian Anthony Pagden referred as autoptic discourse, 
was vital for persuading readers that their accounts and plans were accurate and actionable. The 
personal histories of Vaughan, Whitbourne and Hayman reveal both their relationships to each 
other and how their individual backgrounds shaped the descriptions of Newfoundland which they 
used to persuade their readers.16   
 Of the promoters, Richard Whitbourne had the longest personal history in Newfoundland, 
and he used his experience there as the basis of his argument for colonizing the island. His 
experience, mostly from working in the migratory fishery, supplied him with a detailed 
knowledge of Newfoundland, information that he was determined to use to build a colony there 
that could protect the fishery while becoming a profitable venture. Throughout his works, 
Whitbourne used his experiences to depict himself as having a detailed knowledge of 
Newfoundland’s natural environment, industries and history, and as someone whose prior 
service to the English crown evidenced his trustworthiness. Whitbourne stated that he visited 
Newfoundland regularly with the migratory fishery from 1579 onwards, witnessed Humphrey 
Gilbert claiming Newfoundland for England, commanded a squadron of ships against the 
Spanish Armada and was commissioned by the High Court of Admiralty to hold vice-admiralty 
courts in Newfoundland in 1615. This last assertion is unverifiable since there are no known 
records regarding the granting of such a commission for Newfoundland during the 1610’s.17 
Whitbourne began writing about Newfoundland following the failure of Vaughan’s 
Renews colony in 1619. Vaughan, who was uninvolved in either fishing in or colonizing 
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Newfoundland before Renews, purchased land from the Newfoundland Company in 1616 and 
sent a group of Welsh workers there in 1617 to farm, fish and construct buildings. This initial 
wave of colonists failed, and Vaughan hired Whitbourne in 1618 to rehabilitate his plantation by 
overseeing construction and farming projects. Whitbourne was unsuccessful and left Vaughan’s 
employ in 1619.18  
Whitbourne published his first book, A Discourse and Discovery, in 1620. This work, 
which describes the history, natural resources and economic potential of Newfoundland, used 
personal anecdotes and inventories of biota to describe the island as a prime candidate for 
colonization. Whitbourne submitted this text to King James I and the Privy Council in hopes of 
receiving royal support for colonizing Newfoundland. Although Whitbourne did not get that 
support, the Privy Council approved his book for distribution throughout England through the 
Church and ordered parishes to take collections to pay for printing costs and to compensate 
Whitbourne.19 This distribution succeeded in raising awareness about Newfoundland, as 
evidenced by the priest Richard Eburne’s reliance on Whitbourne’s work to inform his 1624 
book A Plaine Pathway to Plantation, which advocated the colonization of America as a whole, 
and an engraving of scenes from A Discourse and Discovery by Matthäus Merian in 
Dreyzehender Theil Americae. Whitbourne reprinted A Discourse and Discovery in 1622 and 
1623 with additions, including a conclusion detailing an encounter with a mermaid in St. John’s, 
which Merian included in his engraving.20 
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Figure 3 Richard Whitbourne's Encounter with a Mermaid in St. John’s 
 
Source: Matthäus Merian and Theodore de Bry, Dreyzehender Theil Americae, (Frankfurt: Gedrucht bey 
Caspar Rotel, 1628), 5 Memorial University of Newfoundland, Digital Archive Initiative (Accessed 
December 5, 2015, http://collections.mun.ca/cdm/singleitem/collection/cns_images/id/0/rec/4). 
 
Throughout his Discourse, Whitbourne used his personal experience and observations in 
Newfoundland to persuade readers that an economically diverse colony was possible there. This 
approach is seen in Whitbourne’s discussion of Newfoundland’s agricultural potential, which 
states:  
but I need not confine myself to probabilities; seeing our men that have wintered 
there divers years, did for a trial and experiment thereof sow some small quantity 
of corn, which I saw growing very fair, and they found the increase to be great 
and the grain very good.21  
 
Similar passages record observations about Newfoundland's wildlife, trees and the conduct of the 
fishery. Whitbourne used anecdotes to persuade readers to invest in colonizing Newfoundland by 
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first making the case that he was a reliable witness and then reporting that he saw an island with 
untapped natural resources and fertile soil. This reliance on hands-on experience matches what 
Ash referred to as technical expertise, knowledge gained through engagement with an object or 
place that could be deployed to advertise new projects.22 
Whitbourne succeeded in influencing English efforts in Newfoundland. Calvert and Cary, 
two of the Privy Council members who signed the approval for the distribution of A Discourse 
and Discovery, established plantations in Newfoundland in 1621 and 1623 respectively.23 In 
1622, Cary hired Whitbourne as an advisor and to write a promotional tract for his venture, 
which was titled A Discourse and Loving Invitation. This work contained a condensed version of 
the information in A Discourse and Discovery, but targeted potential investors for Cary’s colony 
instead of Newfoundland in general. Whitbourne also influenced T.C.’s A Short Discourse of the 
New-Found-Land, which repeated much of the information in Whitbourne’s work.24  
The second major promoter was Vaughan, who began writing about Newfoundland after 
the failure of his Renews plantation in 1619. Unlike Whitbourne, Vaughan used his education, 
rather than his personal experience, to convince readers of his expertise regarding 
Newfoundland. Vaughan, who graduated from Jesus College, Oxford, in 1597 with a Master of 
Arts, used humanist ideas from that education to argue for colonizing Newfoundland in The 
Golden Fleece. Vaughan used classical imagery and other information gleaned from his studies 
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to provide an interpretive model for understanding the social, economic and political challenges 
facing England, and Newfoundland’s role in solving those problems.25   
In The Golden Fleece, Vaughan, writing under the pseudonym Orpheus Junior, used his 
knowledge of classical Greek literature as a tool for persuading readers. Vaughan likened the 
colonization of Newfoundland to a quest reminiscent of the one undertaken by Jason and the 
Argonauts to obtain the golden fleece. A colonized Newfoundland could, in Vaughan’s view, 
reduce overpopulation, unemployment and drunkenness in England while increasing trade, 
common concerns among English politicians at the time.26 This use of Greek mythology 
leveraged what Fitzmaurice identifies as the persuasive power of classical rhetoric in 
seventeenth-century England. The familiarity and value conferred upon classical sources gave 
writers, especially those with humanist educations, a powerful tool of persuasion by using these 
respected stories to describe contemporary issues and prescribe solutions. 27 Additionally, 
historian Kevin Sharpe found that among those with a humanist education, classical texts served 
as guides for leading virtuous lives that balanced physical feats with spiritual learning.28 
Vaughan’s employment of classical rhetoric in The Golden Fleece adheres to these arguments by 
making the case that England’s social, political and economic challenges resembled those faced 
by ancient Argos, and that the solution to those problems was a grand venture to a wealthy and 
faraway land. Vaughan contended that Newfoundland, with its temperate climate, fertile soil, 
minerals, forests and established fishery, was a prime candidate to be the golden fleece that 
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England, like Argos before it, needed to solve its internal issues and increase its standing on the 
world stage.29 
Hayman, the third major promoter, completed two works in 1628: Quodlibets Lately 
Come over from New Britaniola and A Proposition for Profit and Honour. In both texts, Hayman 
used his personal experience in Newfoundland and education to persuade readers of the potential 
for a profitable colony there with social, economic and political benefits for England as a whole. 
Before 1628, Hayman, an Oxford-educated merchant from Totnes, spent one full year and 
several summers in Newfoundland as the governor of Bristol’s Hope. During Hayman’s tenure, 
Bristol’s Hope flourished, so much so that he commented that he had to do little to keep it 
running. The success of the colony allowed Hayman to spend his time writing poetry and 
translating the works of the Welsh epigrammatist John Owen and the French humanist writer 
François Rabelais into English.30  
The product of Hayman’s leisure time was Quodlibets, a book of poems and 
translations.31 Hayman did not explicitly state in Quodlibets that he was promoting 
Newfoundland, but he included poems that praised the island’s temperate climate and natural 
resources. For example, in the poem “A Skeltonicall continued ryme, in praise of my New-
Found-Land” he stated:  
Although in cloaths, company, buildings faire,/ with England, New-Found-Land 
cannot compare./ Did some know what contentment I found there,/alwayes 
enough, most times somewhat to spare,/ With little paines, less toyle, and lesser 
care,/ exempt from taxings, ill newes, lawing, feare,/ is cleane, and warme, no 
matter what you weare,/ healthy, and wealthy, if men carefull are,/ with much-
much more, then I will now declare,/ (I say) if some wise men knew what this 
were,/ (I doe believe) they’d live no other where.32 
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Although Hayman was keen to demonstrate Newfoundland’s qualities to readers, at no point in 
Quodlibets does he say that he is writing with the intent of encouraging colonists to go there. The 
result is a work of literature meant to entertain readers, particularly his Oxford peers such as the 
jurist William Noye, to whom he dedicated a poem, while providing information about 
Newfoundland to potential colonists.33  
Mary Fuller argues that by writing and translating literature Hayman implicitly promoted 
Newfoundland to readers. Translating the works of Owen and Rabelais into English, as well as 
writing original poetry, demonstrated to readers that Newfoundland could host English cultural 
producers, not just profitable business ventures. Much like Vaughan’s use of classical rhetoric, 
Hayman created a familiar frame for English readers to observe the island by showing that an 
educated merchant could establish a profitable plantation and still engage in intellectually and 
culturally rewarding work.34   
Unlike Quodlibets, A Proposition for Profit and Honour focused on the potential 
economic and political benefits of colonizing Newfoundland. A Proposition for Profit and 
Honour was not published. The manuscript copy, which Hayman submitted to George Villiers, 
the Duke of Buckingham, in the hopes of him presenting it to Charles I, was not reprinted. There 
is no known evidence that Charles I or his advisors disapproved of Hayman’s text, and events in 
1628, notably the assassination of Villiers and Hayman’s departure for Guyana, where he died of 
a fever, likely led to it being overlooked. In this work, Hayman describes how to develop an 
economically diverse colony in Newfoundland using forestry, mining and agriculture to support 
a permanent English population. He also argued that English residents in Newfoundland would 
help the migratory fishery by denying French and Spanish ships access to the island’s shore. In 
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addition to providing directions for colonizing Newfoundland, Hayman critiqued the failure of 
the Newfoundland Company’s Cuper’s Cove and Cary’s Renews.35 
Hayman cited his experience governing Bristol’s Hope to argue that previous 
colonization attempts, especially those by joint-stock companies such as the Newfoundland 
Company, failed because of the lack of personal leadership and investment in their projects. 
According to Hayman, joint-stock companies were unsuitable for Newfoundland because 
shareholders had little personal interest in the ventures they took part in beyond their financial 
commitments and so withdrew too quickly when they encountered problems. To resolve this 
issue, investors needed to personally manage their enterprises, instead of indirectly sharing 
responsibility with other shareholders. Direct personal management gave investors control over 
their investments and made them more willing to confront challenges rather than withdrawing 
when they encountered setbacks. Hayman also argued that the government should support 
individuals interested in colonizing Newfoundland by providing protection and incentives such 
as armed convoys, titles and governorships.36  
The last of the tracts written by these three promoters was Vaughan’s The Newlander’s 
Cure, which he published in 1630 under his own name rather than a pseudonym. Unlike The 
Golden Fleece, The Newlander’s Cure was written as a response to the troubles encountered by 
the colonies established over the previous decade, particularly those Calvert encountered at 
Ferryland before he left Newfoundland in 1629. Vaughan used his knowledge of medicine as a 
tool to persuade readers in the Newlander’s Cure in the same way that he used classical rhetoric 
in The Golden Fleece. Vaughan described illnesses common in America and their treatment to 
explain why Calvert’s Ferryland failed and why colonizing Newfoundland was still a worthy 
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venture. Throughout the text, Vaughan discusses health-related reasons for colonizing 
Newfoundland, such as the virtues of physical labour in a rural setting, mainly farming and 
fishing, and the plants and animals present there that could be used to treat scurvy and other 
illnesses.37 By providing information about specific ailments in Newfoundland and listing their 
cures, Vaughan attempted to convince readers that he was familiar with the island, that previous 
failures were avoidable, and that his works were accurate sources of information about the 
island.38  
Establishing trustworthiness formed a central component of Vaughan’s, Whitbourne’s 
and Hayman’s works. In each text, they prominently displayed their personal experiences and 
educations as a means of proving both their knowledge about Newfoundland and the viability of 
their plans. In effect, each writer promoted themselves in order to promote Newfoundland, 
reflecting Pagden’s argument for the importance of autoptic discourse as a tool writers used to 
persuade readers of the reliability of their accounts of America.39 Whitbourne used his personal 
experience and knowledge of Newfoundland’s history, natural environment and industries to 
advertise the island. Vaughan’s humanist education provided the basis for using classical 
literature and medicine to describe the viability of an English population in Newfoundland. 
Hayman combined these two approaches, demonstrating his training by writing a work of poetry 
and translations during his tenure in Newfoundland, and using experiences there to inform his 
proposals.40  
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Promoting Newfoundland’s Natural Environment 
All three writers used a similar image of Newfoundland’s natural resources and climate 
in their accounts. This cohesive message made Newfoundland appealing to readers and allowed 
writers to advocate a common plan for colonization based on developing land-based natural 
resources. Although each author used a similar depiction of Newfoundland’s natural 
environment, they used different approaches to describe it to their readers. Whitbourne and 
Vaughan used inventories to support their arguments, while Hayman provided general 
assessments of Newfoundland’s natural environment and why it was valuable to England. The 
approaches employed by these writers reflected the purposes of their texts and their awareness of 
both how others were promoting Newfoundland and the challenges encountered by colonies 
there.41  
A central component of each writer’s work was the description of Newfoundland’s 
natural resources and the industries that could succeed there. Vaughan and Whitbourne each 
produced inventories of Newfoundland’s natural resources to describe the island and recommend 
specific industries and trades. Inventories formed a central component of Pickstone’s Natural 
Historical Ways of Knowing. Practitioners of these methods sought to understand the world by 
cataloging and classifying the biota and other natural objects of particular regions. Merchants, 
politicians and others in Europe used these inventories to determine the commercial value of 
regions by identifying objects that could be traded or processed. Both Whitbourne and Vaughan 
used this technique to describe Newfoundland as a land rich with plants and animals that were 
useful as food, trade goods or could be used to manufacture other goods. Both writers listed the 
species of waterfowl found in Newfoundland that could be used as food and fishing bait, which 
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fish species were valuable trade commodities and the species of trees suitable for producing 
lumber, tar and turpentine. These lists, which extend over multiple pages in both texts, provide 
readers with a detailed inventory of Newfoundland’s biota and the industries it could support, 
reinforcing Whitbourne’s and Vaughan’s arguments that English politicians and investors should 
classify the island as worthy of immediate colonization.42 
Hayman did not include any inventories in Quodlibets. Instead, he focused on individuals 
in Newfoundland, describing their efforts rather than listing of the island’s natural resources, a 
decision that reflected his awareness of what previous authors had written about the island. 
Quodlibets included a poem, attributed to Vaughan, applauding Hayman for his ability to make 
Newfoundland appealing to readers, and Hayman wrote a poem complimenting Whitbourne’s 
Discourse and Discovery for its descriptions of the island.43 When Hayman discussed 
Newfoundland’s natural resources he used general terms to convey their value, rather than 
describing them with any specificity. In the preface to Quodlibets Hayman states: 
I suppose it not fit at this time (but attending the success of this presumption) in 
some other larger manner to make known unto your Majesty, the inestimable 
riches of the Seas circling that island the hopeful improvements of the main land 
thereof the more than probable invaluable hidden treasured therein.44 
 
Keeping to this statement, Hayman praised the work of individuals living in and promoting 
Newfoundland, such as Mason, John Slany and Thomas Milware, a planter who lived in Harbour 
Grace, without describing the island’s biota. This difference between Hayman’s work and that of 
the other writers matched the format he used. Hayman did not use poetry as a tool for conveying 
bulk information. Instead, he used it to present new ideas to readers who already had some 
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knowledge about the subject. The only exception to this pattern was Hayman’s description of the 
commodities that colonists could produce in Newfoundland. He listed fish, pitch, tar and ship 
masts, but he did not accompany this with any discussion of the species used to make those 
goods.45  
Whitbourne’s and Vaughan’s methods differed from Hayman’s, but their ideas about how 
to use Newfoundland’s natural resources were consistent. All three promoters agreed that while 
the fishery was valuable, establishing a self-sustaining colony in Newfoundland depended on 
land-based industries such as farming. They also argued that these colonies would create a range 
of benefits for England, with Newfoundland becoming a source of trade goods to support 
enterprises in England and elsewhere in America as well as a place to send and reform England’s 
undesirable people, such as the urban poor. MacMillan notes that in addition to benefiting 
England’s economic and social interests, the growth of a colony and population advocated by 
Whitbourne and Vaughan also served a legal purpose by securing England’s sovereignty over the 
island.46 This approach was not unique to Newfoundland. Historian Daniel Vickers found that 
the English colonization of Massachusetts involved a similar framework of using fish as a trade 
good and farming as the means of establishing a permanent and self-sustaining English 
population.47 
The writers diverged in their ideas of which benefits were most important. Vaughan 
proposed Newfoundland as a solution to social issues afflicting England, such as overcrowding, 
unemployment and “sins” associated with the overconsumption of alcohol and tobacco. 
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According to Vaughan, deforestation and barren soil in England were caused by the burden of 
feeding growing urban populations and the resource requirements of industries such as 
metalworking. Vaughan’s views reflect what historian Bruce Boehrer calls a larger literary trend in 
the early seventeenth century, linking environmental degradation in England, specifically 
deforestation, urban pollution and less fertile soil, to the moral decay of England’s population 
through disease, poverty and unsavory practices such as smoking and drinking. Newfoundland 
was, in Vaughan’s estimation, a version of England before overpopulation and exploitation 
reduced its natural resources, and offered an opportunity to solve England’s issues. 48  
Vaughan’s proposition took advantage of the lack of English development in 
Newfoundland by arguing that colonies could be kept free of vice goods such as alcohol by 
limiting their import and sale. Following this model, Vaughan proposed that the way to colonize 
Newfoundland and reduce social and environmental stress in England was to send the urban poor 
and other undesirable populations from cities such as London to the island. These people were, 
in Vaughan’s view, the greatest cause of crime, vice and depletion of natural resources in 
England but, he argued, through employment as fishers and farmers in a land with restricted 
access to tobacco and alcohol, they could transform themselves into useful members of society. 
For Vaughan, colonization became a moral venture aimed as much at improving England as it 
was at possessing and developing Newfoundland. However, Vaughan did not see Newfoundland 
as a possible utopia. Instead, Newfoundland allowed Vaughan to propose a larger moral project 
that used the labour required by colonization projects, and the economic rewards of that work, as 
part of a mission to save England from the moral degeneracy, environmental degradation and 
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unemployment. This argument for colonizing America was common among promoters in the 
seventeenth century, with America often depicted as a land where colonists could lead pious 
lives, and Vaughan was its leading proponent in regards to Newfoundland.49  
Hayman and Whitbourne shared similar sentiments about Newfoundland’s ability to 
resolve English problems, but their focus was on the economic and political possibilities afforded 
by the island’s natural resources. Although Hayman used poetry to show what Fuller called the 
fertile cultural possibility of Newfoundland, Hayman underpinned this bucolic image with a 
pragmatic insistence that the island had abundant natural resources and a temperate climate, 
making it inviting and profitable for merchants.50 In all of Hayman’s and Whitbourne’s works, 
colonization played a central role in growing England’s economy, particularly its overseas trade, 
and countering threats from European rivals, such as Spain and the Dutch Republic.51  
Colonies in Newfoundland were expected to create benefits for the migratory fishery and 
the West Country ports that supported it. According to Hayman and Whitbourne, economically 
diverse colonies created opportunities for fishing merchants and shipbuilders to reduce their 
reliance on European suppliers for salt and forestry products, such as ships masts, while 
increasing the trade goods they could export. Although both writers advocated the development 
of an economically diverse colony, the migratory fishery still played a significant role in their 
proposals. A permanent English population in Newfoundland could, in their view, increase the 
amount of fish caught by supplying ships and protecting their harbours from foreign competitors, 
thus supporting England’s shipping, provisioning and shipbuilding industries while increasing 
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the number of people employed at sea. In turn, these experienced seamen could be drawn upon 
by the Royal Navy in times of war, increasing England’s military strength. Colonists could 
derive social benefits from these ventures as well, such as Newfoundland’s ability to host a 
culturally valuable merchant class, but these were secondary to the island’s ability to produce 
trade goods for England and experienced seamen for the Navy.52 This mercantilist argument for 
colonizing Newfoundland targeted English politicians, who worried that the lack of goods to 
trade in Iberian markets was draining England of gold and silver while enriching its rivals.53 
In addition to this shared economic message, Hayman, Whitbourne and Vaughan wrote 
that Newfoundland had a temperate climate similar to England’s, even though there was a 
growing body of data about America that opposed that idea. Sociologist Eviatar Zerubavel 
argues that sixteenth- and early seventeenth-century colonial promoters developed expectations 
for what colonists would encounter in America by projecting their knowledge of Europe onto 
America, such as using latitude as an indicator of climate.54 However, by the 1620’s explorers 
were challenging the accuracy of those projections. The French explorer Samuel de Champlain 
and writer Marc Lescarbot reported that winters in New France were colder than anticipated, and 
Champlain criticized the idea that latitude was an accurate predictor of climate. Regarding 
Newfoundland, Mason’s Brief Discourse described how cold air and water from the Arctic 
resulted in a colder than expected climate.55 Hayman, Vaughan and Whitbourne did not mention 
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these reports about climate in their writings. None of these writers reference Champlain’s or 
Lescarbot’s texts, but all three wrote about Mason and his work with the Newfoundland 
Company without discussing his reports about Newfoundland’s climate. This awareness 
indicates that Whitbourne, Vaughan and Hayman preferred to cite their own experiences or 
Newfoundland’s latitude as evidence that it had a temperate climate, rather than disputing 
accounts that reduced their proposals’ attractiveness to readers.56 
These writers’ willingness to focus on a single explanation for Newfoundland’s climate, 
even when there was conflicting evidence, was not unusual in this period. Historian Sam White 
argues that European perceptions of America, especially in regard to its geography and climate, 
were flexible in the early seventeenth century. There was no systematic method of recording or 
synthesizing information about specific regions of America, and many firsthand accounts 
recorded climate and natural environment only for specific locations or times of the year. 
Additionally, the interests of the writers themselves, particularly those trying to promote the 
colonization of a specific region like Newfoundland, favoured the use of information that, while 
not representative of the latest evidence from that region, was still widely accepted in England as 
accurate. As a result of this processes, prior ideas that Newfoundland’s climate was similar to 
that of southern England persisted even when contradictory evidence existed.57 Historian Mark 
Carey described this tendency among writers to favour specific types of evidence as an effort to 
define America’s regional climates by their suitability for Europeans, even if details about those 
climates were inaccurately portrayed.58    
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These depictions of Newfoundland’s climate, natural resources and their ability to serve 
specific political, economic and social needs were not remarkably different from writings 
promoting other regions of America. John Smith used similar descriptions to appeal to English 
investors in his A Description of New England (1616).59 Unlike New England, which its 
promoters portrayed as a place with unfamiliar people and resources that could bring glory to 
England, Hayman, Vaughan and Whitbourne depicted Newfoundland as part of England’s larger 
colonial expansion.60 Fuller described this as transforming Newfoundland into a “wet nurse,” a 
place whose value came from its ability to support other colonies, industries and political 
institutions.61 Vaughan’s, Whitbourne’s and Hayman’s writings support Fuller’s argument. All 
three writers argue that Newfoundland was not an isolated land, but rather that it was an 
important component of a broader imperial network. All three writers described Newfoundland 
in terms related to either its transformative value, as seen in Vaughan’s plan to send England’s 
undesirable people to the island, or its ability to supply specific goods, such as fish, and human 
resources, such as experienced seamen.62  
Although there were differences between each writer’s portrayal of Newfoundland and 
the benefits of English investment there, they shared a similar vision for colonizing the island 
that used both the cod fishery and land-based resources. Using these natural resources, 
Whitbourne, Vaughan and Hayman promised investors an opportunity to develop economically 
diverse plantations, with the cod fishery serving as both a valuable trade good and a source of 
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provisions. This promise made the island an attractive investment for individuals interested in 
increasing their land, wealth and social standing. However, in testing those ideas, colonists 
discovered that the Newfoundland promoted to them did not match the actual conditions there.63 
Promoters and Plantations: 1621 to 1629 
 Whitbourne, Vaughan and Hayman inspired individuals to invest in Newfoundland, but 
their colonies revealed flaws in the promoters’ depictions of the island. Calvert’s Ferryland, 
established in 1621, and Cary’s Renews, founded in 1622, both followed the ideas that 
Whitbourne, Vaughan and Hayman promoted. However, every attempt to implement the plans 
promoted by these three writers failed. Expectations of a temperate climate and abundant natural 
resources that could support economically diverse colonies resulted in ventures unprepared for 
Newfoundland’s harsh weather and unable to become profitable by catching, curing and trading 
cod. Although Hayman and Vaughan tried to explain the failure of these colonies and convince 
readers that their plans were still viable, after Calvert’s departure from Newfoundland in 1629 
colonization efforts shifted away from developing the land-based industries they promoted.64     
  Peter Pope noted that the investors who used the ideas advocated by these three 
promoters were not merchants involved in the fishery. Instead, they were politicians who saw 
Newfoundland as a means to advance their social and economic standing. This political interest 
in colonization was not an exclusively English trend. The Compagnie de la Nouvelle France, 
better known as the Company of One Hundred Associates, was composed mostly of courtiers 
focused on developing the fur trade and other land-based industries in New France, such as 
agriculture. In contrast, while New France came under the control of the One Hundred 
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Associates in 1627, during the 1620’s the English colonization of Newfoundland was managed 
by individuals granted portions of the island. Although there are few surviving written sources 
by fishing merchants from the 1620’s, accounts about Newfoundland by fishers, ship captains 
and others who travelled to the island annually were available to West Country merchants. This 
knowledge about Newfoundland was often unavailable to Cary and Calvert because of their lack 
of involvement in the fishing industry. As a result, colonial investors in this period relied on 
either the written accounts or personal expertise of promoters to inform their ventures.65 
 Calvert’s Ferryland is both the most-fully documented colony established in the 1620’s 
and the largest investment of people, money and resources in Newfoundland made during this 
period. In 1620, Calvert purchased land on the Avalon Peninsula from Vaughan, and the 
following year sent colonists to Ferryland under the leadership of his agent Edward Wynne, 
whom Vaughan had recommended to Calvert. On April 7, 1623, Calvert received a charter from 
James I containing rights to govern the land between Fermeuse and Petty Harbour on the Avalon 
Peninsula, including authorization to enforce laws, appoint magistrates and issue pardons.66 The 
reason for Calvert’s choice of Ferryland is not as well documented as the Newfoundland 
Company’s reasons for choosing Cuper’s Cove. However, by 1620 Ferryland was already a well-
established fishing station known for its sheltered harbour and, unlike Cuper’s Cove, was located 
near the epicenter of the cod fishery, giving colonists access to rich fishing grounds and trade 
routes, factors which likely appealed to Calvert. There is perhaps no better indication of this 
harbour’s advantages than its status for much of the seventeenth century as, according to Pope, 
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“the most important of the south Avalon settlements and, considered with nearby Caplin Bay, 
one of the larger settlements in Newfoundland.”67 
For Calvert, whose political position in England deteriorated in the early 1620’s 
following the failure of his negotiations with Spain and fears of persecution for being a Catholic, 
Ferryland represented an opportunity to serve England by expanding its presence in America 
while staying true to his faith.68 Calvert invested heavily in Ferryland, with his expenditures 
estimated to range from £12,000 to £30,000 and including the construction of a mansion to house 
his family, assert his authority over the surrounding area and serve as the administrative hub for 
managing his venture. This financial investment was not meant only to create an economically 
viable colony. Calvert sought to turn Ferryland into a refuge for English Catholics and sent 
priests to the island.69 
Calvert did develop a fishery, but his plans for Ferryland included farming and 
developing other land-based industries. Writing about Calvert’s intention to establish a Catholic 
enclave in Newfoundland, the London-based Catholic missionary Simon Stock reported to the 
Propaganda Fide, the branch of the Roman Curia responsible for missionary work, that 
Ferryland was “most fertile and stocked with fish beyond all measure,” emphasizing Calvert’s 
plans to both fish and farm.70 Although Calvert’s instructions to Wynne do not survive, 
Ferryland’s soil was a major topic of discussion in reports from the plantation, indicating its 
importance to Calvert. Wynne reported in 1621 that “the land here is (without doubt) very fertile, 
                                                          
67 John Guy, “Journal of the Voyage to Newfoundland,” 1610, NU, Middleton MI X 1/2; “An Account of Sir 
George Calvert’s Interest in Newfoundland,” 1670, in Newfoundland Discovered : English Attempts At 
Colonisation, 1610-1630., ed. Gillian Cell (London: Hakluyt Society, 1982), 250-253  Pope, Fish into Wine, 4-5, 32. 
68 John Krugler, “George Calvert: Courtier, Colonizer, Capitalist, Catholic,” Avalon Chronicles 6 (2001): 1–11; 
Luca Codignola, The Coldest Harbour of the Land Simon Stock and Lord Baltimore’s Colony in Newfoundland, 
1621-1649 (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1988), 12–13. 
69 Erasmus Strouton, “Probation,” October 9, 1628, TNA, CO 1/4, 144-145; Pope, Fish into Wine, 124–132, 288–
289. 
70 Simon Stock to Propaganda in Rome, February 8, 1625, in The Coldest Harbour in the Land, ed. Luca Codignola 
(Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1988), 77-79.  
101 
 
for I have since my arrival seene wheate, barly and rye growe here full eared and kerned.”71 In 
addition to these staple crops, Wynne also stated that he grew tobacco and woad for making dye, 
both of which Whitbourne identified as cash crops colonists could grow to diversify their 
incomes.72  
In 1622, two years after Calvert bought land from Vaughan, Henry Cary launched his 
own effort to colonize Newfoundland by obtaining two land grants: South Falkland, a strip of 
land that extended from Fermeuse to Renews, and North Falkland, which contained the 
Bonavista Peninsula.73 Cary’s employment of Whitbourne as an advisor and writer is the clearest 
example of the influence the promoters had on colonization efforts during the 1620’s. Using 
Whitbourne’s ideas, Cary worked to diversify his plantation by raising livestock, searching for 
minerals mining and forestry. Whitbourne’s 1622 Discourse and Loving Invitation outlined 
Cary’s plan for Renews. Like his Discourse and Discovery, Whibourne’s Loving Invitation 
described Newfoundland’s natural resources, but focused on Renews, the main site for Cary’s 
colony. Whitbourne stated that Renews’s soil was suitable for growing “wheat, rye, barley, and 
other grain: as also for flax, hemp, woad, tobacco, and many other purposes.”74 Whitbourne 
reiterated this plan in a letter he wrote to Cary in 1622 recommending that he send tradespeople 
to Newfoundland to build structures, plant crops and raise livestock, along with a complement of 
fishers. While tradespeople established the buildings and industries that would make the colony 
self-sufficient, the fishers provided a source of food and a trade good.75  
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Cary attempted to put the plan outlined by Whitbourne into action. In 1623, Cary hired 
Francis Tanfield, a relative of Cary’s, to governor Renews and sent Whitbourne to 
Newfoundland as an advisor.76 Additionally, Cary instructed his colonists to prepare the land for 
crops and cattle and to establish a fishery. Cary also ordered that none of his colonists trade or 
live with the Beothuk, but proposed that, if the opportunity arose, they should abduct Beothuk 
children and raise them according to English customs. Cary does not discuss what his plans were 
for these abducted children, and there is no known evidence that his colonists encountered any 
Beothuk.77 This point diverged from Whitbourne’s advice that Cary’s colonists should trade with 
the Beothuk, and T.C.’s description of Renews, which stated that the Beothuk did not inhabit the 
land near Cary’s plantation. Neither writer mentioned nor recommended abducting children.78  
 It is unclear why Cary’s efforts failed, but by 1626 Whitbourne had given up on the 
enterprise and sought employment from Villiers as a naval commissioner, after which he did not 
take part in any ventures involving Newfoundland.79 Similarly, there is no known evidence about 
how long Tanfield remained in Newfoundland, but in 1630 he was no longer associated with 
Cary’s venture and was working in Ireland as an agent for Charles I.80 In 1628, Hayman 
criticized Cary for not taking a greater personal role in managing his colony, and stated that the 
Renews colony existed in “words only.”81 Hayman’s claim that Cary’s plantation only existed as 
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a concept was an exaggeration. Like Cuper’s Cove, Renews remained inhabited by English 
colonists after its investors pulled out.82      
Although Hayman criticized Cary’s approach to the colonization of Newfoundland, 
Calvert embodied the principles that he, Vaughan and Whitbourne espoused as necessary for 
succeeding there, and the early reports from Ferryland reinforced the idea that the island could 
host an economically diverse plantation. The growth of a variety of crops Wynne reported, 
including cash crops, indicated both the arability of Newfoundland’s soil and its temperate 
climate, raising hopes that colonists could expand inland by clearing farmland.83 All three writers 
praised Calvert. Whitbourne focused on the success of crops at Ferryland as vindicating his 
proposals, while Vaughan and Hayman advocated Calvert’s management of Ferryland, which 
included multiple visits to the colony before moving there with his household, as the model for 
future plantations. Although all three writers included anti-Catholic statements in their works, 
they either ignored or were unaware of Calvert’s Catholicism, choosing instead to focus on his 
efforts as proof that their proposals were viable.84   
Ferryland’s success was short-lived. Beginning with the Anglo-Spanish War in 1625 and 
the Anglo-French War in 1627, wartime restrictions and the Navy’s need for ships and seamen 
complicated Calvert’s attempts to support his plantation. Shipping delays, trade restrictions, 
piracy and raids hindered both Ferryland’s supply line from England and access to Iberian trade 
ports, the primary market for the Newfoundland cod produced by English fishers. Calvert was 
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able to use his political connections to stop the seizure of his goods and the press-ganging of his 
sailors by English authorities, but he was also responsible for defending Newfoundland.85 In 
1628, French ships led by Raymond de la Ralde, an enforcer for the de Caën family’s monopoly 
on the Canadian fur trade, attacked English fishing ships in Newfoundland, forcing Calvert to 
divert his ships away from trading cod to engage in a lengthy and expensive defensive campaign. 
According to Pope, these troubles reduced any opportunity Calvert had to generate revenue from 
the fishery.86   
In addition to military and financial setbacks, Newfoundland itself did not meet Calvert’s 
expectations. Calvert took personal control of the management of Ferryland and moved there 
with his family and household in 1628. Despite Wynne’s claims of cultivating tobacco and woad, 
neither crop appeared to have been growing when Calvert arrived, indicating that Wynne’s early 
successes were either exaggerated or could not be repeated.87 Additionally, the winter of 1628-
1629 was severe, with fifty of Ferryland’s one hundred English inhabitants becoming ill, 
including Calvert himself, and “nine or ten” perished.88 The harsh winter, expensive defense and 
reduced trade caused Calvert to leave Newfoundland in 1629 and obtain a new grant to colonize 
Maryland. In a letter to Charles I, Calvert explained that his troubles at Ferryland forced him to 
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seek a more hospitable land, and stated “I am determined to commit this place to fishermen that 
are able to encounter storms and hard weather.”89  
Vaughan’s The Newlander’s Cure, published a year after Calvert announced he was 
leaving Ferryland, blamed scurvy and poor site selection for the colony’s failure. According to 
Vaughan, Ferryland was known as “the coldest harbour of the land,” and was less hospitable 
than Aquaforte, the harbour he claimed to have recommended to Calvert.90 Vaughan identified 
Aquaforte, situated two kilometers south of Ferryland and sheltered within a deep bay, as a more 
suitable location since it was protected from the ocean wind. Despite this assertion, Calvert 
clearly held Vaughan’s advice in some regard: he hired Wynne based on Vaughan’s 
recommendation and his plan adhered to the one presented in The Golden Fleece by developing 
an economically diversified plantation to meet both political and social goals. Although Vaughan 
criticized the choice of Ferryland in The Newlander’s Cure, he made no reference to problems 
with that harbour before 1630.91  
Vaughan’s explanation for Calvert’s failure was not enough to preserve any remaining 
interest in the program of colonization he, Whitbourne and Hayman promoted. Calvert was the 
last of the Newfoundland planters to dedicate their resources to developing an economically 
diverse colony.92 The next major investor in Newfoundland, David Kirke, who took over 
Ferryland in 1638, diverged from his predecessors by eschewing the development of farms and 
other land-based industries. Instead, Kirke used the cod fishery to make Ferryland profitable by 
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exporting cod and servicing the migratory fishery. This change in focus became the standard 
practice for planters in Newfoundland for the remainder of the seventeenth century.93  
The ventures launched by Cary and Calvert all relied on the idea that Newfoundland had 
a temperate climate and abundant natural resources. However, this conceptualization did not 
translate into a viable plan. Efforts to establish industries besides the cod fishery made colonies 
both expensive and exposed to disruptive shocks when Newfoundland’s natural environment did 
not meet expectations. By the time Calvert left Newfoundland, it was apparent to him that the 
ideas promoted by Vaughan, Whitbourne and Hayman were based on a fundamental 
misconception of the island’s natural environment. Calvert did not leave Ferryland to farmers: he 
declared that only fishers could subsist there, a reversal from the vision promoted throughout the 
1620’s.94  
Vaughan’s, Whitbourne’s and Hayman’s works belong to an understanding, prevalent 
during the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, of Newfoundland as a place similar to 
England that could support economically diverse colonies. This interpretation originated in the 
writings of figures such as Parkhurst, Parmenius and Hayes, and focused on promoting the 
economic, political and social value of self-sufficient colonies that served England by supplying 
trade goods, rather than relying on England for support. The Newfoundland Company was the 
first to test this plan in Newfoundland, but the promoters and colonies of the 1620’s represent the 
most thorough application of this idea to both colonize the island and advertise the advantages of 
an economically diverse colony.95  
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Building from either their experiences or education, Whitbourne, Hayman and Vaughan 
worked to convince readers to follow their plans by establishing themselves as experts regarding 
Newfoundland. However, rather than questioning whether the Newfoundland Company failed 
because its assumptions about Newfoundland were inaccurate, all three writers presented the 
same image of the island as a place with abundant natural resources and a temperate climate that 
John Slany had promoted. Although their plans attracted investors and colonists, they did not 
translate into sustainable ventures. Like the Newfoundland Company before them, Calvert and 
Cary discovered that Newfoundland’s climate and natural resources did not live up to the 
promises of promoters, and that colonizing the island was a more challenging task than 
anticipated. These efforts either employed promoters as advisors, as was the case with 
Whitbourne’s work with Cary, or were praised by the three writers for following their advice, 
were unprepared for Newfoundland’s harsh weather and lack of natural resources.96 
Although Cary and Calvert’s efforts failed, they left behind a growing population of 
English inhabitants in Newfoundland. These inhabitants, who garnered little attention from the 
promoters, did not build economically diversified plantations. They focused their efforts on the 
cod fishery by catching, curing and selling fish and servicing migratory fishers and ships. While 
English writers and investors ignored this group in the 1620’s, beginning in the 1630’s these 
inhabitants dominated the discussions of English merchants and policymakers seeking to 
colonize and regulate Newfoundland.97 
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Chapter 3 
Looking out from the Shore: Regulation, Trade and Re-imagining Newfoundland, 1634-
1674 
 
The historical events of this island, from Sir David Kirke’s coming thither to the 
First French War, are too trivial to remember, consisting only of common 
accidents in life among fishers and their traffic.  
John Oldmixon (1741).1  
The lack of explorers and conquerors made mid-seventeenth century Newfoundland seem 
uninteresting to the historian John Oldmixon, but the period from 1634 to 1674 was one of 
significant economic, social and political change. Following George Calvert’s departure from 
Ferryland in 1629, English perceptions of Newfoundland’s natural environment and how to use it 
moved away from developing economically diverse colonies through the use of multiple natural 
resources towards focusing on the cod fishery. Two strategies exemplify this shift. The first was 
the creation of policies that prioritized the fishery over other industries by giving fishing ships 
preferential rights to Newfoundland’s natural resources. The second was the use of trade routes 
by planters and fishers to transport people and goods to and from the island, allowing them to 
specialize in fishing and servicing fishers and ships. This chapter examines these developments 
in three sections to argue that, between 1634 and 1674, English merchants, planters and 
policymakers recognized the cod fishery as Newfoundland’s main industry by adopting and 
codifying practices that used the fishery to expand the English presence in Newfoundland. These 
decisions overturned prior assumptions that Newfoundland’s natural resources could support an 
economically diverse colony and raised questions in England about the island’s value as a 
colonial possession.2  
                                                          
1 John Oldmixon, The History of Newfoundland Containing an Account of Its Discovery, Settlement, Encrease, 
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 The first section analyzes the 1634 “An Order of the Star Chamber Concerning the 
Settlement of the Fishery in Newfoundland,” better known as the Western Charter. This Charter 
was the first attempt by English policymakers to re-think how English fishers and colonists 
should use Newfoundland since George Calvert’s departure from Ferryland in 1629. This 
foundational legislative document introduced a series of regulations and enforcement 
mechanisms that defined the cod fishery as Newfoundland’s main industry and reserved the 
island’s other natural resources, such as its forests, for the use of that fishery. These changes, as 
noted by Gillian Cell and Keith Matthews, constituted the government’s first effort to control the 
English fishery and colonization of Newfoundland. The Western Charter laid out a set of 
regulations to be enforced throughout all of Newfoundland, breaking from the government’s 
previous habit of granting individual planters and companies the right to control portions of the 
island.3  
The Western Charter was not the only attempt to redirect English efforts in 
Newfoundland. The second section focuses on how David Kirke, who took over Ferryland in 
1638, built a profitable enterprise by exchanging cod for provisions and consumer goods 
otherwise unavailable in Newfoundland. Kirke, rather than attempting to develop an 
economically diverse colony, operated on the idea that there were few on-land natural resources 
in Newfoundland and focused his efforts on catching and trading cod. This approach, as Peter 
Pope argued, demonstrated that Kirke was an intelligent businessperson who leveraged 
transatlantic markets to enrich himself and his family.4 Using documents from the National 
Archives and British Library, and reports from archaeological excavations in Newfoundland, this 
                                                          
3 Cell, English Enterprise in Newfoundland, 108–112; Keith Matthews, A History of the West of England-
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section studies how Kirke’s success relied on the fishery and transatlantic trade connections 
instead of land-based industries.5   
The Western Charter and Kirke represent the best-documented cases of a wider shift in 
English fishing and plantation efforts occurring after 1630. The third section examines how other 
residents and fishers in Newfoundland focused their activities on fishing and servicing the 
fishery. Service industries, such as taverns, and transatlantic trade connections allowed 
Newfoundland’s English population to grow in number through specialization, rather than 
attempted self-sufficiency, a trend that reflected the growing understanding of what types of 
industries the island’s natural resources could sustain. This specialization, which historian Robert 
Sweeny argued was indicative of the development of a capitalist society in Newfoundland, 
limited inland development, particularly efforts to develop mining and forestry sectors, and 
incentivized the creation of small, widely dispersed plantations with access to fishing grounds 
and shipping routes.6  
Newfoundland was not the only European colony to experience growth in this period. 
During the late 1620’s and 1630’s, English, Dutch and French colonies in America grew in 
number and population. The development of agriculture and trade, especially the trade of locally 
produced goods such as beaver pelts, fish and tobacco, allowed colonies to sustain permanent 
European populations that spread out to establish new towns, farms and outposts. Some of the 
towns founded during this period, such as Boston, established in 1630, grew quickly in 
population and importance during the mid-seventeenth century and became powerful economic 
and political centres that traded throughout the Atlantic. Newfoundland, in contrast with these 
                                                          
5 “An Order of the Star Chamber Concerning the Settlement of the Fishery in Newfoundland,” January 24 1634, 
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colonies, grew by focusing on a single natural resource. Rather than combining agricultural 
expansion with an export fur trade, as happened in New France, or establishing a fishery and 
hinterland that produced a variety of trade goods, like in New England, successful English efforts 
in Newfoundland concentrated on catching and trading cod. Newfoundland was not alone in this 
focus, the English colonies in Maine similarly focused on the fishery as a means to trade for 
goods that could not be produced locally.7        
By focusing on the fishery, policymakers, merchants and planters re-categorized 
Newfoundland’s place within England’s overseas empire by narrowing their definition of what 
natural resources made it worth possessing and how to control the use of those resources. 
Defining fishing as Newfoundland’s sole major industry created a new understanding of its 
natural environment, the challenges of managing the island and how residents used the 
transatlantic trade enabled by exporting cod to survive there.8 However, English residents and 
fishers in Newfoundland did not abandon all land-based activities. They used forests for fuel and 
building materials, and hunted for food and furs during the winter months, but these activities 
supplied the fishery or supplemented incomes.9 The growing population of planters and fishers 
became the target of complaints and petitions about Newfoundland by West Country merchants, 
who accused them of using abusive practices and reducing the fishery’s economic and social 
                                                          
7 John Martin, Profits in the Wilderness: Entrepreneurship and the Founding of New England Towns in the 
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value to England. The English government’s response to these complaints varied between 
commissioning individuals to intervene on its behalf or passing new legislation, a pattern that 
continued until 1675 when it adopted new methods of learning about and managing the island.10 
The 1634 Western Charter 
 The Western Charter, issued in 1634 by the Privy Council, was the English government’s 
first attempt to enact a framework for enforcing laws and best practices across all of 
Newfoundland.11 Previous charters contained limitations in regards to whom they applied. Both 
Calvert and the Newfoundland Company’s charters forbade them from interfering with the 
migratory fishery.12 The failure of prior colonization efforts, complaints about colonists 
interfering with the fishery, such as those by West Country merchants about the Newfoundland 
Company in 1618, and an ongoing economic depression in England prompted the Privy Council 
to enact legislation to protect the fishery and address chronic complaints. The Western Charter 
worked in broad strokes to define Newfoundland’s function as an English possession by using a 
series of regulations and enforcement practices to preserve and grow the fishery while 
minimizing the government’s financial and military commitments there.13 
 The Western Charter defined the cod fishery as Newfoundland’s main industry, and that 
the island’s value to England came from its ability to host fishers and supply them with wood 
and other necessities while they caught and cured cod. Its provisions covered crimes and 
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regulations ranging from general law-and-order issues, such as murder and theft, to the 
Newfoundland specific, such as regulating the amount of shore space a ship could use and the 
banning of taverns. The goal of these regulations was to prevent activities that threatened to 
reduce the value of the fishery by either managing access to natural resources or banning 
practices that were perceived to interfere with fishers. These regulations responded to complaints 
made by merchants about conditions in Newfoundland while also clearly stating, in a way that 
had not been done before, the government’s perception of what the island’s natural resources 
were and its value as a colonial possession.14  
 The fishing admiral system, the Western Charter’s main enforcement mechanism, was 
the core component for ensuring the Charter’s efficacy. The system granted the title of fishing 
admiral to the captain of the first ship to arrive in a harbour in Newfoundland each year. The 
fishing admiral was responsible for enforcing laws and regulations, keeping records of crimes 
committed in their harbour and transporting anyone accused of an offence in Newfoundland to 
England, where the accused would be tried in one of the West Country towns. The Western 
Charter did not create the fishing admiral system. The Charter called fishing admirals an “ancient 
custom” in use since the sixteenth century, thus turning an informal method of dispute resolution 
into the main law enforcement practice in Newfoundland.15  
 Empowering West Country ship with the administration of laws and regulations in 
Newfoundland was an appealing choice for English lawmakers. On January 24, 1634, William 
Noye wrote that any regulation regarding Newfoundland should rely on the West Country for 
enforcement since merchants and captains from that region were both the most familiar with 
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Newfoundland and impacted by any policy regulating the fishery. Noye, following instructions 
from the Privy Council, drafted the Western Charter.16 There is no known business connection 
between Noye and the Newfoundland fishery, but Robert Hayman dedicated a poem to him in 
Quodlibets, suggesting that Noye may have had some familiarity with the island through either 
Hayman or his book.17 
Although the Western Charter remained the main regulatory document for Newfoundland 
until 1699, in practice it did little to reduce or punish crimes.18 Jerry Bannister, investigating the 
effectiveness of the fishing admiral system, concluded that in the known sources there are “no 
examples of any fishing admirals’ court presiding over a criminal case or ordering punishments 
for criminal offences.”19 The Western Charter’s reliance on fishing ships to enforce regulations 
made the system inexpensive for the government, but unwieldy for ships because of the added 
responsibilities of hearing complaints, recordkeeping and transporting accused criminals. Cell 
and Matthews both argued that the Charter’s true value came from the political leverage it gave 
West Country merchants during future debates, particularly those regarding issues that could 
increase government authority over the fishery, something many West Country merchants 
opposed. In effect, the Western Charter was powerful on paper but rarely enforced because of the 
burdens it placed on ships, a trend historian David Ormrod argued was common to other 
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contemporary trade measures, such as the 1651 Navigation Act, which relied on similar onerous 
enforcement mechanisms that compromised its effectiveness.20 
In addition to imposing regulations, the Western Charter overturned earlier assumptions 
about Newfoundland’s natural resources. Before 1634, writers and colonists promoted forestry as 
an alternative industry to fishing. Anthony Parkhurst, Stephen Parmenius and Richard 
Whitbourne all wrote that Newfoundland’s forests were a potential source of timber, tar and 
turpentine for the English shipbuilding industry.21 However, the Western Charter portrayed these 
same forests as a limited resource to be protected and used exclusively for the fishery by stating:  
That noe person set fire in any of the woodes of the Country or worke any 
detriment or destruction to the same, by ryndings of the Trees, either for the 
seelinge of Shippes, houldes, or for Roomes on Shoare, or for any other uses, 
Except for the coverings of the Roofes for Cookeroomes to dresse their meate in, 
and those Roomes not to extend above sixteene foote in length at the most.22 
 
This change built from the experiences of the previous twenty years, particularly the shift from 
the idea of Newfoundland’s forests as an abundant resource that could supply new industries, to 
a limited one that needed protection to ensure its availability for the fishery.23 
The Privy Council’s efforts to preserve Newfoundland’s forests echoed contemporary 
worries that islands were vulnerable to deforestation, which could reduce their economic and 
strategic value to England. English officials were aware of the need to strategically manage the 
use of forests and the potential harm that could be caused by deforestation. In Green 
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Imperialism, Richard Grove identified the preservation of forests on islands as a central concern 
for colonial policymakers. Early European ventures on tropical oceanic islands, such as Saint 
Helena, destroyed large portions of forest, causing concern in Europe that these islands would be 
rendered incapable of providing the supplies that trade ships needed for long voyages. Although 
Grove concentrated on tropical oceanic islands, his analysis is relevant for studying 
Newfoundland, where the Western Charter enshrined a similar program to preserve the island’s 
forests for the fishery, which relied on them for building materials and fuel. Without sufficient 
quantities of wood, fishing ships would be unable to build stages or other buildings necessary for 
curing fish, significantly decreasing the fishery’s productivity and profitability. The risk of 
deforestation through overharvesting was exacerbated by the temporary nature of the migratory 
fishery’s buildings, which were often destroyed during the winter, intensifying the need for 
building materials each spring.24  
In addition to securing Newfoundland’s forests for the fishery, the Western Charter also 
addressed concerns that forest fires diminished the island’s cod stocks. In 1583, Parmenius 
reported that ash runoff from forest fires caused cod to leave the affected harbours and stated that 
“fish never came to the place about it for a space of seven whole years after, by reason of the 
waters made bitter.”25 Noye and the Privy Council recognized the dangers of both deforestation 
and forest fires by reclassifying forests as a source of supplies and a potential hazard to the 
fishery if mismanaged, rather than as a source of trade goods. This effort to balance the future 
needs of the fishery, and protect the cod stocks from human actions, represents a nuanced 
understanding on the part of the Privy Council regarding the impact of human actions on the 
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ecosystem in Newfoundland. Through its regulations on forest use, the Western Charter sought 
to ensure the long-term viability of the migratory cod fishery and protect the fishery from short-
term damage due to human action. Forest fires remained a concern for policymakers and writers 
after 1634. James Yonge reported in 1671 that ash runoff from forest fires drove fish into deep 
waters far from shore, making them difficult to catch.26 
While restrictions on cutting and burning trees defined the purpose of Newfoundland’s 
forests, the Western Charter’s ban on taverns focused on managing fishers. Policymakers viewed 
taverns as socially and economically detrimental. Drunkenness among fishers decreased the 
quantity of fish caught, thus reducing the fishery’s profitability. In addition to drunkenness 
hurting fishers’ effectiveness, policymakers worried that fishers indebted to tavern owners would 
stay in Newfoundland, abandoning their families in England and burdening the church with 
providing for them. Although the Western Charter banned taverns, complaints about them 
persisted. In 1639, a letter signed by fourteen justices of the peace from Devon argued that 
drinking in Newfoundland hurt the value of the fishery, increased the number of poor in England 
and reduced the amount of trained seamen available to the Navy.27  
The Western Charter was not the first attempt to reduce access to alcohol in 
Newfoundland. William Vaughan, in both The Golden Fleece and The Newlander’s Cure, 
proposed banning alcohol from Newfoundland to create an economically productive and 
religious colony. Unlike Vaughan, the Western Charter framed the ban on taverns as a means to 
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stop an ongoing practice with negative economic consequences. Newfoundland, according to 
English authorities, was a place inhabited and changed by Europeans, but not all of these 
developments were perceived as good. Deforestation and taverns threatened the longterm 
profitability of the fishery, and the lack of a central governor complicated the management of 
that fishery.28  
 The Western Charter represented a different perception of Newfoundland’s natural 
resources than the one that had guided the colonization efforts launched over the previous twenty 
years. The Charter portrayed Newfoundland as a sparse shoreline whose value lay in its ability to 
support the migratory fishery. While this perception aligned with historical fishing practices and 
the failure of previous colonization efforts, it was not the only idea present in England about how 
to use Newfoundland. The Western Charter defined the rights of fishing ships in Newfoundland, 
but it did not define how to use the island’s fishery. There were two main methods of using 
Newfoundland: visiting the island seasonally to fish, or living there year-round by using the 
fishery and cod trade to supply the goods Newfoundland could not provide. These two 
approaches came to the forefront of the government’s considerations in 1637 with David Kirke’s 
grant to colonize and govern Newfoundland.29  
David Kirke’s Ferryland: 1637-1654  
 On November 13, 1637, King Charles I granted the right to colonize and govern 
Newfoundland to David Kirke; James Hamilton, the Marquis of Hamilton; Philip Herbert, the 
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Earl of Pembroke; and Henry Rich, the Earl of Holland.30 Kirke, the only one of the grantees to 
go to Newfoundland or take an active role in managing the venture, established a multi-
generational enterprise based in Ferryland. Kirke’s success came from his ability to leverage the 
transatlantic cod trade, exchanging fish for goods that Newfoundland could not provide and 
operated using a perception of Newfoundland’s natural environment like the one contained in the 
Western Charter. Both Kirke and the Western Charter viewed the fishery as the reason for 
visiting and colonizing Newfoundland. However, Kirke’s use of the fishery differed from the 
migratory fishery protected by the Western Charter. While the Western Charter focused on 
maximizing the amount of fish caught by migratory ships to boost industries in England, Kirke 
traded cod for goods that he could either use or sell in Newfoundland.31   
The grant that Charles I issued to Kirke and his associates defined their rights to 
Newfoundland and judged prior colonization efforts. Except for the Western Charter, Charles I 
revoked all previous grants and charters regarding Newfoundland, acknowledging their failures 
and giving Kirke authority to enforce the terms of his grant over the entirety of the island. Kirke 
and his associates were also granted the right to tax foreign ships in Newfoundland at a rate of 
five percent of their cargoes, a right meant to reduce foreign competition with the English 
fishery. Archeologist Barry Gaulton states that this tax rate exceeded the profit margins typical in 
the provision and cod trade, making it a potentially effective tool for pushing foreign competitors 
out of Newfoundland, particularly Dutch and Iberian traders, which often used the same harbours 
as the English. The grant included some restrictions, such as banning Kirke from building or 
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living within six miles of the shore, a limit meant to encourage land-based industries and reduce 
competition with the migratory fishery. The six-mile limit was added to the Western Charter 
after the issuance of Kirke’s grant, thus applying it to all English residents in Newfoundland. 
Additionally, Kirke’s grant stated that migratory fishing ships had the first choice of shore spaces 
each spring, a restriction designed to prevent him from occupying the best spaces before ships 
arrived. There is no known evidence of Kirke or any other English resident in Newfoundland 
adhering to either restriction.32   
Charles I’s grant to Kirke and his associates was influenced by both Kirke’s prior service 
to the King and his mercantile success. In 1629, David Kirke, along with his brothers Lewis, 
Thomas, John and James, captured Quebec City and Samuel de Champlain, an achievement that 
brought them notoriety in England. Although the Treaty of Susa forced the Kirke brothers to give 
up their prizes, David Kirke was knighted in 1633 for his actions and became a favourite of 
Charles I. By 1637, David Kirke had also created an extensive commercial network by building 
upon his father Gervase Kirke’s wine trade. Kirke’s connections spanned the Atlantic, with 
business relations with William Alexander’s colonization efforts in Nova Scotia and the French 
and Iberian wine trades. The royal favour bestowed upon Kirke and his business connections 
assisted him in establishing the trade network that made Ferryland profitable.33 
 In 1638, David Kirke arrived in Ferryland, a harbour he likely chose because of the 
facilities Calvert built there in the 1620’s, and established himself as both the governor of 
                                                          
32 “A Grant of Newfoundland to Marquise Hamilton, Earle of Pembroke, Earle of Holland and David Kirke and 
their heirs,” November 13, 1637, TNA, CO 195/1, 11-27; Berry Gaulton, “The Commercial Development of 
Newfoundland’s English Shore,” in Exploring Atlantic Transitions: Archaeologies of Transience and Permanence 
in New Found Lands, eds. Peter Pope and Shannon Lewis-Simpson (Woodbridge: The Boydell Press, 2013), 279. 
33 “The Petition of Sir William Alexander and Captain David Kirke,” November 29, 1630, TNA, CO 1/6, 8-9; Pope, 
Fish into Wine, 80-87; David Hackett Fischer, Champlain’s Dream (Toronto: Vintage Canada, 2009), 406–26; John 
Moir, “Kirke, Sir David,” Dictionary of Canadian Biography, accessed June 30, 2015, 
http://www.biographi.ca/en/bio/kirke_david_1E.html. 
121 
 
Newfoundland and its leading merchant. Rather than developing land-based industries, Kirke 
focused his efforts on catching and trading fish as well as servicing and taxing fishing ships and 
their crews. Kirke used the transatlantic cod trade, the rights granted to him by Charles I and the 
lack of local authorities to stop him from breaking the terms of his grant or the Western Charter, 
to build a successful enterprise.34 
Kirke’s business strategy was to use a multilateral trade network to exchange cod for 
provisions and other goods that he sold in either England or Newfoundland. This strategy 
upended the assumptions of prior colonization efforts by using Newfoundland as fishing station 
and base for trade, rather than trying to develop a self-sustaining colony. By using Ferryland as 
the headquarters for his operations, Kirke also broke from the Western Charter in that his efforts 
to profit from trade and servicing the fishery ultimately enriched his family and other planters in 
Newfoundland, rather than the West Country ports the Privy Council preferred in 1634.35  
The primary tool for trading and transporting these goods were sack ships, cargo ships 
designed to cross the Atlantic Ocean quickly to ensure that their goods could fetch profitable 
prices at market. The average sack ship displaced 75-tons, smaller than the average fishing ship 
at 100-tons, but some were larger, such as the 250-ton Faith operated by Kirke and his 
associates.36 Sack ships specialized in trading and transporting fish and other commodities, with 
little involvement in the actual catching or curing of fish. These ships typically operated using a 
triangular trade, with the first leg being from England or Southern Europe to Newfoundland, 
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with ships bringing provisions, salt and wine to trade for fish. The second leg was from 
Newfoundland to Southern Europe, New England or the Caribbean, where they traded fish for 
alcohols, sugar and other goods, a trade possible since Newfoundland cod was exempt from the 
Navigation Acts which ordered that trade ships pass through England before continuing to other 
ports. The third leg was the return voyage to England.37 This process, which Pope succinctly 
described as turning “fish into wine,” gave planters in Newfoundland the ability to subsist and 
profit based entirely on the export of cod.38  
Planters and sack ships often cooperated since, as historian Olaf Janzen noted, timing was 
crucial in the cod trade. In general, the first ships to arrive at a market would get higher prices for 
their cargoes and obtain goods at lower prices than those that arrived later and had to contend 
with gluts of fish and shortages of other goods. This dynamic encouraged merchants to build 
relationships with planters to ensure that sufficient quantities of cod were available upon arrival 
in Newfoundland. The sack trade became a popular investment in England because of its 
flexibility and potential to profit on all three legs of the journey. For example, the politician and 
economic writer Dudley North had no known involvement in the Newfoundland fishery, but 
financed sack ships in the cod trade.39 
The consumer goods, primarily alcohol and tobacco, gathered through the sack trade 
allowed Kirke to operate taverns in Newfoundland. Taverns existed in Newfoundland before 
Kirke’s arrival, but his use of the sack trade to supply taverns reshaped planter’s relationships 
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with the island.40 Taverns allowed planters to sell alcohol and tobacco to both their servants and 
seasonal fishers, creating a new source of income and a means of reclaiming wages. Alcohol was 
especially useful to planters since, as Pope noted, demand for it was elastic and changed in 
accordance with adjustments in prices and wages paid to servants. This elasticity allowed 
planters to change how much they charged to match local conditions, such as poor catches, wars 
or other factors that altered fishers’ and servants’ incomes.41 Kirke operated a tavern in Ferryland 
that sold alcohol and provisions to his servants and visiting ships, a business that was large 
enough to warrant creating a credit system using tokens to exchange for goods. Four tokens have 
been found: three in Newfoundland and one in England.42 The Kirke family’s collection of 
luxury goods, including elaborate Terra Sigillata Earthware from Portugal, and expensive 
imported food items, such as preserved fruits from Portugal, also indicates their success.43  
Kirke’s achievements came at a political cost. From 1637 until his death in 1654, Kirke 
was the subject of a series of complaints, hearings and lawsuits regarding his grant and abuse of 
the Western Charter.44 At the core of these grievances, which came mostly from West Country 
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merchants, was the idea that Newfoundland’s value to England came from its cod, and that Kirke 
interfered with the fishery. Additionally, Cecil Calvert, the son of George Calvert, initiated a 
lawsuit in 1651 regarding Kirke’s right to inhabit Ferryland. Calvert claimed that his father 
appointed an agent to manage Ferryland in his place in 1629, making Kirke’s use of the harbour 
and its facilities illegal. Kirke’s response to these complaints is revealing. Instead of arguing that 
his ability to leverage a transatlantic trade and tax foreigners justified his grant, Kirke contended 
that by colonizing Newfoundland he could establish new industries using land-based resources. 
Although this argument did not accurately represent Kirke’s actions, his use of the same ideas 
presented by writers such as Whitbourne and Vaughan reflected his awareness of the dissonance 
between English expectations for colonies and the limited natural resources in Newfoundland.45 
Two of Kirke’s responses to the complaints exemplify his approach to defending himself. 
The first, titled “Reply to the Answer to the Description of Newfoundland,” (1639) was written 
by Kirke to address specific complaints about him and Newfoundland.46 The second is a letter 
written in 1639 from Kirke to Charles I describing his experience in Newfoundland.47 In both 
documents, Kirke argued that his opponents depicted Newfoundland’s climate and natural 
resources inaccurately to downplay the possibility of any economic activity besides fishing, such 
as saltmaking and forestry.48 
The list of industries that Kirke provided matched those promoted by Whitbourne and 
Vaughan, but Kirke assessed the potential profitability of each industry and how difficult they 
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would be to establish, something previous writers did not do.49 In the “Reply to the Answer,” 
industries are categorized by how easily they could be set up, how they benefited the fishery and 
their potential profitability to determine what was worthwhile for colonists to pursue. Some 
industries, such as making salt by evaporating seawater, were categorized as viable since they 
produced valuable commodities that could reduce the fishery’s reliance on imported supplies, 
while others, such as making potash, were deemed too difficult to be worth pursuing.50 Kirke 
repeated this approach in his letter to Charles I. He argued that not only could Newfoundland 
host multiple land-based industries, but the complaints made about the island by both merchants 
and failed colonists, particularly Calvert, were also incorrect. Kirke blamed mismanagement and 
a lack of expertise for the failure of prior efforts.51 
 Kirke did not limit his responses to proposing new industries. He attacked the fishing 
merchants by arguing that they purposefully misrepresented Newfoundland to support their 
claims. Kirke focused on two assertions by his opponents to make his case: that Newfoundland’s 
fog made the island unhealthy to Europeans and that there were no people there besides 
Europeans. In regard to fog, which the West Country merchants claimed surrounded 
Newfoundland for months at a time, making navigation dangerous and sickening inhabitants, 
Kirke stated that he had not experienced or heard of fog lasting more than three or four days. 
Kirke’s response to the argument that only Europeans visited and lived in Newfoundland was 
more forceful, he mocked his detractors by stating:  
First say you if there be a trade, there must be somebody supposed with whom to 
trade and there be no natives upon the island, how noe natives in Newfoundland! 
Have you lost your eyesight in the fog again and so blinded do you know at whom 
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you strike?52  
 
Kirke maintained that trade and conflict between Europeans and the Mi’kmaq and Beothuk were 
common occurrences. Additionally, Kirke cited John Guy’s encounter with Beothuk traders to 
demonstrate his opponents’ lack of knowledge about Newfoundland. While there is no known 
evidence that Kirke personally interacted with the Beothuk or Mi’kmaq, there are two Beothuk 
warriors depicted on the coat of arms granted to Kirke by Charles I in 1638. These arguments, 
although contrary to Kirke’s actions in Newfoundland, appealed to the assumption that the island 
could host economically diverse colonies, indicating his knowledge of the divergence between 
English perceptions of the island’s natural environment and the actual conditions there.53 
Kirke’s claims that Newfoundland could host an economically diverse colony, even if 
they did not match his actual business strategy, were an effective defence during the 1630’s and 
1640’s, although his loyalty to Charles I likely helped him protect his position. During the 
English Civil War (1642-1651), Kirke remained supportive of the Royalists and his brother 
Lewis served as an officer in the Royalist army. It was not until David Kirke lost Charles I’s 
support that the complaints against him resulted in a response from the government. During the 
Interregnum (1649-1660), Kirke’s position became unstable, particularly following the deaths of 
his co-grantees. In 1649, Hamilton and Rich were executed by Parliament because of their 
Royalist ties, and in 1650 Herbert, who was a Parliamentarian, died from an illness. Coinciding 
with this lost support, Kirke’s main detractors, merchants from the West Country, gained a 
higher standing with the government since the region had largely sided with Parliament during 
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the war.54  
Kirke was arrested in 1651 by a commission approved by Parliament and led by the 
merchant John Treworgie, who then became the governor of Newfoundland. The charges against 
Kirke were that he abused his grant by illegally taxing English ships and restricted access to the 
shore. Although Treworgie’s commission reflected what historians Christopher Hill and Carla 
Pestana called Parliament’s determination to bring the English colonies under its control by 
suppressing Royalists, little changed in regards to the actual management of Newfoundland. 
Most of Treworgie’s letters are concerned with the lack of financial support he received for his 
governorship from the government, and he left Newfoundland in 1659.55 
Kirke’s defence after his arrest used similar arguments as his previous claims by focusing 
on the potential for land-based industries in Newfoundland. Like his “Reply to the Answer to the 
Description of Newfoundland,” Kirke did not include any references to running taverns or selling 
provisions in his defence, and there is no known evidence that he established the industries he 
claimed could succeed.56 Although the Council of State, the executive branch of the English 
government during the Interregnum, cleared Kirke of the charges that he taxed ships and 
restricted shore access, Calvert’s lawsuit resulted in Kirke’s continued detention in England. 
Kirke died in prison in 1654.57  
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During David Kirke’s absence and following his death, his wife, Sara Kirke, managed 
Ferryland and continued to develop both the fishery and provisioning trade. Sara Kirke stands 
out as a major figure in Newfoundland’s merchant community. The 1675 census of 
Newfoundland reported that she operated five fishing boats, kept livestock and possessed enough 
servants, lands and goods to place her among the wealthiest English residents in Newfoundland. 
Kirke overcame significant challenges during her tenure, including resisting efforts by Cecil 
Calvert to seize the family’s plantations and rebuilding Ferryland after a Dutch raid in 1673. She 
continued to manage Ferryland until her retirement in 1679, after which her sons took over the 
plantation.58 Kirke was one of a number of women managing plantations in Newfoundland in the 
mid-seventeenth century. Her sister, Frances Hopkins, a Royalist who fled to Newfoundland in 
1649, operated a plantation in Ferryland, and Margaret Taverner, originally from Poole, ran 
plantations in Bay de Verde and Trinity.59 Additionally, wills from the period show that women 
controlling and inheriting fishing plantations in Newfoundland were not uncommon 
occurrences.60   
Although David Kirke promoted the development of land-based resources, his use of the 
cod fishery and transatlantic trade allowed him to succeed where previous colonists failed. 
Ferryland prospered during his tenure and after because he used cod to trade for the goods that 
Newfoundland could not provide, not because of the availability of minerals or fertile soil. The 
Kirke family was not alone in this approach. Other planters and fishers also focused their efforts 
on using transatlantic trade networks to survive and profit in Newfoundland, changes that 
                                                          
58 Sara Kirke to Charles II, 1660, BL, Egerton Ms., 2395, 258; John Berry, "A List of Planter Names...," September 
12, 1675, TNA, CO 1/35, 149-156; Pope, Fish into Wine, 59–60, 300–303. 
59 John Berry, "A List of Planter Names...," September 12, 1675, TNA, CO 1/35, 149-156; Pope, Fish into Wine, 
59–60, 300–303. 
60 “Will of Dennis Luony of St. John’s, Newfoundland,” January 18, 1678, TNA, PROB 11/356/76; “Will of Ann 
Dennis of Toads Cove, Newfoundland,” November 22, 1699, TNA, PROB 11/453/135; “Will of John Pollard of 
Capeling Bay, Newfoundland,” March 28, 1717, TNA, PROB 11/557/213.  
129 
 
English merchants and policymakers became increasingly aware of during the 1660’s and 
1670’s.61 
Planters, By-boats and Governance: 1660-1674 
By 1660, English policies and practices regarding Newfoundland focused on the cod 
fishery and trade, rather than developing land-based resources. This change benefited two groups 
in particular: planters and by-boat keepers, both of whom increased in number and prominence 
by specializing in catching and trading cod. Neither planters nor by-boat keepers completely 
ignored Newfoundland’s land-based natural resources. Both groups depended on wood from the 
island’s forests and their practices made use of the island’s isolated and protected harbours. The 
growth of both groups occurred outside of the control of the English government or any other 
authority figure. Beginning in 1660, the English government confronted these changes by 
reconsidering what its goals in Newfoundland were, the impact of previous charters and grants 
on the situation there, and how to manage the island’s English inhabitants and migratory 
fishers.62  
Following the Restoration in 1660, policymakers found an uncertain situation in 
Newfoundland. That year, a legal battle between the Kirke family and Cecil Calvert for the 
governorship of Newfoundland brought attention to multiple claimants to that title. This dispute 
began with Sara Kirke petitioning King Charles II to have her son, George Kirke, appointed 
governor. To justify her son’s claim to the title, she cited her late husband’s grant, his service to 
Charles I and the hardships suffered by her family during the Interregnum. Calvert contested this 
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claim by arguing that Charles I wrongfully annulled his family’s charter when issuing Kirke’s 
grant, making him the rightful governor of Newfoundland.63 Calvert won the title in court, and 
sent the captain John Rayner to Ferryland to govern Newfoundland in his place. Rayner’s actions 
in Newfoundland are mostly unknown, with few known sources about his time there. His most 
notable achievements were the seizure of an English ship that he claimed illegally traded with 
Dutch ships and reporting the establishment of a French colony in Plaisance (Placentia) in 1662. 
Rayner left Newfoundland in 1667, and Calvert did not appoint a replacement. Following 
Rayner’s departure, the English government began to learn that the English presence in 
Newfoundland had changed significantly during the Interregnum, and that addressing 
environmental, social and political concerns there would be a difficult process.64 
Plaisance did not receive significant attention from the English government at the time of 
its establishment, and it was not until 1675 that the French presence in Newfoundland was 
discussed in England as a serious threat. Instead, wars with Spain and the Dutch Republic 
preoccupied English merchants and officials. The Dutch threat to the English in Newfoundland 
was particularly acute. While Dutch trade ships were common in Newfoundland during the 
seventeenth century, they did not maintain a sizable fishery there. However, with the advent of 
the Anglo-Dutch wars in 1654, the Dutch fleets inflicted significant damage on English trade and 
fishing operations. In 1665, a Dutch fleet led by the famed admiral Michiel de Ruyter sacked St. 
John’s and raided English migratory fishing vessels. In 1673, another Dutch fleet attacked St. 
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John’s but failed to break into the harbour, and instead raided other harbours along the English 
shore, including Ferryland.65  
While English planters, families and servants had lived in Newfoundland since 1610, the 
Interregnum saw significant growth in their numbers. The political chaos of the Interregnum and 
Civil War provided opportunities for news plantations and practices to develop without the 
oversight or restrictions of a charter granted by the government. Links between Newfoundland 
and England fostered the growth of a dispersed population of planter families and servants 
extending from Salvage, on the northern coast, to Trepassay, on the south-eastern Avalon 
Peninsula, by the time of the Restoration.66 Pope estimated that by 1660 the overwintering 
English population in Newfoundland was near 1,500, up from a few hundred before 1640, with 
periods of growth comparable to New France, which had 3,215 overwintering French inhabitants 
in 1666.67 This population growth was not limited to Newfoundland. Historian Christian Koot 
found that the English population in America grew significantly from 1649 to 1660, creating an 
empire that, when Charles II took the throne, bore little resemblance to the one his father had 
ruled.68  
Not all English inhabitants were new arrivals. Some residents could trace multi-
generational family histories in Newfoundland. In 1676, John Downing, a planter from St. 
John’s, told the Committee for Trade and Plantations, appointed in 1674 by King Charles II and 
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his Privy Council to consider colonial and trade issues, that his father, George Downing, arrived 
in Newfoundland in the 1630’s with orders from David Kirke and Charles I to “reduce the 
Indians to civility and religion.”69 There are no known records of this commission, but George 
Downing and his sons John and William did establish plantations in St. John’s in that period.70 
Downing never portrayed his family’s plantations as self-sufficient. He petitioned the 
government to protect trade routes between Newfoundland and Europe to secure the provision 
and cod trades, which he argued were essential for supporting the island’s English population.71 
Transatlantic familial connections contributed to this population growth, as exemplified 
by the Taverner family. In the 1670’s two branches of the Taverner family emerged, one in 
Newfoundland, descended from Margaret Taverner, and one in Poole, headed by William 
Taverner, a merchant and surveyor who frequently travelled to Newfoundland. Both branches 
maintained a close relationship with each other by trading fish for provisions and promoting 
common interests. Margaret Taverner and her children established multiple plantations in 
Newfoundland and married other merchant families from Poole, resulting in her descendants 
operating plantations with trade connections to Poole into the nineteenth century. William 
Taverner advocated appointing a governor of Newfoundland in a 1680 petition and again in 1713 
in a survey of the island he conducted for the government.72 
English inhabitants in Newfoundland relied on the sea for the fishery, access to trade 
ships and transportation around the island, often to the detriment of developing overland 
connections between harbours. Throughout Newfoundland, land-based connections between 
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harbours were often limited to small trails, even in cases where harbours were near one another. 
Yonge noted in his journal that the path between Renews and Fermeuse, which are four 
kilometers from each other and were used by both planters and migratory fishers in the 1660’s, 
was a small, rarely travelled and difficult trail that traversed bogs and forests.73 The lack of 
inland connections differentiated Newfoundland from other European colonies, such as New 
France and New England, where waterways, trails and roads connected farms, outposts, 
plantations and towns.74  
Depositions taken during the 1660’s provide valuable information about how fishers and 
inhabitants interacted with each other in Newfoundland and the opinions present in England 
about the island. The depositions by John Cull, Richard Parker, Christopher Selman, Thomas 
Pitcher, Nicholas Luce, Thomas Fowles, Thomas Cruse and Gabriel Hiddomas, all seamen, 
fishers and former planters, offer a rare insight into the concerns of those who carried out fishery 
regarding Newfoundland. These depositions were all taken as part of a single inquiry held in 
Totnes in 1667, and discuss topics concerning David Kirke’s governorship, illegal practices in 
Newfoundland, such as operating taverns, and how deforestation and foreign raids endangered 
the English fishery.75 
The condition of the island’s forests and planters’ business activities were two important 
topics within these depositions. Luce, a sailor who claimed to have spent fifty-five summers 
fishing in Newfoundland, accused fishers and residents in Newfoundland of destroying so much 
of the island’s forests that fishers needed to trek four miles inland to find sufficient wood for 
building houses and flakes. Luce also stated that Newfoundland’s poor soil harmed the fishery 
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since planters had few options besides selling alcohol to fishers to supplement their incomes, 
highlighting how planters and fishers used transatlantic connections to develop new businesses 
and make the island habitable. The lack of building materials in Newfoundland was a serious 
issue for the English government. The Western Charter attempted to reduce overharvesting 
forests by limiting the types of buildings that were allowed to be built using the island’s forests. 
However, Luce’s complaint highlighted that the Charter was either unenforced or insufficient, 
and that enough damage had already been done to Newfoundland’s forests that the productivity 
of the migratory fishery was reduced by the amount of time needed to collect building 
materials.76 
The growing number of English inhabitants in Newfoundland created concerns among 
merchants in England, who complained to the government that the island’s residents violated the 
Western Charter by establishing taverns and competing with migratory fishing ships for shore 
space.77 Fears of the effects of illegal drinking were not unfounded. In 1667, Luce described 
drinking establishments as a problem in Newfoundland for over thirty years, with the prevalence 
of taverns causing many fishers to become drunk and indebted to planters.78 Cruse, a planter who 
resided in Bay Bulls from the 1630’s until returning to England in the early 1660’s, supported 
Luce’s statement by admitting that he ran a tavern that sold alcohol to migratory fishers as part 
of his business in Newfoundland.79  
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Seasonal fishers also took advantage of trade connections between England and 
Newfoundland by using the by-boat fishery.80 There is little evidence about the origins of the by-
boat fishery, but it appears to have developed during the Interregnum and quickly attracted 
criticism from West Country merchants, who blamed the practice for causing declining catches 
in Newfoundland. The first documentary evidence of the by-boat fishery is the 1661 re-issue of 
the Western Charter, which contained provisions banning ships from transporting by-boat 
keepers to Newfoundland.81  
Yonge’s 1671 manuscript Some Considerations Touching By-boats examined both the 
by-boat fishery and the opposition to that fishery. In this work, Yonge positions himself as an 
authority about both Newfoundland and the English fishery because of his experience travelling 
with fishing vessels as a surgeon and his familiarity with merchants, ship-owners and by-boat 
keepers from Plymouth. Yonge concluded that merchant resistance to the by-boat fishery was not 
the result any inherent problem with its practices. Instead, opposition originated from the fact 
that by-boats operated outside of the ship-based migratory fishery controlled by merchants. 
Because of their lower overhead costs, by-boat keepers seldom required merchants to finance 
their ventures, increasing competition and reducing how much of the fishery merchants 
controlled. Additionally, there were incentives for fishers to work for by-boats keepers rather 
than the traditional migratory fishing ships. By-boat fishers were paid in shares, not wages, as 
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was common on fishing ships in this period, creating the potential for fishers to earn more money 
on by-boats if catches were good.82  
 The by-boat fishery and concerns about drinking and deforestation in Newfoundland 
highlighted a problem present in the 1634 Western Charter: the lack of effective enforcement 
mechanisms. On paper, the English government split the administration of laws and regulations 
in Newfoundland between the fishing admirals and a governor, but both mechanisms were 
flawed. Neither Kirke, Treworgie nor Rayner effectively enforced laws and regulations in 
Newfoundland, and after 1667 there was no governor present.83 Additionally, the burdens the 
Western Charter placed on fishing ships and the lack of oversight in Newfoundland led to 
complaints that the Charter was ignored and abused.84  
 Beginning in 1668, the issue of governing Newfoundland began to attract attention 
beyond the Kirke and Calvert families, with merchants, members of the Navy and planters 
presenting the government with petitions and advice for solving issues of lawlessness and 
deforestation.85 The naval commander Robert Robinson’s 1668 petition to be named the 
governor of Newfoundland typifies the approach used by pro-governor advocates in this period. 
Robinson presented a list of reasons for appointing a governor in his petition, such as how one 
could defend Newfoundland from foreign raids, prevent and punish crimes, and grow the fishery. 
Robinson posited that his personal experience in Newfoundland as a captain, as well as his vision 
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for transforming the island into a law-abiding colony, made him a prime candidate for the 
governorship.86  
West Country merchants resisted calls to appoint a governor to Newfoundland, such as 
Robinson’s proposal, by citing incidents during Kirke’s governorship and the lack of natural 
resources besides cod as justification for rejecting these requests.87 However, as Matthews 
argues, this resistance demonstrated no overt hostility towards Newfoundland’s English 
inhabitants. Rather, it reflected fears among merchants that a governor would tax the fishery and 
institute regulations disadvantageous to the migratory fishery, such as ending their right to the 
first choice of shore spaces. The government rejected Robinson’s petition following a debate and 
there were no proposals made to address the issues he raised.88 
In England, the assumption that the island could host an economically diverse colony had 
been dismissed by 1674, with fishers, merchants, planters and policymakers concentrating their 
efforts on using the fishery, and the transatlantic connections it enabled, to make the island 
profitable. Although the English government recognized Newfoundland as an important part of 
its growing empire, there was no consensus about how to manage the island. Despite banning 
taverns, deforestation and other damaging practices, complaints about those activities persisted. 
Additionally, the delegation of authority to fishing ships was unable to counter military threats to 
Newfoundland, with Dutch attacks in 1665 and 1673 damaging both the migratory and inhabitant 
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fisheries.89 However, Newfoundland’s growing population raised concerns among officials that a 
governor would be unable to enforce regulations and could hurt the fishery by imposing taxes on 
the fishing ships. Except for re-issuing the Western Charter in 1661 and 1671, the English 
government did not change its approach to managing Newfoundland until 1675.90  
 Beginning in 1634, policymakers created legislation to protect and increase the economic 
value of the cod fishery, an approach reflected in the methods used by merchants, fishers and 
planters in Newfoundland. Although these policymakers’ decisions were, in part, a reaction to 
prevailing concerns of their day, their decisions set long-term precedents for the management of 
Newfoundland that were consistently reinforced through updated versions of the Western 
Charter and in King Williams’ Act in 1699. This focus on the fishery represented a significant 
break from the assumptions about Newfoundland's natural environment that dominated the 
previous twenty-four years. Unlike the promotional texts and colonies launched from 1610 to 
1630, the Western Charter took a narrow view of Newfoundland’s natural environment by 
focusing on making the most of a single resource, rather than developing multiple industries. 
This specialization had a significant impact on the governance, economy and society of 
Newfoundland, and English policy focused on protecting and growing the cod fishery.91  
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 The Western Charter’s emphasis on the fishery also prompted policymakers to rethink the 
importance of Newfoundland’s natural resources for the fishery and the impact of actions by 
English fishers and residents on that fishery. This trend continued with Kirke’s governorship and 
became entrenched with the growing population of English inhabitants and by-boat keepers in 
Newfoundland. However, while the Western Charter focused on supporting the migratory 
fishery, planters and by-boat keepers developed economic niches that used the cod fishery and 
trade to supply trade goods to resell and circumvent traditional labour practices.92  
 Between 1610 and 1674, English perceptions of Newfoundland underwent a dramatic 
shift as assumptions about the island’s natural environment were challenged by colonies failing 
to achieve their goals. Unexpected hardships disrupted widely accepted ideas about 
Newfoundland’s economic value to England, and the practices that would allow colonists to 
extract that value. This history reflects George Soros’ concept of reflexivity and the fallibility of 
human decision making. Changing assumptions about Newfoundland’s value to England built 
upon information from the problems encountered by prior efforts shaped new policies and 
colonies. This recursive cycle resulted in English conceptions of the island’s natural environment 
narrowing to focus on using the fishery to make Newfoundland profitable and habitable.93  
During the 1610’s and 1620’s, English investors and writers assumed that 
Newfoundland’s natural environment resembled England’s and that it could host an 
economically diverse colony, but the experiences of colonists in Newfoundland undermined 
those expectations. Despite inventories and expert advice supporting these early assumptions, 
Newfoundland did not have the climate or natural resources these colonial projectors expected. 
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However, by challenging these expectations, a new, more accurate, perception of 
Newfoundland’s natural environment emerged. Kirke, merchants, planters and by-boat keepers 
engaged in a process of defining Newfoundland’s economic value and directed resources to 
extract that value. This focused approach worked by identifying Newfoundland’s most 
economically valuable natural resource, thus reclassifying the island as a place where colonists 
succeeded through specializing in the fishery and trade. However, the cod fishery and trade 
enabled industries and competition that West Country merchants and government officials 
viewed as undesirable.94   
While there was a growing permanent English population in Newfoundland, it engaged in 
activities that government officials and merchants disapproved of, such as operating taverns. The 
tension between what industries and activities succeeded in Newfoundland, and those that 
English merchants and policymakers preferred, brought attention to the question of what 
Newfoundland’s role as an English possession was and how to control the conduct of fishers and 
residents there. In response to these problems, in 1675 the English government adopted an 
interventionist approach to governing Newfoundland with an attempt to evict all English 
inhabitants from the island.95   
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Chapter 4 
“If it were not for Wood or Fish”: Newfoundland, Knowledge Production and Policy 
Development in 1675 
By 1675, English policymakers, merchants and planters had supplanted the assumption 
that Newfoundland could host an economically diverse colony and instead focused their efforts 
on the cod fishery. From 1675 to 1699, discussions in England turned to the specifics of 
managing Newfoundland: how should residents, fishers and ships use Newfoundland’s natural 
resources to conduct the fishery, and how should the government stop practices that threatened 
the fishery’s profitability? Throughout their inquiries, government officials collected information 
about Newfoundland, tested conclusions drawn from those sources as policies, and reassessed 
their plans when challenged by unexpected results, continuing the reflexive cycle that began in 
1610. Unlike the period from 1610 to 1674, English considerations were not focused on 
determining what industries Newfoundland could support. Instead, policymakers worked to 
identify business and governance practices suited to their new understanding of Newfoundland’s 
natural environment and to determine whether those practices helped meet their goal of 
protecting and increasing the fishery’s economic value.1 
 The introduction of new methods of collecting and analyzing information about 
Newfoundland in 1675 marked a turning-point for the English government’s management of the 
island. In February of that year, the Committee for Trade and Plantations investigated complaints 
that declining cod stocks and abuses of existing regulations disrupted Newfoundland’s fishery. 
The resulting hearings were the most comprehensive consideration of Newfoundland by the 
English government to that point and used new, more systematic, techniques to collect 
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information about the island’s natural resources and inhabitants. The Committee concluded from 
this evidence that evicting Newfoundland’s English residents would solve the environmental, 
economic and legal issues facing the island, such as deforestation and destruction of the 
migratory fishery’s onshore facilities by English residents. However, John Berry, the English 
naval commander in Newfoundland, refused to remove the island’s inhabitants, citing 
discrepancies between his orders and the situation he found on the scene, prompting the 
Committee to re-evaluate its findings. This chapter argues that the eviction order and its 
reconsideration resulted from an emerging approach to knowledge production employed by 
natural philosophers and politicians in Restoration England to form both scientific hypotheses 
and government policies. This inductive method, based on the work of Francis Bacon, used 
cumulative evidence and continually scrutinized conclusions in the face of new information and 
insights to make decisions, practices the Committee applied in both its initial investigation and 
response to Berry’s resistance.2  
The chapter is divided into three sections covering the Committee’s investigation and the 
reaction to Berry’s refusal to carry out the eviction. The first section examines why the 
Committee opened an inquiry into the legal, economic and environmental situation of 
Newfoundland in 1675, and shows how its membership influenced the proceedings. The second 
section discusses the methods that the Committee used to collect and evaluate information about 
Newfoundland, including town surveys, opinions and an outside observer, and why those 
techniques led it to conclude that eviction was the best course of action. The third section 
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examines Berry’s refusal to execute his orders, the reports he wrote about Newfoundland, and 
how the Committee used this new evidence to reassess its findings. The most complete record of 
the 1675 Newfoundland investigation can be found in the Committee for Trade and Plantation’s 
minute books, held at the National Archives in Kew, London. These records, more than any 
other source, illuminate the Committee’s primary concerns, the methods it used and the 
individuals involved. The Colonial Office files, also at the National Archives, contain the letters, 
reports and other documents that informed the Committee. Letters and drafts related to the West 
Country’s impressions of the proceedings are held at the Plymouth and West Devon Record 
Office. These collections reveal that the Committee, which underwent a major reorganization in 
1674 when Charles II replaced the previous board, which he perceived as ineffective, with a new 
body of administrators, worked extensively to understand Newfoundland by accessing 
previously unused information sources.3  
 The approach that the Committee used to examine Newfoundland in 1675 reflected the 
adoption of Francis Bacon’s method of inductive reasoning by natural philosophers and 
politicians in Restoration England. Bacon, an English statesman and natural philosopher who 
died in 1626, proposed that knowledge should be produced inductively through the interpretation 
of evidence accrued from observation and experimentation, and continually tested to ensure its 
accuracy. Building on natural history methods, Bacon’s inductive method used the process of 
collecting and cataloguing evidence to form broader hypotheses about the natural world, rather 
than simply categorizing natural objects. In turn, these hypotheses would be scrutinized against 
new ideas and insights in a continuous cycle of reinforcing, refining, or rejecting conclusions. 
Central to this cycle was Bacon’s prioritization of negative evidence, information that 
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contradicted initial findings, since it allowed for faulty hypotheses to be quickly dismissed or 
refined. Bacon argued that by methodically working towards more general principles, this 
inductive approach would create a body of knowledge free from prejudices and preconceptions. 
This technique contrasted with classical deductive methods of reasoning which often relied on 
syllogistic argumentation, a method that used general principles to establish specific 
conclusions.4  
Following Bacon’s death, his ideas found a series of influential proponents, such as the 
natural philosopher Robert Boyle, and spread beyond natural philosophy during the Interregnum, 
when the economist and philosopher William Petty adapted Bacon’s ideas to inform political 
decisions. This trend accelerated in 1660 with the Restoration of Charles II and the establishment 
of the President, Council and Fellows of the Royal Society of London for Improving Natural 
Knowledge. Founded as a meeting place, organizer, publisher and promoter of methods of 
knowledge production based on Baconian principles, the Royal Society based its program on the 
methods and goals laid out by Bacon in The Advancement of Learning (1605) and Novum 
Organum (1620).5  
The Royal Society’s membership included not only natural philosophers but also 
politicians interested in employing its ideas to inform their decisions, including those regarding 
colonial projects. Founded in 1670, The Hudson’s Bay Company’s leadership included several 
members of the Royal Society and, as historian Theodore Binnema found, merchants working 
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for the Company sought support from the Royal Society by reporting findings from the 
Company’s territory. The Company’s charter reflected the importance placed upon natural 
knowledge as a tool for advancing England’s interests in the 1660’s and 1670’s. Binnema noted 
that the charter “made the connection between exploration and knowledge explicit.”6 This 
joining of natural philosophy, exploration, colonization, business and politics reflected what John 
Pickstone described as the Natural Historical Ways of Knowing’s emphasis on using new 
knowledge to achieve political and commercial goals. By collecting new information about 
America, and using that information to build hypotheses about its natural environment, natural 
philosophers, politicians and merchants were identifying goods, practices and strategies that 
could advance England’s political and imperial ambitions.7 
Historian Michael Hunter argued that, following the Restoration, English government 
officials developed policy by accumulating firsthand accounts to understand issues and judge the 
efficacy of proposed solutions, basing decisions on the available information and allowing for 
change if challenged by new insights or evidence. However, policymakers often disregarded or 
worked around specific components of Bacon’s method, such as his concept of the Idols of the 
Mind, a collection of fallacies that obstructed scientific reasoning by making findings conform to 
prejudices and expectations, to address priority issues.8 Additionally, as noted by historian Gary 
Stuart de Krey, London’s merchant community worked to ensure that government decisions 
guarded the cities’ economic and political power by pressuring policymakers, many of whom 
were merchants themselves, to pay particular attention to local merchant interests in their 
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decisions.9 Even though political realities often shaped their decisions, this approach attracted 
politicians seeking to avoid repeating the violence of the Civil War and Interregnum by 
minimizing the influence of partisan politics. Historians Simon Schaffer and Steven Shapin 
called these efforts an attempt to create an “ideal society, where dispute could occur safely and 
where subversive errors were quickly corrected.”10  
These techniques became particularly important for considering issues either difficult for 
policymakers to observe directly because of the nature of the topic, such as colonial issues, or 
required the careful consideration of large quantities of data. Petty’s investigation of English 
colonial policy in Political Arithmetick, written in 1676 and published in 1690, applied these 
ideas by using economic and demographic data from America to identify ways to increase the 
economic value of England’s colonies.11 The Committee’s investigation shared these goals of 
developing accurate decisions and avoiding partisan interference. In both its investigation and its 
reaction to Berry’s reports, the Committee sought accounts based on firsthand information about 
Newfoundland and based its decision on conclusions drawn from those sources, but was willing 
to reassess its findings when presented with contradictory evidence.12   
The events of 1675 have received little scholarly attention despite their importance for 
understanding both the management of Newfoundland and policymaking in Restoration England 
in general. In 1895, Daniel Prowse ascribed the eviction order to the bribery of the Committee by 
Josiah Child, a prominent politician and economic writer who opposed appointing a governor of 
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Newfoundland. Although there is no evidence indicating that Child, or anyone else, bribed the 
Committee, there are few other interpretations of the event by historians. The only other 
examinations of the eviction order are found in historians Keith Matthews’s and Glanville 
Davies’s doctoral dissertations. Both Matthews and Davies attributed the eviction order to 
attempts by government officials to support West Country towns during a period of economic 
hardship by reducing competition. Neither of their dissertations explained how the Committee 
made the choice that it did or why it reconsidered its findings after Berry’s reports.13 
Both the methods used by the Committee and its efforts to develop and enforce a long-
term solution to Newfoundland’s problems were unprecedented. Before 1675, the English 
government did not have a unified Newfoundland policy. Previous monarchs and government 
bodies divided the management of English efforts in Newfoundland between proprietary 
governors authorized by the government to manage chartered plantations, all of whom had left 
Newfoundland by 1675, and the Western Charter, which delegated the regulation of the 
Newfoundland fishery to West Country fishing ships. The English government had habitually 
made piecemeal decisions based on historical and legal documents and left enforcement to 
outside parties, such as revising the Western Charter to ban by-boats in 1661.14 An examination 
of the methods used by the Committee during its Newfoundland investigation opens new insights 
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into an overlooked turning point in both Newfoundland history and English policy in the Atlantic 
World.15  
Initiating the Investigation: William Hinton and the Committee for Trade and Plantations, 
February 12 
  The petition to which the Committee was responding made no request for eviction. The 
petitioner, William Hinton, an English courtier, merchant and royalist with experience in the 
Newfoundland cod trade, requested on February 12, 1675, that he be appointed governor of 
Newfoundland. If granted with rights similar to those held by previous governors such as David 
Kirke, the position would have provided Hinton significant control over Newfoundland, 
including the authority to tax foreign ships and enforce laws.16 Hinton based his petition on two 
claims: that Charles II had promised him the governorship, and that a governor was needed to 
provide security for the fishery.17 Hinton was not the first to pursue this title since Cecil Calvert’s 
agent, John Rayner, had left Newfoundland nine years earlier.18 However, while the government 
had rejected previous requests, such as Robert Robinson’s 1668 petition, following debates about 
their merits, Hinton triggered an investigation that expanded far beyond his request by seeking 
long-term solutions to Newfoundland’s chronic problems.19  
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 Hinton’s defense of his petition spurred the Committee in this direction. Anticipating a 
debate like the one Robinson had instigated, Hinton presented two letters attacking his potential 
opponents before the Committee made any requests for outside opinions or information.20 He 
accused West Country merchants of profiteering by lending money at interest rates as high as 25 
to 30 percent, charging planters and fishers excessive prices for provisions and stranding fishers 
in Newfoundland and New England to avoid paying for return passages to England. Hinton also 
argued that merchants abused the Western Charter by selectively enforcing its provisions, 
creating a predatory relationship in which merchants could do as they pleased while 
Newfoundland’s inhabitants had no legal recourse.21  
 The government had other motives for an expanded consideration of Newfoundland in 
1675: declining catches and participation in the fishery in the 1660’s and 1670’s. Beginning in 
the late 1660’s and continuing until the early 1700’s, Newfoundland experienced declining cod 
populations because of lower temperatures connected to the little ice age, a period of colder 
temperatures from 1300 to 1870. Catches bottomed out between 1669 and 1674 to 100-140 
quintals (5-7 tons) of dry-salted cod per boat, down significantly from the 180-200 quintals (9-10 
tons) per boat in years reported to be average in the seventeenth century.22 In addition to poor 
catches, conflicts with Spain and the Dutch Republic caused losses of English fishing and trade 
ships, and Dutch raids on Newfoundland in 1665 and 1673 damaged both migratory and 
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inhabitant fisheries. The resulting losses hurt West Country towns such as Plymouth and 
Dartmouth, which relied on the fishery to employ their residents, support the local provisioning 
industry and supply trade goods.23  
At the time of Hinton’s petition, French activities in Newfoundland worried English 
politicians. While the English fishery struggled in the 1660’s and 1670’s, the French expanded 
their presence in Newfoundland. In 1662, French military forces and planter families established 
a town and fortifications at Plaisance with the dual purpose of protecting the French fishery in 
Newfoundland and protecting French shipping to and from New France. France had maintained a 
seasonal fishery in Newfoundland since the sixteenth century, but Plaisance was the first French 
attempt to develop a permanent presence on the island. Unlike the English colonies in 
Newfoundland, Plaisance was initially established by the French government to integrate its 
fisheries there into politician Jean-Baptiste Colbert’s larger mercantilist policies. Plaisance was 
selected as the site of the colony because of its large protected harbour, which could 
accommodate 150 ships, and its proximity to the fishing banks and shipping routes between the 
St. Lawrence River and Europe. The French population in Newfoundland grew slowly during the 
seventeenth century, with an estimated total summer population, including seasonal residents, of 
600 in 1680.24 Although the English government was slow to recognize the significance of 
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Plaisance, in 1675 the Committee was beginning to view Plaisance as a threat to their interests in 
Newfoundland. However, the Committee was unsure how serious that threat was.25 
 The troubled English fishery and the growing French presence complicated Hinton’s 
petition, and the lack of reliable information about Newfoundland magnified these issues. The 
Committee’s review of prior documents, debates and legislation regarding Newfoundland 
revealed more problems than solutions.26 Much of this information was outdated or came from 
questionable sources. Recognizing these difficulties, the Committee collected and analyzed new 
evidence about Newfoundland’s economic, environmental and political issues.27   
The structure and the attendance record of the Committee provide insight into how it 
conducted the Newfoundland investigation. Historian Ian Steele notes that the Committee, one of 
a series of bodies of colonial administrators appointed from 1655 onwards, was the most active 
of these agencies in investigating and intervening in colonial issues until the Board of Trade 
succeeded it in 1696. In 1675, the Committee was composed of the Clerk of the Privy Council 
and twenty-four members of the Privy Council appointed by Charles II, but attendance averaged 
six appointees per meeting during its hearings about Newfoundland.28 The most regular attendees 
were Arthur Annesley, John Berkeley, George Carteret, William Craven and Joseph Williamson. 
These members either held high offices or were involved in other colonies, giving them a vested 
interest in the proceedings. In 1675, Williamson was Secretary of State and Annesley was the 
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Lord Privy Seal. Berkeley, Carteret and Craven financed and governed colonies in Carolina and 
New Jersey, giving them an interest in how the English government managed its North American 
possessions.29 Robert Southwell, a diplomat and the Clerk of the Privy Council assigned to the 
Committee, attended regularly but appears in the minutes only when he spoke or presented 
evidence, owing to his position as a paid bureaucrat rather than an appointed politician.30  
Non-appointed bureaucrats, merchants and others regularly attended the Committee’s 
meetings and offered opinions and evidence on the issues at hand, although the meeting minutes 
seldom recorded who was present beyond the appointed members. The minutes often recorded 
non-appointed individuals only if they submitted information or the Committee gave them a task. 
For example, Child was not a member of the Committee, but he offered opinions about 
Newfoundland on two occasions and appeared in the minutes only on those occasions. There are 
no references as to whether Child attended any other meetings about Newfoundland, but his 
recorded opinions indicate he was well-informed regarding the island’s economy.31 Additionally, 
Samuel Pepys, the famed bureaucrat and diarist, was not an appointed member of the Committee 
but attended in his position as Secretary of the Admiralty Commission. Like Child, Pepys 
appears in the Committee’s minutes only when he spoke or was assigned a task.32 
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 Scientific and political developments in the 1660’s and 1670’s influenced the 
Committee’s proceedings, particularly the spread of Bacon’s inductive reasoning as a political 
tool. Three fellows of the Royal Society participated in the Newfoundland investigation: 
Williamson, Southwell and Pepys, each of whom would be elected President of the Royal 
Society in 1677, 1684 and 1690, respectively. Their involvement in the Royal Society indicates a 
shared interest in Baconian methods of reasoning, an interest that continued into their political 
work. Williamson, Southwell and Pepys developed new sources of information about 
Newfoundland based on the idea that decisions should be based on cumulative evidence and 
allow for further scrutiny.33   
Williamson influenced the Committee’s proceedings in these ways: he attended all but 
one of the meetings about Newfoundland and promoted the collection and analysis of firsthand 
accounts. Although Craven attended all the meetings about Newfoundland, there is no recorded 
instance of him offering any information or opinions during the proceedings.34 Williamson 
promoted town surveys and the critical assessment of information as key to understanding 
Newfoundland, emphasizing an inductive approach to knowledge production by scrutinizing 
hypotheses.35  
Although Pepys and Southwell were not appointed members of the Committee, they 
significantly influenced the investigation. Pepys, who coordinated communications and 
resources between the Committee and the Admiralty, developed the articles of inquiry for John 
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Berry to complete in Newfoundland in the summer of 1675. These organized sets of questions, 
designed to record observations in a standardized format, collected comparable qualitative 
information from multiple observers. Historian Barbara Shapiro argues that Restoration 
politicians developed the articles of inquiry using a Baconian approach to decision-making by 
gathering multiple sets of answers to the same questions over time, allowing for the creation of 
policies that represented the most viable solution to a problem. This survey format allowed 
politicians to retest their conclusions by creating comparable sets of information before and after 
the implementation of a policy. Articles of inquiry would be issued for Newfoundland annually 
after 1675, and represent one of the most detailed series of surviving documents about the 
English presence in early modern Newfoundland.36   
Southwell used his connections and skills as both a diplomat and a fellow of the Royal 
Society to contribute to the proceedings. He obtained statistical information about French 
participation in the Newfoundland fishery and supported the introduction of an outside observer 
to provide an independent analysis of the information collected. In both cases, Southwell worked 
to ensure that the Committee received reliable information about the state of Newfoundland and 
that its analysis represented an accurate interpretation of that evidence.37   
Pepys, Williamson and Southwell's approach diverged from Hinton’s expectations. 
Rather than hosting a debate like the one held in response to Robinson's 1668 petition, the 
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Committee focused on collecting and assessing information to address a range of issues 
regarding Newfoundland. The investigation initiated in response to Hinton’s petition thus 
constituted a reaction not only to issues faced in Newfoundland, but also problems with the 
information available about Newfoundland. Using methods rooted in Bacon’s inductive method, 
the Committee and its attendees, particularly Williamson, Pepys and Southwell, sought new 
sources of information about Newfoundland to guide their decision and to correct flaws in prior 
management practices.38  
Investigating Newfoundland: Collecting and Evaluating Evidence, February 25 to May 5  
 The Committee used three methods to collect and assess information about 
Newfoundland: town surveys, opinions and an outside observer. Government requests for 
opinions regarding the condition of Newfoundland’s cod fishery had appeared as early as 1527, 
but the use of a town survey and an outside observer in 1675 were both firsts. Each of these three 
methods provided information about the condition of Newfoundland and the concerns of English 
fishers and merchants while allowing the Committee to make an informed judgement on 
Hinton’s petition. The methods the Committee used focused on collecting firsthand information 
about Newfoundland, such as accounts by fishers and merchants who travelled there. These 
observations, often reported in formats that were easily comparable across multiple accounts, 
allowed the Committee to develop a policy solution based on a large body of evidence about the 
island’s economy and natural environment.39 
The 1675 use of the town survey was the English government’s first application of 
political arithmetic for managing Newfoundland. Defined by the historian Ted McCormick as 
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the use of quantitative information collected from observational records to guide policy 
decisions, political arithmetic was especially useful for gathering information from multiple 
sources about one subject, as in the case with the town surveys. The Committee issued the 
surveys in response to both Hinton’s concerns and problems found in the review of materials 
from prior hearings.40 West Country towns had kept quantitative records of catch rates and ships 
in Newfoundland in port books before 1675, but that information had been used exclusively for 
taxation purposes. Unlike the port books, the town survey gathered information about 
Newfoundland’s economic value and English population.41 
The Committee sent the survey to fourteen West Country towns as a series of questions 
to be answered by their mayors in consultation with local merchants, ship-owners and others 
with experience in Newfoundland. The survey asked what harbours were used, these harbours’ 
locations in relation to one another, the number of English inhabitants in these harbours, the 
harbours’ navigability, the quality of fishing in each harbour and what locations were suitable for 
fortifying. The Committee collected this information to determine the distribution of 
Newfoundland’s English population, what harbours were the most important for the fishery and 
where fortifications would be most useful.42 Of the fourteen towns contacted, only six replied: 
Weymouth, Falmouth, Plymouth, Southampton, Barnstaple and Bideford. The other eight towns, 
Poole, Lyme Regis, Melcombe, Exeter, Dartmouth, East Low, Foy and Bristol, did not respond 
to the survey despite their involvement in the Newfoundland fishery.43  
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Tobias Burr, the mayor of Weymouth, followed the instructions issued with the survey 
closely, providing the best example of what the Committee wanted from the respondents. Burr 
summoned “the owners and masters of ships usually trading at the Newfoundland” to account for 
“all the ports and places of that plantation together with the number of planters at present 
residing there.”44 He completed the survey by listing the requested information without adding 
additional information or opinions, providing a straightforward response that purported to 
represent the collective experience of Weymouth’s merchants and ship-owners regarding 
Newfoundland.45 
Unlike Burr, Thomas Farr, the mayor of Southampton, was reluctant to complete the 
survey as requested by the Committee. Farr argued that he was unsure why he should respond 
since all he was reporting was common knowledge about Newfoundland. While he did complete 
the survey, Farr provided unsolicited opinions about Newfoundland’s English inhabitants. 
According to Farr, residents destroyed buildings belonging to West Country fishing ships, 
causing delays each spring as fishing crews rebuilt structures. Farr’s addenda indicated not only 
antipathy in Southampton towards Newfoundland’s English inhabitants, but also reluctance 
simply to list the requested information.46   
Farr’s response represented a trend among West Country merchants to portray 
Newfoundland’s English inhabitants as detrimental to the fishery, a point that Prowse interpreted 
as an organized English effort to suppress Newfoundland’s development. Matthews, W. Gordon 
Handcock and Peter Pope have contested Prowse’s interpretation by arguing that while anti-
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inhabitant opinions were present in the West Country, there was no active effort to suppress 
Newfoundland’s English inhabitants by merchants of that region. Instead, West Country 
merchants and mayors often resisted government interference in the fishery, such as the 
appointment of a governor, which they worried would increase taxes and reduce the rights 
granted to them in the 1634 Western Charter.47 
The 1675 town survey supports Matthews’s, Handcock’s and Pope’s interpretation. With 
the exception of Farr’s response, the town surveys did not express anti-inhabitant views. The 
four other completed surveys from Falmouth, Plymouth, Barnstaple and Bideford followed a 
format like Burr’s, offering basic information about what harbours were used, whether they were 
inhabited and how well protected they were. Their responses were largely identical with few 
minor differences, such as the distances between harbours and the number of inhabitants in 
specific places. The surveys offer no breakdown of the population numbers in Newfoundland 
beyond planters and servants, which the mayors estimated was between nine hundred and one 
thousand in total. The town surveys defined the English population of Newfoundland solely by 
the fishery and the economic relationship between planters and servants, with no larger society 
or government. When analyzed together, the town surveys present a Newfoundland characterized 
by many sheltered harbours inhabited by small clusters of planters and their servants.48   
The town surveys are different from any other method used to gather information about 
Newfoundland during the initial investigation. Until Berry’s census later that year, no other 
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sources of demographic information about Newfoundland existed in England, making town 
surveys a vital source of otherwise unavailable information. This demographic data allowed the 
Committee to produce and implement an evidence-based solution immediately, rather than wait 
months for censuses and reports to arrive from Newfoundland. Later, when Berry completed his 
census of Newfoundland, the Committee revisited its initial findings, particularly the 
demographics reported by the town surveys.49  
While the Committee emphasized the importance of firsthand accounts presented with 
little interpretation, respondents preferred the more familiar format of opinions. This familiarity 
is seen in the fact that the opinions submitted exceeded the town surveys in both the quantity of 
responses and diversity of information provided. Although opinions represented a form of 
partisan argumentation, there was valuable information in the letters and oral arguments elicited 
by Hinton’s petition that the Committee used in its deliberations.50 
 Two influential opinions came from John Parrett, a West Country merchant and lobbyist 
who opposed Hinton’s petition, and from John Gould, a London merchant who supported the 
appointment of a governor of Newfoundland.51 In an oral argument, Parrett insisted that Hinton’s 
petition presented an inaccurate depiction of Newfoundland. Rejecting Hinton’s accusations that 
merchants abused Newfoundland’s inhabitants, Parrett argued that the West Country merchants 
were both the best source of information about the island and the best choice to carry out the 
fishery. Parrett also stated that establishing a governor would be difficult due to the island’s 
climate and poor soil, as they would require expensive buildings and imported supplies to 
overcome. Repeating what he claimed was a common saying in the West Country, Parrett stated 
                                                          
49 Farr, “Answer to orders on Newfoundland,” March 24 1675, TNA, CO 1/34, 62-63; Shapiro, Probability and 
Certainty in Seventeenth-Century England, 37–44. 
50 Minutes of the Committee for Trade and Plantations, February 25 to April 8, 1675, CO 391/1, 4-12. 
51 Minutes of the Committee for Trade and Plantations , Whitehall, February 27, 1675, CO 391/1, 5-6; Pope, Fish 
into Wine, 44.  
161 
 
that “if it were not for wood or fish New-Found-Land were not worth a rush.”52 Opposing 
Parrett, Gould argued that if Newfoundland had a governor, it could produce fish more cheaply 
than France, boosting England’s trade. Although Gould does not discuss it, appointing a 
governor to Newfoundland could protect London’s merchant community from the West 
Country’s privileged position in the fishery outlined in the Western Charter, a move that aligns 
with De Krey’s argument that London merchants used their influence over the government to 
protect themselves from regional competitors. Gould, echoing Hinton’s letters, accused 
merchants such as Parrett of destructive self-interest that would permanently reduce the island’s 
value to England. Unlike Parrett, Gould did not offer any source for his claims.53 
In addition to opinions from individuals, some West Country towns coordinated their 
efforts. Richard Hook, the mayor of Barnstaple, wrote to William Weekes, the mayor of 
Plymouth, stating that the two towns shared similar outlooks about Newfoundland and that they 
needed to work together during the ongoing “examination of all things relating to the settlement, 
government and trade of Newfoundland.”54 Hook argued that by working together Plymouth and 
Barnstaple could prevent the appointment of a governor and support the West Country as the 
best choice to enforce regulations and conduct the fishery.55 Weekes, in agreement with Hook, 
gathered abstracts on the regulation, business and environment of Newfoundland and appointed 
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two representatives to argue against Hinton’s petition.56 Hook, along with Thomas Gearing, the 
mayor of Bideford, wrote to the Committee asking it to reject calls for the appointment of a 
governor of Newfoundland.57  
Despite such opposition to a governor, there were advocates for the cause in the West 
Country as well. George Pley, a merchant from Weymouth, wrote to the Committee arguing for 
the appointment of a governor of Newfoundland to prevent the theft and vandalism of shore 
facilities, to protect the fishery from the French and to stop deforestation. Pley reported that 
250,000 young trees and 50,000 older trees were cut yearly in Newfoundland to construct and 
repair buildings. Additionally, unknown quantities of Newfoundland’s trees were destroyed 
annually by forest fires started by inhabitants and fishing crews. Repeating the complaints made 
by Nicolas Luce and others since 1634, Pley argued that deforestation was a long-term threat to 
the migratory fishery, as it depended on Newfoundland’s forests for fuel and building materials. 
The island’s forests continued to diminish despite the government’s recognition of the threat 
posed by deforestation to the viability of Newfoundland’s fishery, and the agreement among 
fishers and merchants that overharvesting and burning trees hurt the fishery.58  
Despite their more subjective nature, opinions did provide information unavailable in the 
town surveys. Parrett and Pley provided quantitative information and references to their sources: 
Pley relied on quantitative data about deforestation in Newfoundland to make his case and 
Parrett cited accounts from sailors and merchants who had experience in Newfoundland. In both 
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instances, Pley’s and Parrett’s opinions presented firsthand accounts about Newfoundland 
otherwise unavailable during the hearings. Although the Committee prioritized observational 
information presented without interpretation, such as the town surveys, it did not ignore 
informed opinions. However, the partisan nature of opinions did create problems. On December 
4, 1675, following Berry’s refusal to carry out the eviction, Williamson criticized Parrett for 
misrepresenting evidence in his opinions for political gain.59    
 Faced with a large quantity of information and contradictory opinions, the Committee 
brought in an outside observer to provide an analysis of the challenges facing the Newfoundland 
fishery and propose a solution. James Houblon, a London merchant involved in the Iberian wine 
trade and later a director of the Bank of England, was selected as the observer. 60 Houblon did not 
participate in the investigation before his report, but he did have personal connections to 
Southwell, Pepys and Williamson. Houblon made a point of ensuring the Committee recognized 
his outsider status, stating: 
I am altogether a stranger to the point in issue, though Mr. Secretary Williamson 
was pleased the other day to tell me that there was an intention to lead a governor 
to Newfoundland, and a colony, and to plant there, as a thing fit to be done to 
retrieve that trade.61  
 
These connections, as well as his background as a merchant, made Houblon at once an outsider 
to the issue and a trusted analyst.   
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Houblon’s report considers Newfoundland in the context of the English shipping decline 
in the 1670’s and whether changes in the governance of Newfoundland could help resolve this 
problem. In this context, Houblon advised that a new legislative framework and a governor were 
needed to solve Newfoundland’s problems and boost England’s fishery. Houblon qualified his 
stance with doubts about the ability of either Newfoundland’s inhabitants or a governor to defend 
against foreign incursions without investments in fortifications and garrisons. In Houblon’s view, 
the advantage of a governor would be in regulating the fishery to reduce costs and increase the 
volume of cod produced, not security. Although the Committee did not agree with Houblon’s 
final assessment, it accepted his report.62 
There were gaps in the Committee’s consideration, most notably the lack of accounts 
from Newfoundland’s English inhabitants and the absence of discussion of the Beothuk and 
Mi’kmaq people. Instead, the Committee relied on sources in England, many of whom had little 
or no experience in Newfoundland, and were mainly concerned with financial issues, such as 
merchants. The fact that the investigation took place in the winter, when sea ice surrounds much 
of Newfoundland, precluded the Committee from sending requests for information to the island. 
However, Newfoundland planters who wintered in England could have contributed.63 In 1677, 
Williamson identified the absence of testimony from any of Newfoundland's English inhabitants 
in 1675 as one of the reasons for both the eviction decision and its failure.64  
The lack of any consideration of the Beothuk and Mi’kmaq peoples is notable since it 
represents a gap in the Committee’s knowledge that was neither corrected nor recognized. The 
only reference to either people is in a report from the French port city of Saint-Malo presented by 
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Southwell. The report, primarily focused on the size of the French fishery, stated that the French 
built the fortifications at Plaisance to defend against the Beothuk and Mi’kmaq.65 This assertion 
is questionable. Although the Mi’kmaq presence in Newfoundland was concentrated near 
Plaisance, French-Mi’kmaq relations were peaceful and focused on trade. Additionally, the 
fortifications at Plaisance were positioned to defend against large seaborne threats such as 
English warships, not attacks from land or small canoes like those used by the Mi’kmaq and 
Beothuk.66 The Beothuk also frequented the area around Plaisance, but their presence in that 
region was smaller than that of the Mi’kmaq.67 There is evidence of English-Mi’kmaq trade in 
this period, but no references to English-Mi’kmaq relations in the 1675 investigation.68  
The questionable explanation for French fortifications in Southwell’s report highlights 
the absence of the Beothuk peoples during the hearings. Unlike Plaisance, the Beothuk 
frequented Trinity Bay, an important region for the English fishery. There is documentary 
evidence as well as archaeological evidence of Beothuk-English contact and trade in this period, 
but the Committee did not receive any such reports.69 It did review Samuel Purchas’s Hakluytus 
Posthumus, which included an account of John Guy’s 1612 encounter with Beothuk traders in 
Trinity Bay, but there is no mention of this meeting in the minute books or letters. The failure to 
consider the Beothuk and Mi’kmaq limited the Committee’s understanding of the possibility of 
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trade, cooperation or conflict with either people, skewing its view of the importance of a 
governor and the English population on the island.70  
On April 1, the Committee announced its intention to reject Hinton’s petition and evict 
all English inhabitants from Newfoundland, reserving the island for the sole use of the migratory 
fishery. Additionally, in recognition of the Western Charter’s flaws, the Committee called for 
suggestions on how to revise the Charter to reflect the needs of the fishery.71 Following the 
announcement, Hinton’s opponents pushed their advantage to gain more favourable terms. Hook 
and Gearing requested that provisions in the Western Charter regulating the cutting of trees be 
removed, arguing that these restrictions were unnecessary once Newfoundland’s English 
inhabitants were evicted.72 Parrett, along with representatives from Barnstaple and Dartmouth, 
requested that English warships seize any New England fishing ships at Newfoundland and that 
the government distribute an updated version of the Western Charter.73 Except for the seizing of 
ships from New England, the Committee adopted all of the suggestions it received. On May 5, 
Charles II approved the Committee’s decision and ordered letters be sent to the governors of 
other plantations to prepare to receive Newfoundland’s inhabitants.74  
No known source explicitly states why the Committee chose eviction. The Committee 
never discussed or proposed eviction before its announcement on April 1, and it was not among 
any of the suggestions made by Hinton’s opponents, who argued only for the rejection of 
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Hinton’s petition and stricter enforcement of the Western Charter. Davies and Matthews have 
argued that the decision stemmed from economic decline in the West Country, but their 
conclusions do not reflect many of the concerns presented or the methods the Committee used to 
collect and evaluate evidence. 75      
The clearest indication of why the Committee chose eviction is in a 1677 reference book 
compiled by Williamson. Williamson’s An Account of the Colony and Fishery of Newfoundland 
and the Present State Thereof contains historical, geographical and political information about 
Newfoundland. In regards to 1675, the Account of the Colony and Fishery states that the 
Committee, after gathering and analyzing accounts of Newfoundland, agreed that the island’s 
inhabitants hurt the fishery by destroying the island’s forests. Additionally, the Committee found 
that Newfoundland’s poor soil and winter ice would make defending and governing the island 
expensive and ineffective.76   
The minute books and letters from the hearings reveal the Committee’s use of Baconian 
reasoning to determine the best course of action regarding Newfoundland. It valued evidence that 
could easily be compared across multiple accounts, as seen in the town surveys, and prioritized 
firsthand accounts in its decision-making process.77 This prioritization extended to opinions as 
well. Parrett’s and Pley’s opinions, although highly partisan, presented valuable information 
about Newfoundland in the form of statements made by fishers and merchants.78 The emphasis 
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on firsthand accounts worked against Hinton, whose supporters could not provide sufficient 
evidence to counter his opponents.79  
Both the Account of the Colony and Fishery and the Committee’s minute books and 
letters present eviction as the choice backed by the most evidence. The accounts presented a 
Newfoundland that was sparsely populated, had few defensible harbours and suffered 
widespread deforestation. While migratory fishers received some criticism for damaging 
Newfoundland’s forests, most blame was assigned to inhabitants for destroying buildings and 
forests and committing crimes. Working from the evidence it collected about the population, 
economy and natural environment of Newfoundland, the Committee developed the hypothesis 
that evicting the island’s English inhabitants would remove the primary cause of complaints, 
boost the migratory fishery’s value and facilitate the enforcement of regulations. However, the 
sources it used to make that decision would be proven inaccurate.80 
Encountering Newfoundland: Berry’s Refusal and its Reception, July 24 to December 4 
Upon his arrival in Newfoundland, John Berry refused to carry out the eviction, reporting 
on July 24, 1675 that the situation he found there did not match his orders.81 In the articles of 
inquiry and letters Berry sent to England, he stated that fishing ships, not inhabitants, destroyed 
buildings for firewood. Additionally, he found that fishing ships stranded fishers in 
Newfoundland to avoid paying for return passages to England, giving credence to Hinton’s 
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letters.82 The French presence in Newfoundland had also been underestimated, with Plaisance 
representing an immediate threat to the English fishery. Berry argued that if he removed 
Newfoundland’s English residents, French inhabitants would quickly move from Plaisance into 
the English harbours and threaten the migratory fishery, and he instead supported the 
establishment of a governor and garrison at St. John’s. Although there were few efforts by 
French planters to inhabit the spaces used by English fishers after the initial colonization of 
Plaisance, the French invasion of the English shore in 1696 vindicated Berry’s fear of French 
expansion.83 In a letter to Williamson, Berry goes further in his support for Newfoundland’s 
English inhabitants, stating that he “cannot but pity the poor inhabitants, considering so many 
false informations have been laid at their charge, as formerly reported.”84 The Committee did not 
discount Berry’s information because it contradicted its findings. Instead, the Committee used 
Berry’s reports to question how it came to its initial conclusion and identified flaws in its 
investigation.85 
Berry provided the Committee with new information about Newfoundland by completing 
the census and articles of inquiry. Both documents reported information about Newfoundland's 
population and fishery, as well as economic, environmental and political conditions, by 
recording observations about every harbour used by English fishing ships and inhabitants 
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between Salvage and Trepassey.86 The Committee valued the 1675 census since it reported a 
larger population than previously portrayed, including families raising children and keeping 
livestock, two points missing from the town surveys. The census reported 1,523 inhabitants in 
total, including 132 male planters, 66 women, 62 of whom are listed as wives and 4 as widows, 
214 children and 1,111 fishing servants employed by planters, a much higher number than the 
estimated total population of 900 to 1,000 residents reported in the town surveys. In addition to 
population figures, Berry reported the planters kept 522 cattle and an unspecified number of 
sheep, contradicting the argument that inhabitants were entirely dependent on trade for 
provisions.87 Berry argued that many inhabitants would be unable to find employment in England 
as lucrative as the Newfoundland fishery, with some making “in a summer season near £20 […] 
while such a person would not get £3 in England.”88  
The English society in Newfoundland as presented by Berry in his articles of inquiry and 
census was more complex than the one the Committee originally envisioned. Rather than being a 
lawless land whose residents competed with the migratory fishery, Newfoundland had a growing 
population of prosperous English workers and families who benefited the migratory fishery by 
preventing unchecked French expansion. In addition to protecting the fishery from French 
incursions, the inhabitant fishery employed individuals who would otherwise be impoverished in 
England. The Newfoundland fishery’s ability to employ England’s poor offered an argument for 
inhabiting the island that first appeared in William Vaughan’s The Golden Fleece, but little 
evidence had supported Vaughan’s argument until Berry’s reports. Given concerns in England 
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regarding the costs of poor relief programs, the employment of the poor in the Newfoundland 
fishery made eviction a less appealing option to the Committee.89 
Outside of employing England’s poor, Berry’s reports did not present many new ideas 
about Newfoundland. Rather, he offered more detailed observations about Newfoundland than 
any other source the Committee collected in 1675. The problems Berry reported, such as abuses 
by West Country fishing ships and the extent of the French threat, were previously reported by 
Hinton, Gould and Pley.90 However, before Berry’s census and articles of inquiry, the pro-
governor advocates did not have the evidence needed to counter the town surveys, opinions and 
reports coming from Hinton’s opponents. Berry presented the evidence that these pro-governor 
advocates lacked, and challenged the hypothesis that Newfoundland was a poor and lawless land 
best served by removing its inhabitants.91  
Berry’s actions and reports received a mixed reception in England. Parrett protested 
Berry’s actions and argued that the Committee needed to enforce the eviction order immediately, 
or else Newfoundland’s inhabitants would grow in number and cause more problems. However, 
Williamson, who had initially approved of evicting Newfoundland’s residents, supported Berry 
and criticized Parrett for misrepresenting information about Newfoundland and trying to exclude 
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the poor from benefiting from the fishery. Following a debate, the Committee accepted Berry’s 
reports on December 4 and did not issue any reprimand for his disobedience.92  
The Committee’s acceptance of Berry’s findings reflects the changing use of observation 
and negative results in knowledge production and policymaking in Restoration England, and the 
reflexive relationship English politicians, planters and merchants had with Newfoundland. The 
Committee, working from evidence gathered within England, developed a perception of the 
situation in Newfoundland that it attempted to resolve through direct intervention. However, 
Berry’s evidence opposed the Committee’s conclusions and questioned the reliability of town 
surveys and opinions from the West Country, all while coming from a figure considered 
politically independent. This distinguished Berry from Houblon, who, while also politically 
independent, could not provide new evidence to support his views. Although the Committee 
expected West Country mayors, merchants and ship owners to provide accurate reports, Berry 
accused these same groups of misrepresenting Newfoundland for political purposes. These 
accusations had a significant impact. Following 1675, the committee annually issued articles of 
inquiry to naval commanders going to Newfoundland but conducted no additional town 
surveys.93 
Despite the acceptance of Berry’s reports, the Committee did not rescind the eviction 
order. Instead, Berry’s focus on providing information about Newfoundland had an immediate 
impact on the government’s approach to managing Newfoundland. In 1676, the Committee gave 
Captains Russell and Wybourne, the naval commanders for Newfoundland that year, the same 
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orders Berry received the previous year, including the census and articles of inquiry. Like Berry, 
Russell and Wybourne refused to remove Newfoundland’s inhabitants, and the Committee 
reprimanded them only for failing to provide timely responses to the articles of inquiry and 
census. In 1677, the Committee officially cancelled the eviction order, but the practice of issuing 
yearly articles of inquiry and censuses for Newfoundland continued.94  
 The Committee’s 1675 Newfoundland investigation grew from a larger change in how 
Restoration politicians and natural philosophers understood the world and made decisions. 
Rather than holding a debate solely on the merits of the petition, as had been the case during 
prior considerations, the Committee sought to address broader issues regarding Newfoundland 
by collecting new information about the island. This approach adhered to Bacon’s inductive 
method of reasoning by emphasizing the importance of building hypotheses using firsthand 
accounts and retesting those ideas as new evidence became available. The Committee used 
observations collected from town surveys and opinions to form hypotheses about 
Newfoundland’s population, natural resources and the challenges that faced the English fishery, 
using their findings on these individual issues to inform a more general solution. By issuing 
Berry a census form and articles of inquiry to complete in Newfoundland, the Committee created 
in advance a means to verify its conclusions. This arrangement proved fortunate for the 
Committee: when Berry refused to carry out the eviction, the Committee was quickly able to 
collect new firsthand information about Newfoundland to test its initial conclusions and identify 
errors in its judgement.95   
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The Committee’s use of new methods of information collection and interpretation 
challenges the idea that the English government’s actions originated from an inherent hostility 
towards Newfoundland’s inhabitants. Although Farr, Parrett and Child opposed Hinton’s 
petition, none of them proposed eviction. Instead, the Committee’s focus on identifying the 
issues facing Newfoundland and finding a solution to its problems, as presented by the evidence 
submitted during its investigation, made eviction an appealing course of action. The accounts 
gathered prior to Berry’s reports presented a Newfoundland with a small population of English 
inhabitants that caused significant damage to the migratory fishery and the island’s forests; 
removing those English inhabitants represented the clearest solution backed by the most 
evidence. The Committee’s willingness to reopen the issue following Berry’s refusal, and his 
presentation of evidence that opposed its conclusions, demonstrates the Committee’s dedication 
to finding an evidence-based solution. The Committee’s willingness to re-examine its initial 
decision refutes the idea that the eviction decision was the product of any active hostility or 
corruption regarding Newfoundland.96  
Although the Committee reissued the eviction order in 1676, the conversation in England 
about Newfoundland had changed. Berry’s reports cast doubts on the reliability of West Country 
mayors, merchants and representatives to supply accurate accounts about Newfoundland, making 
the Committee consider them a source of what Shapin and Schaffer refer to as “subversive 
errors” that used incorrect information to gain favourable outcomes.97 Following Berry’s reports, 
the Committee worked to prevent these errors from affecting future decisions. Beginning in 
                                                          
96 Prowse, A History of Newfoundland, 189–190; Matthews, A History of the West of England-Newfoundland 
Fishery, 209–221; Davies, England and Newfoundland, 22–24; Charles II, order for the removal of inhabitants from 
Newfoundland, May 5, 1675, TNA, CO 1/34, 151; Minutes of the Committee for Trade and Plantations , December 
4, 1675, TNA, CO 391/1, 25-26. 
97 Minutes of the Committee for Trade and Plantations , December 4, 1675, TNA, CO 391/1, 25-26; Farr, “Answer 
to orders on Newfoundland,” March 24 1675, TNA, CO 1/34, 62-63; Shapin and Schaffer, Leviathan and the Air-
Pump, 298.  
175 
 
1676, Newfoundland planters, members of the Navy and other direct sources from 
Newfoundland played a central role in the English government management of the island and its 
understanding of its natural environment. This approach defined the relationship between 
politicians and Newfoundland’s English inhabitants for the remainder of the seventeenth 
century.98   
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Chapter 5 
New Voices and Old Problems: Debate, Policy and Action, 1676-1696 
 Following the failure of the order to evict Newfoundland’s English inhabitants, the 
Committee for Trade and Plantations entered a new period of learning about the island’s English 
residents and how they had adapted to the island’s natural environment. The goal of the 
Committee’s hearings and considerations, which extended from 1676 until Pierre Le Moyne 
d’Iberville’s invasion of the English shore of Newfoundland in 1696, remained the same as it had 
been in 1675: to find a way to protect and grow the fishery. To investigate this issue, the 
Committee solicited information and opinions from Newfoundland’s residents and members of 
the Navy, something it did not do during in its previous hearings. This process revealed an 
English society more complex than was reported during the 1675 hearings. Newfoundland’s 
English inhabitants, rather than being a small group of planters who only fished and sold alcohol, 
were a growing population of new arrivals and multi-generational families who supplemented 
their fishing incomes with farming, fur hunting and other industries that used land-based natural 
resources. These findings increased the government’s awareness of Newfoundland’s society and 
economy, but complicated efforts to manage the island as policymakers responded to the 
challenges of regulating a widely dispersed population and reformulated their ideas about 
Newfoundland’s natural environment. Learning from the failure of the 1675 eviction order, the 
Committee focused on identifying ongoing practices and updating policies to align with new 
information about how fishers and planters used Newfoundland’s natural resources, rather than 
implementing policy changes designed to alter the practices of residents and fishers.1 
This chapter is divided into three sections examining how colonial administrators 
collected and used reports about Newfoundland to define its value as an English possession after 
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1675. The first section examines the emergence of planters and fishers from Newfoundland as 
participants in policy discussions, and how members of the Navy supplied decision-makers with 
information about the island. The information these sources brought forward challenged the 
Committee’s assumptions about how residents and migratory fishers used Newfoundland’s 
natural resources and the legal and business relationships between these two groups. The 
participation of these people, as seen in the Committee for Trade and Plantation minute books 
and Colonial Office files, was a significant shift from the government’s prior reliance on sources 
from within England during debates and hearings. The second section considers the 
government’s reaction to new sources after 1675, particularly the increase in interventions by 
naval officials and the Committee to resolve individual legal, political and economic issues, as 
seen in the Committee’s minutes and Joseph Williamson’s Account of the Colony and Fishery of 
Newfoundland (1677). The third section examines the fortification of St. John’s following the 
Glorious Revolution, and how this military investment accounted for the challenges of protecting 
and managing the geographically dispersed English fishery and population in Newfoundland.2  
The Committee’s focus on collecting information directly from Newfoundland was a 
response to the problems it experienced in 1675, but it also reflected the ongoing centralization 
of English colonial administration in London occurring in the late seventeenth century. Historian 
Jack Greene argued that from the mid-seventeenth century onwards, metropolitan politicians 
increased their political power by replacing traditional contractual arrangements with direct 
government control that concentrated English economic and political power in London. England 
was not alone in this centralization. Similar trends were occurring across Europe, most notably in 
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France, where King Louis XIV used a centralized bureaucracy to restrict the authority of 
regional rulers and project the government’s power overseas.3  
This process of centralization did not just involve creating legislation and appointments 
that increased central authority. It required policymakers to communicate with colonial lands to 
understand the needs of specific places and the challenges of governing them. In the case of 
Newfoundland, this meant that policymakers in England used trade connections and convoys as a 
means to learn about the island and exert their authority, a pattern that contrasts with Greene’s 
findings that the English government used local centres in New England, such as Boston, to 
govern the region. In both New England and Newfoundland, the increase in direct government 
control was meant to protect the benefits the government derived from its colonies and address 
complaints that colonists competed with English merchants or supported activities, such as 
smuggling, that hurt the government’s interests.4 Although this centralization began during the 
Interregnum, events in the late seventeenth century, such as the ascension of the co-regents 
William and Mary in the 1688 Glorious Revolution, accelerated the trend. Following the 
Glorious Revolution, Parliament and other central government bodies increased their powers to 
both make legislative decisions and manage English interests in Europe and abroad. The 
hallmark of this process was the growth of state apparatus for both collecting information and 
exerting authority, such as the use of convoy commanders to protect trade ships and report on 
local conditions.5  
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A similar trend emerged in the English government’s management of Newfoundland in 
this period. Historians Gillian Cell and Elizabeth Mancke argued that between 1630 and 1674 the 
government began to actively manage English efforts in Newfoundland, rather than simply 
granting authority over the island to individuals and companies. However, the government did so 
by delegating power to participants in the fishery through the Western Charter or to individual 
colonists through grants and commissions, such as John Treworgie’s commission to arrest David 
Kirke in 1651, rather than by deploying its own resources. This focus on delegating authority 
changed after 1675 as government officials reconsidered their intentions in Newfoundland and 
the difficulties of policing the day-to-day practices of fishers, planters and merchants.6  
Keith Matthews, discussing the issue of translating government interests into orders and 
results, noted that late seventeenth century policymakers struggled to make decisions that 
balanced what was desirable with what was achievable in Newfoundland, often without finding 
clear solutions.7 The government’s findings challenged presumptions about the efficacy of the 
fishing admiral system and revealed what Jerry Bannister called a system of informal dispute 
resolution customs which could not be easily replaced. As a result of the government’s efforts, 
the authority of the West Country towns and merchants as enforcers of regulations in 
Newfoundland, and the main sources of information about conditions there, eroded after 1675. 
Studying how the government collected and considered information about Newfoundland after 
1675 reveals not only the importance of firsthand observations within the government’s hearings, 
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but also how English ideas changed about Newfoundland’s natural resources and the importance 
of industries besides fishing.8 
New Voices and New Perspectives: Planters, Naval Commanders and Policymakers 
Beginning with Berry’s 1675 census and articles of inquiry, there was a growing 
awareness among government officials in London that Newfoundland hosted a more complex 
English society than previously depicted and that residents were engaged in various economic 
activities besides fishing. Petitions, reports, censuses and opinions submitted to the Committee 
by Newfoundland’s planters and members of the Navy revealed that not only was the island’s 
English population larger than expected, but that it had developed business and legal practices 
adapted to the island’s natural environment. Some of these practices, such as small-scale 
agriculture, were previously discounted by officials as not viable in Newfoundland. 
Policymakers were not uncovering a society unknown in England, but rather they were learning 
about activities obscured by distance and class divides stemming from the fact that few who 
presented petitions or reports to the government before 1676 had experience living in 
Newfoundland. The merchants and mayors that had submitted reports during the 1675 
investigation had little or no personal experience in Newfoundland. John Parrett cited 
information collected from sailors and fishers who went to Newfoundland, not his own 
experiences there. The availability of sources with firsthand knowledge of Newfoundland after 
1675 gave policymakers new insights into the English society developing there, creating a more 
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nuanced understanding of how residents and migratory fishers adapted to the island’s natural 
environment.9 
On November 7, 1676, John Downing, a planter from St. John’s, presented the first 
petition in a series of debates about the governance of Newfoundland held by the Committee. 
These discussions questioned the Committee’s 1675 findings and revealed that residents and 
fishers had a more complex relationship with each other and Newfoundland’s natural resources 
than previously depicted. Downing challenged the 1675 eviction order by arguing that it violated 
previous government decisions that allowed planters to inhabit Newfoundland and pass land, 
titles and charters to their heirs. To support his argument, Downing cited his father’s 
appointment as deputy-governor of Newfoundland in 1640, and a commission issued by Charles 
I and David Kirke to build a plantation in St. John’s, grow crops and convert the Beothuk and 
Mi’kmaq to Christianity.10 Downing did not mention any contact with the Beothuk or Mi’kmaq. 
Additionally, Downing reported that the government’s decision to evict Newfoundland’s 
inhabitants in 1675 hurt planters even though Berry refused to carry out the order. According to 
Downing, before Berry’s arrival migratory fishers used the eviction order as an excuse to destroy 
planter’s buildings and drive families away from St. John’s.11 Downing’s account of these attacks 
is difficult to verify. Berry reported that migratory fishers destroyed their own buildings and that 
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he found standing buildings in every inhabited harbour, including St. John’s, suggesting that any 
violence between planters and fishers was likely limited.12 
 From 1660 to 1675, there was little discussion about the development of agriculture in 
Newfoundland outside of merchants, such as Parrett, stating that the island had too little arable 
soil for farming. Berry and Downing complicated this idea by reporting that Newfoundland did, 
in fact, support some agriculture. Berry recorded in his census that there were 522 heads of cattle 
and an uncounted quantity of sheep kept in Newfoundland by planters, a point that Downing 
expanded.13 Downing reported that his family raised cattle in St. John’s for food and to sell in 
addition to fishing, diversifying their plantation’s income and reducing its dependence on 
imported provisions.14 Peter Pope found that pigs were also valuable livestock in Newfoundland 
during the seventeenth century since they ate fish offal, turning one of the fishery’s waste 
products into edible calories.15 Additionally, excavations in Ferryland have found that vegetables 
from kitchen gardens were an important component of English planter diets.16 While kitchen 
gardens and livestock indicated that English planters could supplement their diets and incomes 
using agriculture, they fell short of the promises made in the 1610’s and 1620’s that 
Newfoundland could host an agricultural colony.17  
Downing also complicated English understandings of what residents in Newfoundland 
did during the winter months by describing how the fishery’s seasonal cycle allowed residents to 
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use the island’s other natural resources. While both the complaints against Kirke and the 1667 
depositions reported that English residents spent the winter months drunk and damaged the 
migratory fishery’s facilities, Downing instead asserted that residents were busy cutting trees, 
hunting for furs, and repairing boats and nets. These activities, like the agriculture Downing 
reported, supplemented incomes or assisted the fishery by reducing resident’s dependence on 
imported provisions and the time needed each spring to prepare for fishing. These insights 
presented a part of life previously obscured from policymakers by their reliance on information 
from fishing merchants and naval personnel, groups that did not overwinter in Newfoundland 
and were therefore unable to observe these activities.18   
Downing did not just describe the living conditions in Newfoundland and the crimes 
committed by fishing ships, he asked the Committee to establish a governor there, as William 
Hinton did in 1675.19 Unlike Hinton, Downing had significant experience and knowledge of 
Newfoundland and a connection to the previous governors through his father’s position as 
deputy-governor. The Committee requested more information about Newfoundland to make a 
decision on Downing’s petition, but delays prevented an in-depth consideration of the matter 
until March 1677, and proceedings continued until May, when Downing returned to St. John’s to 
prepare for the fishing season.20 Downing was able to secure one victory before leaving London. 
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On March 30, 1677, the Privy Council issued an order stating that Newfoundland’s inhabitants 
were not to be disturbed or removed, officially ending the 1675 eviction order.21 
Downing’s accounts arrived at a time when the Committee focused on collecting 
information about Newfoundland, rather than creating new policies. Before 1677, no government 
body expressed interest in collecting texts, maps or other sources about Newfoundland in 
anticipation of future hearings about the subject. However, following the failure of the 1675 
eviction order, the Committee began to gather materials and compile reports to inform any future 
considerations about the island, rather than to make decisions at that time. This interest was not 
unique to Newfoundland. Historian Natasha Glaisyer found that, during the late seventeenth 
century, English merchants and politicians began to collect commercial, political and natural 
information with the expectation that it could be useful in the future, not just for addressing 
immediate concerns.22 In 1677, the Committee acquired a copy of William Vaughan’s The 
Golden Fleece, paid a mapmaker to paste a map of Newfoundland on cloth for the Committee, 
and Williamson created the reference book An Account of the Colony and Fishery of 
Newfoundland to inform their decisions about Newfoundland.23 The Golden Fleece provided 
detailed descriptions of Newfoundland with a plan for turning the island into an economically 
diversified colony. Although this plan was no longer considered viable, Vaughan included 
accounts of early voyages and colonization ventures. In regards to the map, there is no known 
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information about it outside of a Treasury Book entry about paying the mapmaker. There is no 
reference to the specific map used.24   
The Account belongs to a series of reference books, collected letters and notebooks 
produced by or for Williamson about colonies, people and politics.25 The text contains 
summaries of Newfoundland’s history, geography, natural resources, economy and 
contemporary affairs. There is a map of Newfoundland included in the text, but it is unclear if 
this is the same one mentioned in the Treasury Books or a separate one meant for Williamson’s 
use. The Newfoundland presented in Williamson’s book does not resemble the one described by 
Vaughan in 1626. While Vaughan depicted Newfoundland as a place with a temperate climate 
and rich soil, Williamson’s book emphasizes Newfoundland as a barren land whose English 
residents relied on imported supplies to survive, indicating that The Golden Fleece was likely not 
used as a source for writing the Account of the Colony and Fishery.26  
 Although the Committee was interested in learning about Newfoundland, it did not 
implement any policy changes after Downing’s departure, prompting his brother William 
Downing and Thomas Oxford, a merchant from St. John’s, to appear before the Committee in 
1679 to request that they appoint a governor of Newfoundland. Oxford, like the Downing 
brothers, attributed his right to live in Newfoundland to the fact that his family had resided in St. 
John’s for over seventy years. Unlike John Downing, William Downing and Oxford stated that 
their request for the government to appoint a governor of Newfoundland was made on behalf of 
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all the island’s English residents.27 Downing’s and Oxford’s claim to represent Newfoundland’s 
inhabitants, and that residents desired a governor, was a first. Previous requests to appoint a 
governor focused on either the qualifications of the individual who petitioned for the title or the 
reasons why a governor was needed, but before 1679 none claimed that they wrote on behalf of 
the island’s English population.28 
 
Table 2 The English Population of Newfoundland Reported by Convoy Commanders, 
1675-1693 
 
The ages that constituted childhood were not specified. No details were recorded in 1679 other 
than the total number of English inhabitants. No census numbers were registered for 1678, 1683 
or 1685-1690. Source: TNA, CO 390/6, 1-4. 
 
Downing and Oxford’s claim to represent Newfoundland’s inhabitants indicates the 
beginnings of the political and economic centralization of English activities around St. John’s. 
While explorers and fishers recognized St. John’s as one of Newfoundland’s best harbours for 
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Colonial, America and West Indies, Volume 10, 1677-1680, ed. W Noel Sainsbury and J W Fortescue (London: Her 
Majesty's Stationery Office, 1896), 324; Thomas Oxford, “Petition to the King’s Privy Council,” April 2, 1679, 
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391/3, 3. 
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Year Men Women Children Servants Total
1675 132 66 214 1111 1523
1676 138 57 148 953 1286
1677 152 108 269 1355 1884
1679 1700
1680 212 99 251 1130 1692
1681 219 97 246 1956 2518
1682 138 56 56 1400 1650
1684 197 117 199 1450 1963
1691 261 149 309 1331 2050
1692 149 139 261 1012 1561
1693 745 141 358 1098 2342
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shipping and fishing since the sixteenth century, no chartered company or governor colonized the 
harbour during the seventeenth century.29 However, by the 1670’s, St. John’s hosted a growing 
population of English residents that both fished and serviced the migratory fishery. St. John’s 
became home to an active political community in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth 
centuries as residents of that harbour became vocal proponents of increased local legal and 
political authority over Newfoundland.30  
Before 1675, planters, other than those with charters such as Calvert and Kirke, rarely 
appeared in any documents about Newfoundland. The presence of the Downing brothers and 
Oxford before the Committee in 1676 reflected the threat the eviction order posed to their 
livelihoods, the growing political community in Newfoundland and the Committee’s interest in 
collecting information about Newfoundland from individuals with firsthand experience there. 
While the Downing brothers and Oxford did not succeed in convincing the Committee to appoint 
a governor, they provided new insights into the economic, political and social lives of 
Newfoundland’s English residents.31 
Just as Williamson and the Committee were not the only parties interested in collecting 
information about Newfoundland, Oxford and the Downing brothers were not the only 
individuals with a stake in changing the island’s management. Members of the Royal Navy, 
particularly those involved in the convoys to Newfoundland, became important sources of 
information and political actors who used their knowledge of the island to push for favourable 
policies. Historian Sari Hornstein, examining the peacetime functions of the Royal Navy, found 
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31 Minutes of the Committee for Trade and Plantations , February 12, 1675 to December 4, 1675, TNA, CO 391/1, 
4-26. 
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that the Newfoundland convoy played a significant role in English commerce because of its route 
from Newfoundland to markets on both the Atlantic and Mediterranean coasts of Iberia before 
returning to England. This route allowed the convoy to protect English merchant ships travelling 
around Iberia, not just those coming from Newfoundland. This importance contributed to naval 
personnel, especially commanders, becoming advocates for policies they thought would better 
secure the Newfoundland fishery and increase its volume.32  
Naval interest in Newfoundland predated 1675, as evidenced by Robert Robinson’s 1668 
petition for the governorship, but the institution of yearly convoys and articles of inquiry in 1675 
correlated with captains and other personnel becoming more active in advocating specific 
policies. The opinions convoy commanders included with their annual articles of inquiry are the 
best example of this advocacy. While the inquiries recorded qualitative and quantitative data, 
such as the types of businesses residents engaged in and the number of fish caught, convoy 
commanders often included unasked-for policy recommendations.33 This relationship between 
convoy commanders and bureaucrats was not unique to Newfoundland, it reflected what 
historian John Brewer identified as the Navy’s increasing importance as a tool for both exerting 
the English government’s authority over colonies and informing decisions related to those 
colonies.34  
Captain William Poole’s 1677 answers to the articles of inquiry exemplify how members 
of the Royal Navy became politicized regarding Newfoundland. Poole, using information about 
the economic connections between residents and migratory fishers collected in Newfoundland, 
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argued that the government should support the growth of both the inhabitant and migratory 
fisheries. In his reports, Poole reinforced Berry’s and John Downing’s accounts by describing 
Newfoundland’s English inhabitants as a valuable resource for the migratory fishery. According 
to Poole, residents cut trees to build boats and structures during the winter for migratory fishers 
to use in spring, provided care for the sick and injured, and rented their rooms and warehouses 
for migratory ships to store equipment and salt in for the next season. While Poole acknowledged 
that there was an “ancient animosity” between inhabitants and migratory fishers, he assured the 
Committee that there was sufficient room for both in Newfoundland, and that migratory fishers 
and residents relied on each other to make their ventures profitable.35 Following Poole’s reports, 
other captains, such as Robinson, who was the convoy commander in 1680, and Charles Talbot, 
the convoy commander in 1683, used the answers to the articles of inquiry to advocate that the 
English government support a mixed inhabitant and migratory fishery by appointing a 
governor.36  
The crews of the warships in Newfoundland also provided information and opinions 
about the island. Two reports come from Nehemiah Troute, a ship's purser who served under 
Berry in 1675 and gave a deposition about Newfoundland in 1678, and John Thomas, a chaplain 
who served under Robinson in 1680 and wrote a report about the island.37 Both Troute and 
Thomas described Newfoundland as a place with significant undeveloped potential. Thomas, 
writing from a religious perspective, warned that the current situation there was unsustainable 
without a civil government and church, since many residents lived together out of wedlock, 
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raised unbaptized children and committed crimes.38 Troute, writing from an economic 
perspective, was concerned that Newfoundland’s English inhabitants were becoming dependent 
on New England for supplies, undercutting England’s trade with the island and creating 
opportunities for smuggling, an activity that a governor could, in his view, prevent.39  
Beginning in the late seventeenth century, English politicians increasingly saw New 
England as a threat to England’s trade and political influence in America, including 
Newfoundland. Because of New England’s proximity to Newfoundland, traders from Boston and 
other ports arrived at the island before English ships each spring, allowing them to sell 
provisions and buy fish at better rates than their English counterparts.40 In 1675, Josiah Child 
argued that Newfoundland risked forming closer ties to New England than England because of 
this trade, hurting English shipping by reducing the provisioning trade and increasing 
competition.41 In 1687, Samuel Pepys reported that New England traders used Newfoundland as 
a base for smuggling tobacco to Dutch ships to demonstrate for the Committee the difficulties 
English authorities had controlling trade in America.42  
The reports by members of the Navy largely agreed about Newfoundland’s climate and 
natural environment. Poole, Robinson, Troute and Thomas all described Newfoundland as 
having poor soil, receding forests and harsh winters. Unlike those arguing against a governor in 
1675, these members of the Navy did not see these concerns as reasons to stop the government 
from investing its resources in protecting and managing the island. Without solving the problem 
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of how to govern Newfoundland’s widely dispersed residents and migratory fishers, ongoing 
issues, such as deforestation, smuggling and lack of cooperation with authorities, threatened to 
undermine the cod fishery’s value to England.43  
This new information about Newfoundland and the growing number of people 
advocating for the government to change how it managed the island challenged policymakers. 
Reflecting the reflexive framework George Soros described, the information collected after 1675 
highlighted the complexity of life in Newfoundland and challenged England’s Newfoundland 
policy, rather than supporting the presumption that Newfoundland could only support a cod 
fishery. Assumptions about what practices worked in Newfoundland and the limits of its natural 
environment formed after the failure of the colonies launched in the 1610’s and 1620’s, were not 
entirely accurate. The existence of agriculture and other industries, even in the limited form John 
Downing reported, disrupted the image of Newfoundland as a barren land on which 
policymakers based their policies. The prevalence of complaints about abuses by fishers, planters 
and merchants, and evidence that residents engaged in industries besides fishing to supplement 
their incomes, led policymakers to view the Western Charter as insufficient. However, although 
the Downing brothers, Oxford and members of the Navy, such as Wheler and Poole, raised 
awareness in England about the challenges facing the English in Newfoundland, the government 
had difficulty solving those issues.44  
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Changing Actions in Newfoundland, 1680-1688 
 Beginning in 1680, the Committee used the information it had collected over the previous 
five years about Newfoundland’s residents, economy and natural environment to launch a series 
of initiatives to defend the island, grow the fishery and enforce laws. Its announcements reflected 
both its awareness of the difficulty of managing Newfoundland’s widely dispersed population 
and the need to stop practices that hurt the fishery’s value. However, implementing these ideas 
proved difficult, resulting in multiple announced plans being abandoned and an increased 
reliance on allowing previously banned practices and addressing issues on a case-by-case basis, 
rather than enforcing regulations throughout Newfoundland. Despite spending considerable time 
and resources learning about Newfoundland, the Committee was unable to address questions 
about how to stop undesirable practices, preserve natural resources necessary for the fishery and 
protect the fishery from threats.45  
 In 1680, the Committee declared that it would appoint a governor of Newfoundland and 
fortify St. John’s. There had been multiple petitions to appoint a governor of Newfoundland 
since 1667, but, despite announcing that a governor would be appointed, the Committee did not 
follow through on its plan. There is no discussion in the Committee’s minute books or letters 
about why it did not appoint a governor after the announcement, and there was confusion in 
England about the government’s intentions. In 1680, the mayor, merchants and ship-owners from 
Poole advised the Committee against removing Newfoundland’s inhabitants, an order that had 
been struck down three years earlier.46 
 Rather than sending a governor to Newfoundland, members of the Navy and the 
Committee took a direct role in settling disputes that threatened to disrupt the fishery and trade. 
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This interventionist approach increased the government’s control over English affairs in 
Newfoundland, but did not extend to policing the day-to-day activities of fishers and residents. 
Two events illustrate this approach: a dispute in 1680 regarding the theft and destruction of 
French fishing boats and supplies by English fishers and planters, and a 1681 petition by the 
merchant William Miles asking the Committee to collect debts from planters. In both cases, the 
Navy and the Committee dedicated resources to resolving the issues themselves, rather than 
leaving them to be addressed by fishing admirals and planters.47  
 In 1680, a French planter named Jean Ducarret requested that the English fishing 
admirals in Trepassay investigate the theft and destruction of his property by English fishing 
servants and planters who hunted for furs along the French shore during the winter of 1679-1680. 
In addition to asking the admirals investigate the issue, Ducarret gave George Perriman, an 
English planter in Trepassay, power of attorney to retrieve his stolen property. Perriman 
delegated part of this authority to George Kirke, one of Sara and David Kirke’s sons, to recover a 
boat stolen from Ducarret. The fishing admirals, Perriman and Kirke settled part of the dispute 
on their own, with two planters, Christopher Pollard and John Roulston, agreeing to pay Ducarret 
damages, but Robinson, the convoy commander that year, tried four others implicated in the 
incident. Robinson, whom the fishing admirals and Kirke asked to examine the case, tried the 
fishing servants Francis Knapman, William Couch, Samuel Wood and John Wallis and, upon 
finding them guilty, punished them onboard his ship.48  
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Robinson’s involvement represents an insertion of government authority in a case that, 
according to the Western Charter, should have been handled entirely by the fishing admirals.49 
Before King William’s Act in 1699, there was no document giving Naval captains the power to 
hear cases in Newfoundland or punish those found guilty, but Robinson received no reprimand 
for exceeding his authority.50 The complicated delegation of investigative and collections duties 
suggests that these processes were not unfamiliar to those involved, reflecting what Bannister 
calls the reliance on legal customs by residents and fishers when formal legal systems were 
insufficient.51  
The second case shows the Committee intervening in legal matters relating to 
Newfoundland, rather than a member of the Navy becoming involved because of a request by 
fishers or planters. In 1681, Miles, who traded provisions to planters in exchange for fish, 
complained to the Committee that fourteen planters refused to pay the debts they owed him. The 
planters listed in the petition, mostly located in New Perlican and Heart’s Content, collectively 
owed Miles £684 payable in 1,289 quintals (65 tons) of cod. To resolve the issue, Miles asked 
the Committee to collect the debts for him or support an agent of his sent to collect those debts.52 
The Committee ordered the convoy commander to collect Miles’s debts and announced that 
Newfoundland’s English inhabitants could not be allowed to ignore their debts to merchants 
since it would discourage trade.53  
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Government interventions to resolve individual complaints such as Miles’s were 
uncommon. However, the reasoning behind the Committee’s decision is consistent with its 
interest in increasing its control over Newfoundland. Like the 1675 investigation, the 
Committee’s decision to collect debts for Miles demonstrates its focus on finding a way to 
protect and govern the Newfoundland fishery, as well as its recognition that the current 
regulations, specifically the Western Charter, were insufficient. Crime and abuses of the Western 
Charter’s terms were widespread, but the habitation and economic patterns that succeeded in 
Newfoundland made enforcing regulations difficult since the distribution of residents and fishing 
ships limited the abilities of any single authority to stop unwanted practices.54  
The Committee addressed some of the Western Charter’s insufficiencies by changing its 
provisions so that they better aligned with how residents used the island’s natural resources. In 
1680, the Committee announced that Newfoundland’s English inhabitants could build houses no 
closer to the shore than a quarter-mile, much closer than the previous six-mile limit required in 
the Western Charter.55 The six-mile limit existed as a prescriptive regulation since its inception in 
1637. Residents rarely lived far from their boats and shore facilities, and the lack of arable soil or 
other natural resources gave them little reason to move further inland. Not only was the limit 
regularly violated, as seen in archaeological finds of houses from that period near the shore, but 
there is no known evidence that any English planter followed it or that fishing admirals or 
convoy commanders punished residents for living near the shore.56 The Committee also 
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announced that inhabitants were allowed to keep gardens and orchards so long as they were no 
closer than a quarter-mile to the shore, a decision that acknowledged the reports by John 
Downing and naval commanders that small-scale agriculture was common in Newfoundland.57  
By allowing planters to live and grow crops closer to the shore, the Committee 
recognized the limits of its ability to enforce regulations in Newfoundland, the economic 
relationships between migratory fishers and residents, and its prior misreading of the situation 
there. This awareness originated in the Committee’s use of information from the Downing 
brothers, Oxford, Poole, Troute and Thomas. These individuals all noted that inhabitants 
maintained shore facilities, built boats and reserved space for fishing ships, thus reducing the 
amount of time migratory fishers spent setting up each year.58 These arrangements did not mean 
that resident-migratory fisher relations were without incident, only that these relations were, on 
the whole, beneficial to both parties. Although the Committee did not expect Newfoundland to 
become an economically diverse colony, its recognition that residents grew crops and raised 
livestock was a major change from its 1675 decision that the island was only valuable for its 
ability to support the migratory fishery.59  
The Committee’s decisions better aligned policy with conditions in Newfoundland, 
although they did not resolve the question of how to enforce laws and regulations there. The 
convoy commander Francis Wheler’s 1684 answers to the articles of inquiry supported 
appointing a governor, but he differed from Poole, Robinson and Talbot in his reason for that 
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support. Wheler described Newfoundland as a lawless place with a population united in its 
refusal to cooperate with naval authorities, making it impossible to discover who had committed 
a crime. Like Poole, Wheler portrayed inhabitants as useful for the fishery since they maintained 
the stages and houses left overwinter by fishing ships but added that both migratory fishers and 
residents committed crimes that hurt the fishery, such as starting forest fires. Wheler also 
recognized the difficulties of governing Newfoundland’s widely distributed population and 
proposed that the only way to enforce laws there would be to appoint a magistrate in every 
harbour, an approach that had not been suggested previously.60   
Wheler’s insight into how Newfoundland’s natural environment complicated law 
enforcement was accompanied by one of the first descriptive accounts of fur hunting in 
Newfoundland. While most English inhabitants focused on cutting wood during the winter, 
Wheler found that Bonavista’s residents spent the winter inland trapping beaver and otter for sale 
to trade ships in the spring.61 Bonavista’s English inhabitants, intentionally or not, loosely 
followed the Beothuk’s seasonal pattern of spending summer on the coast and winter inland, 
moving as the seasons favoured different natural resources.62 This practice spread throughout 
Newfoundland in the eighteenth century and remained in use into the early twentieth century in 
remote communities.63  
 Although government officials recognized that the existing legislation was ineffective, 
they were unable to find an adequate replacement. The Committee and the Navy intervened in 
individual cases, especially when they threatened merchant interests, but did not follow through 
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on broad policy changes except to legalize ongoing practices that, while previously banned, the 
fishing admirals had not been punishing. Matthews asserted that this approach represented “the 
only way to reconcile two absolutely opposed factors. If settlers were removed the French would 
possess the whole island, but if a governor was sent, then settlement would be unduly 
encouraged and Newfoundland would become another New England.”64 Matthews’ explanation 
does not account for the logistical difficulties of governing Newfoundland’s geographically 
dispersed English population, as depicted in the town surveys and censuses from 1675 onwards. 
However, policymakers were attempting to accommodate several conflicting goals. The 
Committee could not easily address questions about how to govern Newfoundland’s residents 
and fishery, how to control activities besides fishing, such as farming and tavern keeping, or 
what the government’s role was in shaping the island’s growing population and their activities. 
Additionally, there was no one outcome desired by the merchant communities in London or the 
West Country, and merchants from both regions differed in their opinions about the efficacy of 
new ideas for governing Newfoundland. This lack of action persisted until the political climate in 
England changed in 1688.65  
Protecting Newfoundland: The Glorious Revolution and King William’s War, 1688-1696 
The political instability after 1688 associated with the Glorious Revolution, which 
resulted in the ouster James II and ascension of William and Mary, and the outbreak of King 
William’s War, which brought England into conflict with France, had a different effect on the 
development of Newfoundland than the Interregnum had. Unlike the period of the Interregnum, 
during which the government did little to manage Newfoundland other than arresting David 
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Kirke, after 1688 the changing political tides in England and the threat of French attack resulted 
in an increase in government efforts to defend and manage Newfoundland.66 This interest took 
the form of a series of surveys by the Royal Navy and the fortification of St. John’s. By focusing 
on defense, the English government took on the role of protecting Newfoundland’s English 
population, something it had not done previously. At the centre of this change was a decision 
made in 1689, and carried out in 1693, to fortify St. John’s and place a garrison there. The 
government’s choice of St. John’s recognized that harbour as the most important English-
controlled location in Newfoundland, and attempted to answer the question of how to protect 
Newfoundland’s isolated and widely dispersed English population. Although these defenses 
failed to repel d’Iberville’s 1696 invasion, English military investment in St. John’s continued 
after the Treaty of Ryswick in 1697, creating a permanent government presence in 
Newfoundland. This focus on developing St. John’s contrasted with the Committee’s previous 
concerns about its limited ability to govern Newfoundland. Before 1688, English efforts to 
regulate Newfoundland were complicated by questions about how to enforce laws over a widely 
dispersed population and whether a permanent government presence would help the fishery. 
However, the outbreak of King William’s War and the threat of French attack motivated the 
government to define what, exactly, its role in Newfoundland was and how to deploy its 
resources to protect the island’s benefits for England.67 
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The government’s interest in controlling Newfoundland was part of a larger trend of 
English intervention in America after 1688. Greene, writing about the governance of the Thirteen 
Colonies, found that the reign of William and Mary accelerated the ongoing centralization of 
colonial authority in London under Parliament and a growing administrative class.68 Historian 
Nuala Zahedieh, writing about London’s political and merchant community, built upon Greene’s 
argument by stating “the resolution of the rules of the Atlantic game in 1689 allowed a 
consolidated state better to manipulate and manage the imperial economy in its own interests and 
ushered in an extended period of slow growth.”69 Newfoundland did not experience the same 
level of disruption as New England, where the governor was overthrown in 1689 and replaced by 
a charter that limited the colony’s autonomy, but authority over Newfoundland did become 
concentrated in parliament and administrative bodies such as the Committee.70 
On May 16, 1689, four months after the proclamation of the acceptance of William and 
Mary as co-regents was sent to Newfoundland, the Committee announced it would spend £3,000 
to establish fortifications, a garrison and military governor in St. John’s. Although this was not 
the first announcement of a governor of Newfoundland, it was the first to result in action since 
1660. The reason for establishing this governor and garrison, as recorded in the Committee’s 
minute books, was to defend Newfoundland and its fishery from French attacks, not to enforce 
regulations.71  
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This commitment to defending Newfoundland marked the beginning of a permanent 
government presence in the island, but it was a decision motivated more by military needs than 
by a desire to govern the island’s English populace. Although French forces built fortifications 
and placed a garrison in Plaisance in 1662, before King William’s War they launched no attacks 
on English ships or inhabitants except to push English planters out of the immediate area around 
Plaisance. With the outbreak of war with France in 1688, Plaisance became a serious threat to the 
English fishery. There were no English harbours as fortified as Plaisance for ships and 
inhabitants to shelter in or for the Navy to launch ships from, making English fishers and 
residents vulnerable to attack.72 
The choice of location for these fortifications indicated an important realization in 
England: that St. John’s was the main harbour of the English fishery, and that the government 
could not protect every English-inhabited harbour in Newfoundland. St. John’s, despite being 
acknowledged since the sixteenth century as one of the best harbours in Newfoundland, was not 
chosen as an operational base by either the Newfoundland Company, Henry Cary, George 
Calvert or David Kirke. Instead, the harbour became, as Pope called it, “the most important of 
the migratory fishing stations,” and a series of planters, such as the Downing and Oxford 
families, independently transformed it into a major fishing, trading and military centre by the 
late-seventeenth century.73 The lack of defined roads and paths between many regions of the 
English shore meant that a governor and garrison would be limited in their ability to respond to 
incidents in remote harbours. Defending every English inhabited-harbour in Newfoundland 
would have been prohibitively expensive, forcing the Committee to choose where its resources 
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would be best deployed. Fortifying St. John’s presented a way to protect a significant portion of 
the fishers and residents in Newfoundland without overextending the government’s resources.74    
Before 1689, merchants, companies and proprietary governors were responsible for 
building and maintaining fortifications and guns to defend the English shore. Despite the expense 
and lack of government support, there were private efforts to build defenses. John Guy built a 
fort near Cuper’s Cove in 1612 to protect the plantation from pirates, and Kirke placed fifty-six 
cannons in Ferryland, St. John’s and Bay Bulls between 1637 and 1651. The merchant 
Christopher Martin reported that he landed cannons in St. John’s in 1665 and 1667 and built 
fortifications near the harbour’s narrows.75 The defenses in St. John’s were functional in 1673, 
when the guns at the port’s entrance and a chain strung across the narrows repulsed a squadron 
of Dutch warships, but by 1688 these defenses were abandoned and in poor condition.76  
The Committee ordered the fortification of St. John’s in 1689, but there were delays in 
beginning construction. In 1691, English inhabitants from St. John’s petitioned the Committee to 
send the promised governor to Newfoundland and begin fortifying the harbour.77 Despite French 
raids on English fishing ships, it was not until 1693 that Wheler, at the behest of the inhabitants 
of St. John’s, began the process of designing fortifications. On the recommendation of Christian 
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Lilly, Wheler’s engineer, two forts were built in St. John’s and cannons placed on either side of 
the harbour narrows.78 
Although policymakers avoided the topic of Newfoundland’s governance after 1688, 
their recognition that the island and its English inhabitants were worth defending was a 
significant change. No state resources were spent to protect Newfoundland’s English residents 
before 1693. The warships sent each spring to Newfoundland were there to defend fishing and 
trade ships and collect information, and once the ships left in the fall, policymakers saw little 
reason to defend Newfoundland. Fortifying St. John’s was an important step towards settling the 
question of how to manage and protect Newfoundland’s widely dispersed fishery and 
inhabitants. The government’s decision to focus on St. John’s acknowledged its limited ability to 
oversee and defend Newfoundland, by concentrating resources in the area it perceived as the 
most relevant to the fishery.79   
 While the reflexive process of basing plans on preconceptions about Newfoundland’s 
natural environment and adjusting assumptions when those plans were challenged revealed the 
fishery to be the island’s single major industry, the Committee discovered after 1675 that this 
conclusion was incomplete. Berry’s refusal to evict Newfoundland’s English inhabitants began 
an extended reconsideration of the island’s place in England’s growing overseas empire and how 
residents and fishers used the island. From 1676 to 1696, the Committee learned that prior efforts 
to regulate how English residents and fishers used Newfoundland’s natural environment, based 
on the assumption that the island’s natural resources were only valuable for supplying the 
fishery, were inaccurate. The petitions, opinions, censuses and answers to inquiries the 
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Committee received revealed that Newfoundland’s English residents farmed and hunted fur-
bearing animals as well as supported the migratory fishery by storing goods, repairing equipment 
and tending the sick and injured. None of these activities supplanted the fishery, but they 
complicated the image of Newfoundland as a place that was, as John Parrett argued in 1675, only 
valuable for its fish and wood.80 
The Committee’s re-evaluation of Newfoundland was not an isolated occurrence. Rather, 
it was part of a broader change occurring in England regarding the management of its colonies 
that increased the central government’s authority over its colonial subjects, often at the expense 
of regional interests. Wars during the late seventeenth century, the growth of mercantilist 
policies in England and an increasingly powerful central government had, according to Christian 
Koot, solidified English control over its transatlantic trade and increased the government’s 
capacity to implement policies in remote regions. These changes resulted in an interconnected 
English empire with more trade between colonies, but they also increased the central 
government’s willingness to end local practices and depose figures it perceived as a threat to its 
interests. Officials did not intervene in Newfoundland to the same degree they did in New 
England, but the use of new sources of information and focus on using reports from 
Newfoundland changed how the government perceived the island’s value and how residents used 
its natural resources.81 
After the failure of the 1675 eviction order, the government resisted enacting new 
policies in Newfoundland. The Committee acknowledged that there were chronic problems in 
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Newfoundland that threatened to undermine the cod fishery’s profitability, and that the existing 
regulations and enforcement practices were insufficient to address those problems. However, the 
information the Committee collected and the hearings it held revealed more problems than 
solutions. At the centre of the Committee’s considerations was the question of how to manage a 
land whose English population was widely distributed and whose commercial value came from 
an industry reliant on a complex relationship between residents, migratory ships and trade with 
Europe and America. Although policymakers changed sections of the Western Charter, such as 
reducing building limits, these alterations had few practical effects. Migratory fishers and 
planters continued to fish and live in Newfoundland in the same fashion as they had before 1675, 
and with few exceptions, such as the collection of debts for Miles, there was little government 
intervention.82  
It was not until war threatened the fishery that the government began to invest its 
resources in Newfoundland, and even then they avoided creating any new civil authority there. 
Although the English government made no final decision about how to govern Newfoundland, 
the information available to policymakers about the island presented a much more complicated 
place than perceived before 1675.83 However, while the government gradually adopted new 
approaches to managing Newfoundland from 1676 to 1696, it was d’Iberville’s invasion of the 
English shore in the winter of 1696-1697 that initiated a period of change.84 
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Chapter 6 
Defining Newfoundland: Pierre Le Moyne d’Iberville and King William’s Act 
 
Then back once more to Carbonear, / where stubborn English still held out./ 
Again he looked with fierce desire/ at the frowning cliffs of the island grim,/ and 
again the cannon’s thunderous roar/ right royally did welcome him./ His pride 
was crushed, his rage was great,/ all mercy to the winds he threw/ the settlement 
to the torch was put,/ then d’Iberville sullenly withdrew. 
Anonymous, “The Ballad of d’Iberville’s Raid.”1 
 
The decades after the Restoration saw numerous ineffective and failed attempts by the 
English government to manage residents and fishers in Newfoundland. Between 1660 and 1696, 
the logistics of overseeing Newfoundland’s isolated harbours, and new information about how 
English migratory fishers and residents used the island’s natural resources, thwarted the 
government’s efforts to regulate activities in Newfoundland. However, 1696 marked the 
beginning of a period of rapid change. Pierre Le Moyne d’Iberville’s invasion of the English 
shore of Newfoundland in the winter of 1696-1697 devastated the English fishery and population 
there, prompting the English government to assess how to rebuild the island and whether it 
should change how the island was governed and defended. Building from the knowledge 
government bodies, merchants and planters had gained about Newfoundland’s economy and 
natural environment over the previous eighty-nine years, policymakers considered what the 
island’s value as an English colonial possession was and how to manage the practices of fishers 
and residents there. The result of these considerations was the 1699 statute King William’s Act, 
which defined the fishery as Newfoundland’s sole valuable industry, reserved the island’s 
terrestrial natural resources for the use of that fishery and refined how Newfoundland was 
governed.2 
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News of the French attacks on Newfoundland caused the English government to hold 
hearings about what the island’s economic value to England was, how to retake the island and 
how fishers and residents there should be governed. Merchants, lobbyists and naval officials sent 
reports of d’Iberville’s attack to the government accompanied by petitions advocating changes in 
the management of Newfoundland. This political pressure, which continued until the passage of 
King William’s Act in 1699, differed from prior considerations of Newfoundland. Rather than 
entering a cycle of debates and little action, as had occurred after 1675, the hearings beginning in 
1696 resulted in new legislation. The discussions took place in three phases. The first was the 
reaction to d’Iberville’s attack and the planning of the English counterattack in 1696. The second 
phase began with the retaking of Newfoundland’s English shore in 1697 by English forces. 
Following this campaign, the commanders of the attack used their experiences in Newfoundland 
to argue for the government to change its approach to governing the island. The third phase 
occurred in 1699 with the creation of King William’s Act, which both updated the provisions 
contained in the Western Charter and introduced new regulations and enforcement mechanisms 
to protect the migratory and resident fisheries.3  
There are few known surviving sources about the drafting of King William’s Act, making 
it difficult to study. However, examining the letters and reports presented to the government 
before Parliament passed the Act provides insight into the issues considered by its writers, an 
approach assisted by the introduction of new recordkeeping techniques in 1696. Beginning that 
year, specialized files were created for documents about Newfoundland presented to the 
government, a change from the previous method of combining records about multiple regions of 
America into a single series. In 1696, the Colonial Office 194 file was created to hold reports, 
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communications, agreements and other materials regarding Newfoundland sent to the Secretary 
of State and to the Board of Trade, a committee of the Privy Council formed in 1696 to replace 
the Committee for Trade and Plantations. Unlike the Committee, which was composed of 
members of the Privy Council and, as Ian Steele notes, was perceived by King William III as 
costly and ineffective, the Board of Trade was composed of eight paid commissioners appointed 
by the king who were not members of the Privy Council. Select documents from before 1696 
were copied and collected in the Colonial Office 195 file to complement the 194 file. In addition 
to these government documents, the British Library holds the letter books and journals of 
Michael Richards, the military engineer in charge of fortifying St. John’s from 1697 to 1703. 
Richards’s writings discuss the condition of Newfoundland after d’Iberville’s campaign and the 
difficulties encountered while fortifying and defending the island. These sources, when viewed 
together, provide insight into the people, events and questions that defined the period leading up 
to the writing of the Act.4  
King William’s Act has been the subject of academic and popular debate since the late 
eighteenth century, with little consensus about either the intentions of its writers or its impact on 
Newfoundland’s history. The traditional assessment of the Act, which comes from John Reeves 
and Daniel Prowse, is that it concentrated political and legal authority over Newfoundland in 
West Country fishing merchants, who then abused their power to suppress Newfoundland’s 
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English inhabitants.5 Since the 1980’s, historians Patrick O’Flaherty and Frederick Rowe have 
used the idea that King William’s Act concentrated political power in West Country merchants 
to argue that the Act was meant to prevent Newfoundland from developing into a colony with 
any degree of political self-determination.6 Opposing this argument, both Keith Matthews and 
Jerry Bannister argued that King William’s Act did not restrict Newfoundland’s inhabitants since 
their established practices were largely unaffected by the Act’s provisions. Bannister also 
asserted that whatever the Act’s purpose was on paper, it did not match the actual legal and 
economic developments in Newfoundland, with few known cases of its provisions ever being 
fully enforced.7 
Much of this debate originates from the lack of known sources about what Parliament’s 
intentions were when writing King William’s Act. Historian Alan Cass called the Act’s genesis a 
mystery, with few sources indicating why Parliament would propose or pass it in 1699. 
Examining the Parliamentary minute books and other sources, Cass found that the Act was not 
the result of any singular vision for Newfoundland. Instead, King William’s Act underwent a 
series of major, but poorly recorded, revisions between its introduction and passing that 
complicate analysis of its drafting. Multiple individuals and committees made significant 
changes to the Act’s provisions that accounted for how Newfoundland’s fishery and its 
associated trades, such as provisioning and shipbuilding, affected the economies of towns in 
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England. According to Cass, these economic interests made King William’s Act an imperial 
trade measure, rather than a colonial constitution. The Act’s focus on trade indicates that it was 
enacted with the goal of increasing Newfoundland’s economic value to England by allowing 
both migratory and inhabitant fishers to ply their trade “without any other restraint than was 
customary.”8 
 Although Cass and O’Flaherty have explored the legislative process behind the passing 
of King William’s Act, the political, economic and military history that preceded it has received 
little scholarly attention. Historians have used King William’s Act as the beginning of their 
studies, as is the case in Bannister’s Rule of the Admirals, or focus on its provisions without 
considering the period before it was passed, as is the case in Cass’s and O’Flaherty’s works.9 
Studying the events and discussions that occurred over the three years leading up to King 
William’s Act, this chapter examines the Act as the result of a larger debate over 
Newfoundland’s role as an English colonial possession occurring in the late seventeenth century. 
The events and hearings that took place over this three-year period demonstrate both the pressure 
placed upon the government to manage English activities in Newfoundland, and the difficulties 
of creating policies that balanced the needs of all parties involved in the fishery. This approach 
agrees with Cass’s argument that King William’s Act was a trade measure, and expands upon it 
by examining the Act as the result of a history of English officials, merchants, naval 
commanders and planters assessing what Newfoundland’s trade value was and how best to 
extract it.10  
D’Iberville’s Campaign and English Reactions: 1696-1697 
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D’Iberville’s military campaigns have brought him notoriety in Canadian history. In 
popular and scholarly work, particularly French language media, d’Iberville is a symbol of New 
France’s importance and strength in the Atlantic World during the seventeenth century. Historian 
Charles Reed wrote a biography of d’Iberville titled The First Great Canadian (1910), and 
statues of d’Iberville stand outside the Parliament Building of Quebec and as part of the Valiants 
Memorial in Ottawa. D’Iberville’s reputation as a military commander came from a series of 
successful campaigns he led against the English in America, and he was known to English 
authorities before invading Newfoundland. Prior to his Newfoundland campaign, d’Iberville 
successfully raided the Hudson Bay Company and attacked English colonies and allies 
throughout New York.11  
In Newfoundland, d’Iberville’s legacy is the destruction of the English shore during the 
winter of 1696-1697, and how the English campaign to retake the island initiated a larger 
discussion about the management of Newfoundland and its value as a colonial possession. 
Wartime raids and piracy were common dangers in Newfoundland since the sixteenth century, 
but d’Iberville’s campaign was the largest attack on the English there to that point, and the 
reaction to his attack reshaped England’s Newfoundland policy. Politicians, merchants and 
military officials treated the forcible removal of Newfoundland’s English inhabitants and 
destruction of shore facilities as an opportunity to re-evaluate how the island was managed and 
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decide how, once it was retaken, the government could change the practices of fishers and 
residents there.12  
In November 1696, d’Iberville, leading a force of 220 fighters, composed of 100 French 
soldiers and 120 coureur de bois and Mi’kmaq allies, marched overland from Plaisance to the 
English shore. Beginning in Renews and continuing northward to Trinity, d’Iberville’s forces 
attacked every inhabited harbour they encountered. Attacking from land allowed the French 
forces to circumvent English fortifications since they were mostly positioned to repel warships, 
not land forces. The only successful resistance was in Carbonear, where residents took shelter on 
a fortified island until d’Iberville withdrew.13  
The exact number of affected English inhabitants is unknown, but historian Alan 
Williams, using the journal of Jean Baudoin, a priest who accompanied d’Iberville, estimated 
that at least 105 English residents were killed and 1,166 captured, 300 of whom were deported. 
These figures are low since they do not include three of Baudoin’s entries reporting that “some” 
or “many” English were captured, and one entry that stated that “some” English were killed 
without providing figures.14 The number of people who died in captivity is unknown, but was 
likely high. All three of David and Sara Kirke’s living children and four of their six 
grandchildren died while imprisoned in Plaisance, suggesting that many of the individuals 
captured, but not deported, perished.15  
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There was no debate in England about whether Newfoundland was worth retaking, only 
disagreement over how to manage the island after it was recaptured. Requests to appoint a 
governor to Newfoundland or to strengthen the Western Charter arrived before the government 
soon after reports about the destruction of the English shore. On November 16, the Board of 
Trade received its first reports about d’Iberville’s invasion. Seven days later, Robert Robinson 
appeared before the Board and argued that Newfoundland needed a governor and that the 
military campaign to retake the island was a prime opportunity to appoint one. Beyond 
Robinson’s claims about the opportunities presented by d’Iberville’s invasion, his argument 
repeated the same points he used to support appointing a governor in his 1668 petition and 1680 
articles of inquiry. Opposing Robinson, representatives from Plymouth, Barnstaple and Bideford 
requested that there be no governor appointed to Newfoundland and asked the Board of Trade to 
reaffirm the Western Charter as the principal document governing the island.16 
To understand the situation in Newfoundland, the Board requested information from 
individuals who had knowledge of the attacks, an appeal that contributed to the debate about 
what to do with the island once it was recaptured.17 Christopher Coke, a fishing merchant and 
lobbyist from the West Country, submitted the depositions of 200 refugees from St. John’s who 
witnessed d’Iberville’s attack. Coke used these depositions to argue that the government’s best 
course of action would be to stop inhabitants from returning to Newfoundland, and dedicate its 
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resources to protecting the migratory fishery. This approach would, in Coke’s opinion, make the 
fishery more profitable to England by ending competition between the migratory and resident 
fisheries, and prevent future raids and invasions from having such a devastating effect since there 
would be no residents to attack.18 Opposing Coke, John Whitrow, a merchant from Dartmouth, 
presented a letter to the Board with advice about what harbours to retake first and recommended 
that the government support re-colonizing Newfoundland by establishing a governor there. 
According to Whitrow, a permanent English colony in Newfoundland would increase the 
migratory fishery’s value by providing it with labour, support services and protection from future 
attacks.19  
The Board of Trade’s response to d’Iberville’s invasion was based upon information from 
letters and depositions by merchants and refugees since there were few alternative sources of 
information about the situation in Newfoundland. A French fleet defeated the English warships 
in Newfoundland during two battles in Ferryland and Bay Bulls before d’Iberville began his 
campaign. Additionally, poor weather foiled an attempt in December 1696 to send more English 
warships to Newfoundland to counter the French attacks and collect information. Officials in 
London believed naval commanders to be the most reliable sources of information about 
Newfoundland, but without these sources, they relied on refugees and merchants.20   
The reports presented to the Board led them to misunderstand d’Iberville’s mission in 
Newfoundland. These mistakes, like the Committee’s eviction decision in 1675, resulted in the 
Board’s actions misaligning with the actual situation in Newfoundland. In the spring of 1697, 
d’Iberville was sent to Hudson Bay to capture York Factory from the Hudson Bay Company, but 
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the Board was informed that he was recruiting soldiers in France to complete his conquest of 
Newfoundland and garrison its harbours. As a result, the force of 1,500 soldiers and eight 
warships raised to recapture the English shore encountered none of d’Iberville’s forces. The 
information supplied by merchants and refugees also shaped the plan to retake Newfoundland. 
Norris and Gibson would start by attacking St. John’s, securing the harbour for a convoy of 
fishing ships before spreading out along the coast to retake harbours, relieve holdouts and engage 
d’Iberville’s forces. Following Gibson’s and Norris’s campaign, the Board changed its focus 
from taking back the island to developing a strategy for holding the island and managing it.21   
Retaking and Rethinking Newfoundland: 1697-1699 
In June 1697, Norris and Gibson captured St. John’s without a fight. As Norris and 
Gibson expanded their campaign along the coast, they found that the French forces had 
destroyed every English structure. Gibson reported to the Board of Trade that everywhere he 
went in Newfoundland he found “nothing but destruction and ruin, not a house standing” and 
that “nothing escaped the barbarous fury of the enemy.”22 Despite the damage caused by 
d’Iberville, the remaining residents and fishers rebuilt their operations soon after the English 
shore was retaken. Unlike mining and other capital intensive industries, the cod fishery could be 
re-established relatively easily once new boats and tackle arrived. Rebuilding the shore facilities 
necessary for the fishery was not an unusual task for residents or migratory fishers since flakes 
and stages were often damaged or destroyed during the winter. The crops and livestock 
d’Iberville destroyed were replaced by provisions imported through existing trade routes.23 
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Recapturing Newfoundland started a new series of discussions in England about what the role of 
a colony with a single valuable natural resource was, and how policymakers could use this period 
of reconstruction to increase their ability to manage the island. At the core of the Board’s 
considerations were Norris’s and Gibson’s reports. The two officers provided different 
interpretations of what Newfoundland’s economic value to England was and how to adapt to the 
challenges of governing the island created by its geography and natural environment.24    
Gibson and Norris regularly disagreed with each other while in Newfoundland and 
afterwards. During their campaign, Norris proposed an attack on Plaisance to push the French 
out of Newfoundland, but Gibson and Richards opposed him, preferring to dedicate their 
resources to securing English harbours and fortifying St. John’s. Gibson’s and Richards’s choice 
was vindicated when a squadron of French ships blockaded St. John’s, but were deterred from 
attacking by the soldiers guarding the harbour narrows and warships within the harbour. In 1699, 
the Admiralty investigated Norris’s disagreements with Gibson, Richards and other officers 
while in Newfoundland, some of which were alleged to have turned violent, and consequently 
suspended Norris from the Navy for two years. These disagreements extended beyond 
operational choices. Gibson and Norris presented different opinions to the Board of Trade about 
how Newfoundland should be rebuilt and governed.25 
 Like John Berry in 1675, Norris and Gibson provided opinions and firsthand accounts 
about Newfoundland that officials used to inform their decisions. There were some similarities 
between Norris and Gibson’s reports, such as the extent of the destruction caused by d’Iberville 
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and their opinions that a new approach to governing the island was needed, but there were also 
significant differences. Reflecting their positions, Gibson, the army officer, advocated for 
appointing a governor and garrison, while Norris, the naval officer, preferred minimizing the 
government’s presence on land and favoured the use of ships to defend the island and enforce 
laws.26   
 Norris argued that the fishing admiral system represented the best means to regulate 
Newfoundland and that a governor would be ineffective because of the fishery’s wide 
geographic distribution and the lack of inland development. These factors made meant that ships 
were better suited to monitoring resident’s activities since they could reach more harbours than a 
land-based governor during the spring and summer. According to Norris, merchants and ship 
captains were already familiar with the fishing admiral system, making it an ideal system to 
oversee harbours that convoy commanders seldom visited. Norris did not promote the removal of 
inhabitants or stopping their return to Newfoundland. Instead, he saw the migratory fishery as 
more valuable to England than the resident fishery, and favoured practices that could increase the 
number of fishing ships and seamen employed in Newfoundland. Norris’s focus on limiting the 
government’s presence in Newfoundland was not just a situational recommendation. Historian 
David Aldridge described Norris as a cautious decision maker “impervious to the provocations 
of circumstance” and often focused on maintaining the status quo.27 Although Norris opposed 
appointing a governor, he supported placing a garrison in St. John’s to create a safe harbour 
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during times of war. Norris continued to promote this view following another assignment to 
Newfoundland in 1698 as a convoy commander.28 
 Although Norris’s opinions aligned with those presented by many West Country 
merchants, such as Coke, he differed from his peers in the Navy. Beginning in 1668, with 
Robinson’s request for the governorship of Newfoundland, members of the Navy, such as Berry, 
Nehemiah Troute and Francis Wheler, consistently supported appointing a governor to the 
island. Norris did not explain or acknowledge this divergence from his peers, indicating that 
despite the prevalence of one set of opinions about Newfoundland within the Navy, it was not a 
monolithic organization.29 Like George Pley’s opposition to his fellow West Country merchants 
in 1675, Norris’s experiences led him to different conclusions than those presented by other 
contemporary naval personnel, and there was no rebuttal submitted by those peers regarding his 
findings.30 Instead of being corrected or countered by other members of the Navy, Norris became 
a prominent figure in discussions about Newfoundland in 1698 and 1699.31  
Although Gibson did not return to Newfoundland after 1697, he remained an advocate for 
appointing a governor. His argument, as presented to the Board of Trade in 1697, was that 
Newfoundland required more than a military governor, it needed a “civil and church government 
also.”32 By making Newfoundland a colony with three branches of government, Gibson hoped to 
defend it from future attacks, stop crimes and fix what he saw as a lack of Christianity among the 
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island’s English inhabitants. Gibson, commenting on the absence of churches and poor living 
conditions in Newfoundland stated that the English residents there “lived more like heathens 
than Christians.”33 In 1698, Gibson responded to arguments that a governor would have limited 
capabilities because of the dispersed English population by proposing that the government 
relocate English residents to St. John’s and its neighbouring harbours. Centralizing 
Newfoundland’s residents would be a major policy change, but if completed could allow a 
governor to enforce regulations and punish crimes effectively. In Gibson’s opinion, resettling 
residents would also address complaints about competition between resident and migratory 
fishers, since many of the harbours occupied by residents would become available to fishing 
ships.34 
 There was agreement in England that the cod fishery was Newfoundland’s single major 
industry, but this did not stop Gibson from considering if the island had other natural resources 
worth developing. Writing about St. John’s, Gibson stated in 1697 that: 
Such a quantity of strawberries I never see nor ever hear. The few meadows with 
5 miles of this place are full of them, and currants both white and red and 
rasberries in great abundence growing wild in the woods bit all this had noe been 
enough to make the inhabitants or planters apply themselves to cultivate the 
ground but wholle that of the fishing, which yeild them a vast advantage and far 
beyond anythign that they could maye by labouring the ground.35 
 
While Gibson did see a potential for agriculture in Newfoundland, he maintained that the codfish 
was the main reason for residents to live there. This stance aligned Gibson’s comments more 
with John Downing’s reports of small-scale agriculture than William Vaughan’s claims that the 
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island could support an agricultural colony.36 The opportunity for some agriculture in 
Newfoundland supported Gibson’s argument for establishing a permanent military, civil and 
church presence since crops could reduce the upkeep costs of a governor and support a larger 
centralized population. Gibson did not acknowledge the failure of previous attempts to create 
economically diverse colonies such as the Newfoundland Company’s Cuper’s Cove or George 
Calvert’s Ferryland.37  
 Although Gibson and Norris were the most prominent sources of information in the 
Board of Trade’s 1697 and 1698 minutes, they were not the only ones. In 1698, Thomas 
Handaside, the officer Gibson left in charge of defending and fortifying Newfoundland during 
the winter of 1697-1698, wrote a report about his time there and presented it orally to the Board. 
Handaside and his command of 300 men experienced a harsh winter in St. John’s. Due to 
insufficient building materials and supplies, Handaside’s force was unprepared for the cold 
winter conditions. 214 of Handaside’s men died, a seventy-one percent fatality rate. The minute 
books do not include any reactions or questions regarding Handaside’s reports, and the 
fortification of St. John’s continued despite this setback. These deaths indicated not only the 
severity of Newfoundland’s winters but also that planners did not always learn the lessons of 
previous English experiences, making them vulnerable to repeating prior mistakes. Knowledge 
of Newfoundland’s potentially lethal winter conditions for the unprepared was available in 
England since George Calvert’s reports that he was leaving Ferryland in 1629. Additionally, the 
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lack of trees in Newfoundland suitable for building with was known to English politicians since 
the 1660’s.38   
 The recapture of the English shore presented an opportunity to change how the 
government managed Newfoundland to address the island’s limited natural resources and the 
challenges of overseeing a geographically dispersed population. There were still 
misunderstandings and questions about Newfoundland’s natural environment, such as Gibson’s 
comments about agriculture and the deaths during the winter of 1697-1698, but the reports 
presented to the Board of Trade focused primarily on the management of the fishery. Both Norris 
and Gibson suggested changes to settlement patterns and law enforcement practices that reflected 
the difficulties of managing a single-industry colony with little terrestrial development whose 
widely dispersed English population was difficult to oversee. Although the government’s 
discussions about Newfoundland had largely turned to military matters in 1697 and 1698, in 
1699 legislators examined the state of the island and, after sixty-five years of relying on the 
Western Charter, passed a new statute to govern the island.39   
King William’s Act, 1699  
King William’s Act, given Royal Assent on May 4, 1699, defined how the English in 
Newfoundland could use the island’s natural resources and implemented management practices 
adapted to the challenges of governing the island. At the centre of King William’s Act’s 
provisions was the idea Newfoundland’s value to England came from its cod fishery, and that the 
government’s goal was to protect and grow that fishery. Building from the previous eighty-nine 
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years of English efforts to colonize and govern Newfoundland, policymakers focused on 
understanding how Newfoundland’s geography influenced its governance, how its forests and 
other natural resources were used to support the fishery and the practices adopted by residents 
and migratory fishers.40   
Unlike the Western Charter and its reissues, which were developed by committees of the 
Privy Council, Parliament wrote and passed King William’s Act. Parliament’s involvement 
reflected both the growth of its power in England after the Glorious Revolution, Newfoundland’s 
status in English imperial policy, and the history of policies and regulations passed by the Privy 
Council and its committees that delegated authority over the island. Unlike the Western Charter, 
which specifically gave West Country towns and fishing ships the right to manage 
Newfoundland and a series of regulations to uphold, a statute could be applied broadly to the 
island without the same preferential delegation of authority.41 Parliament’s decision to pass a 
statute governing Newfoundland adhered to a larger trend during the 1690’s and early 1700’s of 
Parliament increasing its influence over colonial policy, often by projecting its authority over 
areas traditionally controlled by regional authorities. Historian Jack Sosin argued that during this 
period Parliament enacted legislation that reduced the control of colonial charters, particularly 
chartered governors such as those in New England, in an effort to align the colonies with its own 
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vision for England’s empire. Parliament’s decisions in 1699 support Sosin’s argument.42 Rather 
than delegating authority over Newfoundland to West Country towns, as the Western Charter 
had done, King William’s Act allowed Parliament to define the island’s value as a colonial 
possession and manage the island in accordance with its larger imperial policy. Legislators 
confined their discussions to finding ways to increase the amount of fish caught and the number 
of seamen participating in the fishery. The goal of these inquiries was to increase 
Newfoundland’s economic and military value to England. Three presentations about 
Newfoundland and the cod trade demonstrate this focus.43  
 The first presentation was Norris’s answers to inquiries and opinions about 
Newfoundland given to the Board of Trade on January 2, 1699. Norris, continuing from the ideas 
he submitted in his 1697 and 1698 reports, argued that the government should keep the Western 
Charter and leave law enforcement and dispute resolution duties to the fishing admirals. He also 
argued that any new regulations should favour the West Country’s migratory fishery and 
provisioning trade by stopping residents from trading with ships from regions besides the West 
Country. According to Norris, Newfoundland’s poor soil made residents dependent on trade 
ships for food and other goods, creating a valuable market for the victualing industry. However, 
ships from New England and Southern Europe brought alcohol and other goods that reduced the 
provisioning trade’s value to England by competing with West Country ships and contributing to 
the proliferation of taverns and other businesses that hurt the migratory fishery.44 
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 The second presentation came from fifteen migratory fishing ship captains who visited 
St. John’s in 1698. On February 6, 1699, the captains wrote to the Board of Trade that residents 
and by-boat keepers in St. John’s illegally competed with the migratory fishery by taking the best 
shore spaces before the fishing ships arrived in spring. This competition meant that fishing ships 
were often unable to find adequate room on shore and were forced to use spaces far from the 
fishing grounds or move to other harbours.45 For fishers, finding sufficient space on shore was 
essential for producing dry-salted cod and Newfoundland’s vulnerability to storms and rocky 
coast meant that the amount of usable space was limited. Additionally, taking a spot far from the 
fishing grounds increased the amount of time boats spent travelling, reducing their efficiency, 
and relocating to another harbour meant starting fishing later in the season, reducing the amount 
of time they had to fill their cargoes before the convoy left. The government had tried to address 
these concerns previously. The Western Charter regulated how much space fishers could use and 
gave migratory ships first-choice of shore space, but these provisions had proven difficult to 
enforce. Unlike Norris, who wanted to strengthen the Western Charter, the captains wanted the 
government to intervene directly by sending representatives to Newfoundland to stop illegal 
practices.46  
The Board of Trade wrote the third presentation on March 30, 1699, to advise King 
William III about Newfoundland’s economic value to England, which they estimated to be above 
£300,000 annually, and how to increase that value. Because of the importance of the cod fishery 
and its vulnerability to attack, the Board recommended that the government invest more money 
and resources into fortifying St. John’s. The Board also argued that fortifications needed to be 
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built to withstand Newfoundland’s harsh climate, and that bricks and other building materials 
necessary to protect a garrison from cold weather should be shipped to the island. The Board 
cited Handaside’s reports about the winter of 1697-1698 to demonstrate the need for these 
materials, using the hardships Handaside’s force experienced to counter any assumptions that 
Newfoundland’s climate was temperate and that a garrison there required no special 
preparations.47  
Although the Board of Trade did not directly participate in writing King William’s Act, 
there is evidence that its efforts influenced Parliament’s decisions. Parliament sent a draft of 
King William’s Act to the Board of Trade for it to review, and the Board’s minutes mention that 
it made some unspecified suggestions for the draft, but there are no references to the Board 
submitting its ideas to Parliament. Cass notes that while the surviving documentation obscures 
the connections between different government bodies, merchants involved in the Newfoundland 
fishery, such as the London-based merchant Thomas Nisbet, discussed the Act with both 
Parliament and the Board of Trade. Additionally, there is evidence that Edward Seymour, who 
was the Member of Parliament for Exeter and Totnes, and submitted the first draft of King 
William’s Act to Parliament for consideration, was familiar with the Board of Trade’s 
presentations about Newfoundland. On April 4, 1699, Seymour stated in a speech to Parliament 
that the Newfoundland fishery was worth over £300,000 annually, the same amount the Board 
reported five days earlier. In addition to these connections, King William’s Act accounted for the 
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same issues of tensions between residents and migratory fishers and limited land-based natural 
resources that Norris and the fishing captains submitted to the Board.48   
The statute passed by Parliament defined the rules by which migratory fishers and 
residents should interact, banned activities thought to harm the fishery, and reserved 
Newfoundland’s terrestrial natural resources, particularly its forests and shoreline, for use by the 
fishery. These rules did not explicitly ban other industries, but the focus on the fishery indicates 
that Parliament expected no other major industries to be established in Newfoundland. 
Parliament’s emphasis on the cod fishery above all other businesses, and preserving terrestrial 
natural resources for the use of that fishery, supports John Pickstone’s findings about how 
governments and merchants used natural history to identify goods with commercial value and 
how to increase their production. Although the Natural Historical Ways of Knowing were often 
an additive process, where new information was used to identify new commercial goods and 
industries, Parliament instead used the knowledge collected about Newfoundland to focus on a 
single industry. King William’s Act limitations on activities besides fishing, even if it did not 
explicitly ban them, ensured that all English efforts in Newfoundland went towards the fishery, 
the industry which created more economic value for England than the small-scale agriculture, fur 
hunting and forestry described between 1676 and 1696.49 The Act’s twelfth provision, which 
bans the cutting or burning of trees and the clearing of land for any purpose other than providing 
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fuel and building materials for fishing facilities and boats, demonstrates this interest in reserving 
natural resources for the fishery.50  
Besides implicitly banning forestry industries, such as making tar and turpentine, the 
Act’s land clearance restrictions reduced residents’ ability to expand their agricultural activities. 
The Western Charter contained a similar provision, but unlike the Charter, which the Privy 
Council enacted after colonists reported that they failed to grow crops in Newfoundland, 
Parliament passed the Act when there was evidence that the island could support small-scale 
farming. Downing’s letters, Berry’s census and Gibson’s reports all indicated that while fishing 
would remain the dominant industry in Newfoundland, residents were growing crops and raising 
livestock to supplement their diets and incomes. The Act discouraged residents from engaging in 
industries besides fishing, rather than assuming that Newfoundland could not support them. This 
approach supports Cass’s argument that Parliament expected the Act to increase the island’s 
commercial value to England by protecting both the fishery’s access to forests and position the 
provisioning trade as the main source of food for residents.51  
Parliament kept the fishing admiral system as King William’s Act’s main enforcement 
mechanism, but refined it by making the warships escorting the Newfoundland convoys into 
courts of appeal for cases heard by the fishing admirals. By making naval vessels courts of 
appeal, the Act addressed complaints that the fishing admirals selectively enforced and abused 
regulations by creating a legal method of challenging their decisions. Although the naval 
commanders previously held no formal power over affairs in Newfoundland, captains and 
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convoy commanders were willing to accept greater duties, as demonstrated by Robinson’s efforts 
to punish individuals for destroying property.52 Additionally, the Act contains no provisions 
giving West Country towns any preferential right to hear cases brought back to England by 
fishing admirals, ending that region’s privileged position to oversee Newfoundland’s legal 
process as defined in the Western Charter. Instead, the Royal Navy, a branch of the central 
government, was given the role of ensuring the fair enforcement of the Act’s provisions. This use 
of naval and merchant vessels reflects David Armitage’s argument for the oceanic focus of 
English colonial administration. Access to Newfoundland by ship created opportunities for 
political and economic power to remain in England when it might otherwise be relinquished to a 
regional capital.53 
The Act’s reliance on the fishing admiral system for enforcement, while continuing a 
practice that naval personnel, politicians and residents criticized as being ineffective, was an 
important statement by Parliament regarding the challenges of managing Newfoundland.54 
Parliament, rather than continuing a practice the evidence indicated was inadequate, identified 
fishing admirals as the best means to provide some level of law and regulatory enforcement in 
Newfoundland, and, with the addition of courts of appeal, attempted to address the issues that 
had made those admirals insufficient. This conclusion did not stand in opposition to the evidence 
presented to the government since 1675, or the evidence-driven approach to decision making 
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used by the Board and its predecessors. Parliament based its conclusions on the challenges 
presented in the demographic and environmental data available about Newfoundland. Isolated 
harbours with few overland connections dotted the English shore, making it difficult for a 
governor to enforce regulations and hear cases during the summer and even harder in winter 
when ice made the coast dangerous to navigate. The fishing admiral system’s ability to oversee 
every harbour used by the English fishery during the summer solved both the problem of 
governing isolated harbours and placated West Country merchants who feared that new 
regulations could reduce the fishery’s profitability. Although Gibson and others considered an 
appointed governor to be the preferred method of managing Newfoundland, the history of failed 
governorships, as well as the lack of on-land development, made a governor unsuitable for the 
island.55 
 Parliament defined the fishery as Newfoundland’s only valuable industry, but cod was 
not the only product of that fishery valued by the government. King William’s Act included rules 
to protect and grow the supply of newly-trained seamen available to the Royal Navy. Migratory 
fishing ships, planters and by-boat keepers were all required to include fresh men in their boat 
crews. Planters and by-boat keepers were required to include two fresh men in every six people 
they employed, with at least one having no prior experience at sea. For fishing ships, one in 
every five crewmembers was required to be a fresh man.56 The fishery’s ability to train seamen 
was not a new concept. Politicians and merchants advocated Newfoundland as a nursery for 
seamen throughout the seventeenth century. Joseph Williamson’s Account of the Colony and 
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Fishery of Newfoundland stated that Newfoundland’s harsh climate and lack of alternative 
industries made it an ideal place to train new seamen. The lack of agriculture, logging, mining or 
other land-based industries meant that the fresh men sent there would spend significant portions 
of their time on the water fishing before returning to England, giving them the skills and 
experience the Navy needed to crew its warships.57  
 The heavy regulation of shore access by King William’s Act reflected both the 
importance of shore space to the fishery for curing fish and the relationships between resident 
and migratory fishers. Rather than giving migratory fishing ships first choice of shore space each 
spring, as the Western Charter prescribed, the Act recognized that residents had a right to claim 
land in Newfoundland. Provisions five through seven specify that any residents who possessed 
land in Newfoundland before 1685 had the right to inhabit and build upon that land without any 
interference but permanently reserved any beach or land used by fishing ships since 1685 for the 
migratory fishery. Provision five states that residents that arrived after 1685 illegally used 
facilities built by the migratory fishery and compelled them to leave:  
That all and every such person and persons, as since the said year of our Lord, 
One Thousand Six Hundred Eighty-Five, have or hath taken, seized or detained, 
any such stage, cookroom, beach or other places, for taking bait, or fishing, or for 
the drying, curing or husbanding of fish, shall on or before the said Twenty Fifth 
day of March relinquish, quit and leave to the public use of the fishing ships 
arriving there.58 
 
Provision six adds to this by stating that inhabitants could not build new structures on land used 
by fishing ships since 1685.59 There is no charter, ruling or policy from 1685 regarding 
Newfoundland that explains the use of this date. However, the Act’s creators likely used 1685 
since it marked the beginning of King James II’s reign. James II’s efforts to increase his personal 
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control over England’s colonies were controversial in England. Following the Glorious 
Revolution Parliament, William and Mary worked to undo his actions.60 
Although these provisions appeared to ban any new English inhabitants from 
Newfoundland, there was an important caveat. Matthews noted that these regulations only 
banned the development of land already used by the migratory fishery, leaving large portions of 
the English shore unused by fishing ships available for legal habitation. This caveat contributed 
to the growth of an English population along Newfoundland’s southern coast after the Treaty of 
Utrecht shifted the boundaries between the English and French shores in 1713, giving colonists 
access to numerous harbours unused by English ships.61   
 King William’s Act gained a reputation in the eighteenth and nineteenth century as an 
oppressive policy, with Prowse referring to it as an “absurdity and monstrosity” in 1895.62  
However, the Act did not deviate significantly from prior charters and decisions, and it was often 
more lenient on residents and by-boat keepers than the Western Charter. Many of King 
William’s Act’s provisions restated or adjusted regulations introduced in the Western Charter, 
such as the fishing admiral system and restrictions on burning forests and vandalizing buildings. 
Where the Act diverged from its predecessors was in Parliament’s realization of the difficulties 
of governing Newfoundland and the needs of other methods of fishing beyond the traditional 
migratory fishery. Parliament distilled the lessons from the previous eighty-nine years of 
colonizing and managing Newfoundland into a precise definition of what the island’s natural 
resources were, what their value to England was and how to govern the island’s coast. This 
                                                          
60 “William III, 1699: An Act to Incourage the Trade to Newfoundland,” 515-518; Sosin, English America and the 
Revolution,12–28; Nuala Zahedieh, The Capital and the Colonies: London and the Atlantic Economy, 1660-1700, 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 49–54. 
61 Matthews, A History of the West of England-Newfoundland Fishery, 252–55; Handcock, So Longe as There 
Comes Noe Women, 101–4; John Mannion, “Irish Migration and Settlement in Newfoundland: The Formative 
Phase, 1697-1732,” Newfoundland and Labrador Studies 17, no. 2 (October, 2001): 273–76. 
62 Prowse, A History of Newfoundland, 225. 
232 
 
process led Parliament to the conclusion that since Newfoundland’s value to England came from 
its fishery, all choices made regarding the island should grow and protect the trade and seamen 
that fishery created.63 
Between 1610 and 1699, merchants and policymakers launched a series of efforts to 
control the use of Newfoundland’s natural resources and implement a regulatory and law 
enforcement system suited to the island and its cod fishery. These efforts began with a relatively 
narrow geographic scope. Both the Newfoundland Company and George Calvert were only 
responsible for enforcing regulations on their respective lands. However, beginning with the 
Western Charter and David Kirke’s grant, the government broadened the scope of its decisions to 
encompass the entirety of the English shore.64 Despite the government’s increasingly nuanced 
understanding of Newfoundland’s natural environment, economy and English society, its actions 
were either ineffective, as demonstrated by the 1675 eviction attempt; legitimatized the status-
quo, as seen in the quarter-mile limit in 1680; or were restricted to case-by-case issues, as 
exemplified by the collecting of debts.65  
D’Iberville’s campaign, while devastating to the English fishery, created an opportunity 
for the government to change how it managed Newfoundland. The rebuilding of the English 
                                                          
63 “An Order of the Star Chamber Concerning the Settlement of the Fishery in Newfoundland,” January 24 1634, 
TNA, CO 1/8, 1-6; Western Charter, January 27, 1661, in Keith Matthews, ed., Collection and Commentary on the 
Constitutional Laws of Seventeenth Century Newfoundland (St. John’s: Memorial University of Newfoundland: 
Maritime History Group, 1975), 131; Charles II in Council Order, January 27, 1676, in Collection and Commentary 
on the Constitutional Laws of the Seventeenth Century Newfoundland, 167-180; “William III, 1699: An Act to 
Incourage the Trade to Newfoundland,” 515-518. 
64 James I, “Patent for the Newfoundland Company, Patent Rolls, 8 Jac. I., Pt. VIII,” 51–62; James I, “Grant of the 
Province of Avalon to George Calvert,” 1623, TNA, CO 1/2, 150-140a; “An Order of the Star Chamber Concerning 
the Settlement of the Fishery in Newfoundland,” January 24 1634, TNA, CO 1/8, 1-6; “A Grant of Newfoundland to 
Marquise Hamilton, Earle of Pembroke, Earle of Holland and David Kirke and their heirs,” November 13, 1637, 
TNA, CO 195/1, 11-27. 
65 Charles II to Joseph Williamson, May 5, 1675, TNA, CO 1/34, 151; Berry to Joseph Williamson, July 24, 1675, 
TNA, CO 1/34, 240-24; Minutes of the Board of Trade, Whitehall, February 26, 1680, TNA, CO 391/3, 69; “Report 
touching on Account of William Miles with the Planters of Newfoundland,” May 17, 1681, TNA, CO 1/46, 362-
363; “Agreement to send a Military Governor to St. John’s, Newfoundland,” May 16, 1689, TNA, CO 391/6, 121-
122. 
233 
 
shore and the government’s willingness to commit resources to defend it created favourable 
circumstances for reshaping English society in Newfoundland and protecting the cod fishery 
from undesirable practices.66 King William’s Act reflected this opportunity and the reflexive 
process that characterized the English experience in Newfoundland over the previous eighty-nine 
years. Parliament defined the fishery as the island’s sole valuable industry, recognized the 
importance of land-based natural resources for the fishery, and implemented management 
practices suited to Newfoundland’s geographically dispersed population.67 
Viewing King William’s Act within the context of the developments leading up to its 
formulation complicates its place in Newfoundland history. Although O’Flaherty and Rowe 
argued that the Act was an imperial policy designed to prevent the development of a colony, 
their arguments are not supported by the issues, debates and concerns of policymakers, 
merchants and members of the Navy at the time.68 Rather than increasing merchant control over 
Newfoundland, King William’s Act reduced the authority West Country merchants previously 
had over legal proceedings, recognized residents’ right to own land and allowed formerly banned 
practices, such as operating taverns. Instead of attempting to stop a colony from developing, the 
debates, presentations and reports from 1696 to 1699 support Cass’s argument that Parliament 
developed a trade measure meant to maximize Newfoundland’s commercial value.69  
King William’s Act’s focus on a single industry is consistent with the Natural Historical 
Ways of Knowing’s emphasis on using knowledge about the natural world to identify goods with 
commercial value and to maximize their worth. Although English fishers visited Newfoundland 
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since the sixteenth century, government officials and naval commanders discussed whether the 
island held sufficient natural resources to host other industries as late as 1697.70 The 
government’s previous decisions, such as Kirke’s grant and the 1680 regulations about shore use, 
explicitly allowed for the development of other economic activities, such as agriculture, despite 
repeated failures to establish those activities from 1610 onwards.71 Parliament’s focus on 
preserving resources for the use of the fishery, as well as the lack of any allowances for mining, 
forestry or agriculture, reflected the English government’s decision to define Newfoundland as a 
place valuable for its fish and the seamen trained by the fishery. This narrowed definition of 
Newfoundland’s economic value came from the increase in information available in England 
about the island’s natural environment gleaned from the reflexive learning process that defined 
the previous eighty-nine years. King William’s Act, which was the result of this reflexive 
process, formed the basis of England’s Newfoundland policy throughout the eighteenth century 
and remained in effect until 1824 when it was repealed as part of a series of constitutional 
reforms in Newfoundland.72  
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Conclusion  
Despite early promises by colonial promoters and planners, that Newfoundland held 
abundant natural resources and could host an economically diverse colony, by the late 
seventeenth century merchants and politicians in England agreed that the cod fishery was its only 
viable industry. Looking back, this conclusion appears obvious, as stories of an ocean teeming 
with cod filled reports about Newfoundland from 1497 onwards. However, from 1610 to 1699 
merchants, colonists and politicians in England did not ask whether the cod in the waters off 
Newfoundland was worth catching, its value in Europe being well established. Instead, they 
asked whether Newfoundland could host more than a fishery and, if not, what was its role as a 
colonial possession, and what did that indicate about the English society developing there? These 
questions repeatedly arose throughout the seventeenth century as policies and business ventures 
failed to meet their objectives, challenging English assumptions about Newfoundland’s natural 
environment, its economic value and how to extract it. Reports from these efforts pressured 
decision-makers in England to reconcile their expectations of what industries and colonization 
practices could succeed in Newfoundland with news that their ideas failed, leading to new plans 
better aligned with the opportunities and challenges presented by the island’s natural 
environment.1  
This reflexive cycle of forming and implementing plans based on assumptions about 
Newfoundland’s natural environment, and responding to new information when those projects 
did not achieve their intended outcomes, was a consequence of the speculative nature of early 
ventures. With the limited amount of information about Newfoundland available in England 
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during the 1610’s and 1620’s, colonists, promoters and investors bet on the idea that the island 
held abundant natural resources and had a temperate climate. These backers expected English 
colonies in America to develop a wide range of industries with the goal of becoming self-
sustaining and producing multiple trade goods. Sir Francis Bacon described this approach in his 
essay “On Plantations,” and he, alongside other backers, attempted to implement it by investing 
in the Newfoundland Company. However, efforts to establish economically diverse colonies in 
Newfoundland failed because of cold winters, poor soil and a lack of natural resources that made 
large-scale farming, mining and other industries unviable. 2   
The failure of these early efforts challenged preconceptions about Newfoundland’s 
climate, natural resources and ability to host a self-sustaining English colony, causing merchants, 
policymakers and colonists to reconsider their use and management of the island. Reflecting 
what George Soros termed reflexivity, fallibility and the human uncertainty principle, the 
knowledge that policymakers, merchants and planters gained about Newfoundland’s natural 
environment from these failed efforts encouraged them to re-examine their expectations and 
develop new ideas based on a more accurate conception of the island. This process of testing 
assumptions and responding to feedback resulted in a series of increasingly targeted policies and 
practices that identified and corrected inaccurate ideas about Newfoundland. This recursive cycle 
led to English efforts focusing on the cod fishery and eschewing the development of land-based 
industries. Newfoundland’s cod stocks meant that the island continued to be worth controlling 
and colonizing after failed ventures disproved assumptions about the fertility of the soil, 
abundance of natural resources and climate. Fishers and planters dispersed along the coasts to 
find harbours protected from storms and close to fishing grounds, adapting to Newfoundland’s 
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lack of land-based natural resources by trading cod and developing niche industries, such as 
taverns, and repairing boats. These strategies succeeded in making Newfoundland profitable for 
the thousands of English migratory fishers and residents who went there, and the ocean became 
both the main source of trade goods and the most effective means of governing the island.3 
The changing perceptions of Newfoundland’s natural environment over time are 
important for understanding early European encounters with remote lands and the learning 
process in which Europeans engaged to discern the economic value of those lands. 
Newfoundland demonstrates the difficulties that Europeans encountered while adjusting to 
regions where the climate and natural resources diverged significantly from their expectations, 
and the cyclical process of testing and refining perceptions of these kinds of regions. Although 
merchants, planters and policymakers regularly updated their plans in response to disruptions 
and failures, their corrections were often incomplete, leading to new problems and the 
persistence of incorrect ideas. The flow of information to and from Newfoundland complicated 
this process of adjusting policies and practices still further. Policymakers and merchants relied 
on intermediaries, such as naval commanders, fishers, ship-masters and planters, to implement 
plans and report on their effectiveness, creating opportunities for misinformation and 
misunderstanding to affect their decisions.4 When those third parties pursued their own agendas, 
these problems became acute. Richard Whitbourne and Robert Hayman promoted Newfoundland 
by citing their experiences there and used knowledge from their encounters to describe the 
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island’s natural resources and the industries it could support, although faulty assumptions 
undermined their plans.5 David Kirke used inventories and firsthand accounts to outmaneuver his 
rivals, listing industries, natural resources and other opportunities in Newfoundland that he 
claimed justified his grant, even though he focused his efforts on the fishery.6  
Learning from the challenges created by these problematic accounts, government 
officials employed new methods, such as censuses and articles of inquiry, to develop a body of 
cumulative firsthand observations about the island that allowed a greater comparative analysis to 
inform their decisions.7 These approaches reflected the prevalence of the Natural Historical 
Ways of Knowing as a means to understand unfamiliar natural environments and determine their 
potential economic value. However, unlike other regions where naturalists deployed these 
methods, such as the Caribbean with its new and unfamiliar plants and animals, understanding 
Newfoundland became a reductive process. The narrowing English understanding of 
Newfoundland highlights the fact that the Natural Historical Ways of Knowing were as 
important for identifying incorrect concepts as they were for finding and categorizing new ones. 
Merchants, planters and politicians disproved ideas about Newfoundland’s natural environment 
and climate, such as the idea that its soil and temperature were good for growing European crops, 
through experience and observation. Rather than revealing new biota that increased 
Newfoundland’s potential economic value, this learning process resulted in targeted policies and 
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practices that compensated for the island’s lack of natural resources by maximizing the value of 
the cod found there.8 
This focus on the ways in which English perceptions of Newfoundland developed 
through a reflexive cycle diverges from the predominant historiographical trend of studying how 
English society grew in Newfoundland. English fishers and residents in Newfoundland 
influenced and were influenced by judgements made in England about the island’s economic 
value, how to extract that value and how to manage the people and industries involved. The ways 
in which politicians, merchants and planters in England learned about Newfoundland’s natural 
environment highlights the difficulties that these individuals and groups experienced in creating 
effective policies and practices, and the extent to which their choices reflected the available 
information about Newfoundland, not necessarily what was actually occurring there. The use of 
incomplete or outdated information in England led to decisions unsuited to conditions in 
Newfoundland, caused fishers and residents to break regulations, and contributed to complaints 
by merchants that the island was a lawless place. Historians have explored issues related to 
charges of lawlessness and their effects on the growth of English society in Newfoundland. 
However, these topics cannot be fully assessed without understanding the information that was 
available to individuals deliberating on these problems in England, and how contemporary 
information collection and analytical methods influenced their decisions.9    
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No overarching hostility towards Newfoundland’s residents defined the government’s or 
West Country merchants’ actions. Although regulations favoured the migratory fishery, which 
was perceived by legislators as more valuable to England than the resident fishery, few of these 
efforts suppressed Newfoundland’s English inhabitants.10 Instead, in learning about the 
difficulties of colonizing and managing Newfoundland, English merchants and politicians 
considered the benefits of different methods of governing and using the island against the 
challenges of enforcing laws and regulations. These inquiries found no easy answers. English 
authorities could resolve specific cases, such as collecting debts for a merchant, but broad 
legislative frameworks consistently failed to achieve their intended outcomes.11  
Although the 1634 Western Charter attempted to regulate migratory fishers and residents, 
and the 1675 eviction order was meant to remove what was perceived as a threat to the 
profitability of the cod fishery, these efforts did not meet their goals. After John Berry refused to 
carry out the 1675 eviction, the government initiated a wide-ranging program of information 
collection and analysis to inform its decisions.12 King William’s Act reflected policymakers’ 
improved understanding of Newfoundland’s society and economy, and accounted for the 
challenges of governing the island, by implementing enforcement mechanisms and regulations 
that integrated with the fishery’s established patterns.13 This adaptation to Newfoundland came 
from both the knowledge accumulated over the previous eighty-nine years and the shift to what 
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Jack Greene refers to as the “negotiation between those new arenas and the European centers that 
aspired to bring them under their jurisdiction and to which those arenas desired to be attached.” 14 
Policymakers and merchants learned to balance what they wanted from Newfoundland with what 
the island and its English population could provide, resulting in the island’s legal and political 
status as an English colonial possession with no central governor or legal institutions during the 
seventeenth century.15 
As David Armitage argued, the English empire was conceived in early modern England 
as an oceanic one, and Newfoundland is a prime example of that orientation.16 From 1610 to 
1699, English merchants, politicians and planters learned that success in Newfoundland 
depended on leveraging what the Atlantic Ocean provided: cod and access to the lands it 
bordered. Fishers, colonists and merchants focused on using cod to trade for the provisions and 
comforts Newfoundland lacked, turning away from the early goal of creating economically 
diverse colonies to a pragmatic specialization in fishing. European efforts were so concentrated 
on Newfoundland’s coasts to the exclusion of inland expansion that it was not until 1822 that the 
first European traversed inland Newfoundland and the British naturalist John Millais chided in 
1903 that “a very large portion of Central Newfoundland is less known than Central Africa.”17 
This seaward orientation created a colony that bore little resemblance to its contemporaries, such 
as New England, where economic and political development centred on towns and spread inland. 
Instead, English colonists, merchants and policymakers balanced the challenges posed by 
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Newfoundland’s lack of on-land natural resources with opportunities derived from the cod that 
swam near its shores.18  
 In 1699, Parliament defined the fishery as Newfoundland’s only viable industry, but the 
possibility of developing new industries based on natural resources besides cod remains a central 
issue for Newfoundlanders and historians to the present day. Daniel Prowse wrote his History of 
Newfoundland during the construction of the Newfoundland Railway, and Harold Innis’s and 
Alexander McLintock’s studies coincided with the growth of the pulp and paper industry, both 
projects founded with the same basic goal as Cuper’s Cove: to diversify Newfoundland’s 
economy by developing land-based natural resources. However, these efforts did not transform 
Newfoundland’s economy to the extent promised by their promoters.19 When the cod fishery 
closed in 1992 for the first time in its five-hundred-year history, a lack of alternatives drove 
many residents to seek employment in mainland Canada and elsewhere.20  
Areas for Future Study  
 This dissertation presents a small part of a much larger history of how Europeans learned 
about Newfoundland’s natural resources and climate. Constraints regarding both the availability 
of sources and scope of the dissertation limited the discussion of several important subjects 
deserving of in-depth study. These limitations, the result of both practical restrictions regarding 
the research process and decisions made to clarify the dissertation, indicate both the limits of 
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how much one can cover in a research project of this size and the richness of Newfoundland 
history as an area of study. This section identifies areas where further studies could expand upon 
this dissertation’s subject and points to some of the available primary and secondary source 
materials.   
 In regard to the English experience in the seventeenth century, subsequent studies can 
expand on this dissertation’s work on the interactions between English political, legal and 
religious institutions and Newfoundland’s residents. The National Archives in Kew holds wills 
by planters and fishers who resided in Newfoundland. An analysis of how these wills were 
recorded and transmitted to England could provide insight into transatlantic connections that 
served legal and religious purposes for individuals with no local access to the church or court. 
Wills by women who owned property and ran businesses in Newfoundland offer an entry point 
into women’s history during England’s colonial expansion. One approach could be to compare 
the experience of women planters in Newfoundland with those of women in other English 
colonies. Understanding the ways in which women’s experiences in Newfoundland differed from 
those in other colonies could provide insight into the lives of early modern female entrepreneurs 
and the opportunities provided by having a relatively weak governance and law enforcement 
system. A study of the life of Sara Kirke offers a good starting point for this subject. Kirke’s 
success as a merchant and matriarch of a family of planters is documented in both reports about 
Newfoundland by convoy commanders and a petition she wrote to Charles II.21  
 The influence of other English colonies on the development of Newfoundland during the 
seventeenth century suggests another area that has not received significant attention. Although 
historian Ralph Lounsbury has examined trade between New England and Newfoundland in the 
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1630’s, there has been little recent scholarship on the subject, and even less on how 
developments in New England and elsewhere affected Newfoundland. There is evidence that 
English policymakers perceived the growth of New England, and Boston in particular, as a threat 
to their interests in Newfoundland. However, these sources, particularly the Colonial Office Files 
and Board of Trade minutes, do not often consider the types of interactions occurring between 
Newfoundland and other English colonies or what information about Newfoundland could be 
gleaned from those relationships. Archival research in the United States, specifically in Boston 
and Maryland, two areas in regular contact with Newfoundland during the seventeenth century, 
could shed light on the exchange of people, goods and information between England’s colonies. 
This information could illuminate how the understandings of Newfoundland’s economy and 
natural environment developed throughout the Atlantic World.22 
England was not the only European power involved in colonizing Newfoundland, but 
there has been relatively little work done on other nations’ efforts in comparison to the body of 
literature about English colonization. Topics on French perceptions of Newfoundland, and how 
these perceptions contributed to the decision to establish a colony in Plaisance in 1662, remain 
understudied. Despite a growing number of archaeological and documentary studies about the 
French experience in Newfoundland, such as the collection of essays Les Français à Terre-
Neuve edited by Ronald Rompkey and Nicolas Landry’s Terre-Neuve, 1650-1713, there is still 
significant work to be done in both detailed scholarship and presenting scholarly findings to a 
broader audience.23 Given the largely unilingual English population of Newfoundland and 
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Labrador, any effort to raise awareness about the French in Newfoundland requires the 
production of an English language text. The translation of Laurier Turgeon’s Le Temps des 
Pêches Lointaines in English represents an important starting point, but this work is written for 
an academic audience, not general readers.24  
 Ethnographer Ingeborg Marshall and historians Ralph Pastore and Charles Martijn have 
explored the relationship between Europeans and the Beothuk, Inuit and Mi’kmaq in 
Newfoundland, but there is little work about their place in the European imagination of the 
island. Some work has been done on European depictions of the Beothuk, Inuit and Mi’kmaq, 
such as Shane O’Dea’s examination of an engraving of John Guy’s trade with the Beothuk, but 
there has been little scholarship about the wider European awareness of them. Given the small 
number of known references to the Beothuk, Inuit and Mi’kmaq in seventeenth-century English 
sources, a study of why that information was either unknown or not considered worth recording 
would be valuable for understanding how colonization marginalized these people. One approach 
to this topic would be a comparative analysis of European records about the Beothuk, Inuit and 
Mi’kmaq and that of other people in New France and New England. Similarities and differences 
between the documentation from these regions could offer a starting point for studying why the 
Beothuk, Inuit and Mi’kmaq are often absent from English considerations of Newfoundland.25  
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Finally, there is enough material regarding the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries to 
warrant a dissertation about how English perceptions of Newfoundland changed from 1699 to 
1832, when a representative government was established there. A study of the growth of business 
and political communities in Newfoundland, particularly St. John’s, and how they interacted 
with their peers in England, could be valuable for understanding the island’s political and 
economic history. Such a work could begin with a survey of the articles of inquiry from 1699 
onwards contained in the Colonial Offices 194 file, and the maps and papers related to the 
explorer and cartographer James Cook’s 1762-1767 Newfoundland voyages.26 One possible 
question would be how the development of logging and sealing industries in the eighteenth 
century contributed to England’s willingness to create a representative government in 
Newfoundland. There is a robust body of scholarship about Newfoundland’s political, legal, 
economic and military history during this period. Three good starting points are Jerry Bannister’s 
Rule of the Admirals, Sean Cadigan’s Hope and Deception in Conception Bay and Olaf Janzen’s 
War and Trade in Eighteenth-Century Newfoundland.27 
 In all of these areas, understanding the space that Newfoundland occupied in the 
European colonial consciousness remains crucial. Newfoundland’s natural environment 
complicated every attempt by English policymakers and merchants to impose order and replicate 
its own ideas about how colonies should develop. The difficulties early investors found when 
trying to develop colonies, and which the English government encountered in governing 
Newfoundland, created a space, that was loosely controlled and, in many respects, poorly 
                                                          
26 William Whiteley, “James Cook and British Policy in the Newfoundland Fisheries, 1763–7,” Canadian Historical 
Review 54, no. 3 (September, 1973): 245–72. 
27 Sean Cadigan, Hope and Deception in Conception Bay: Merchant-Settler Relations in Newfoundland, 1785-1855 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1995); Bannister, The Rule of the Admirals; Olaf Janzen, War and Trade in 
Eighteenth-Century Newfoundland, Research in Maritime History 52 (St. John’s: International Maritime Economic 
History Association, 2013). 
247 
 
understood. Although in 1699 Parliament designated the fishery as Newfoundland’s sole 
valuable industry, questions about whether it could host other industries, how to govern its 
population and its role in the larger colonial and, after 1949, national entities to which it 
belonged continued to be asked. The seventeenth century was a period of learning for English 
policymakers, merchants and planters, but the knowledge they had acquired by 1699 provided 
few easy answers about Newfoundland and its future as an English colony.28  
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Appendix 
Appendix A: The Western Charter, January 24, 1634 TNA, CO 1/8, 1-6. 
An Order of the Star Chamber Concerning the Settlement of the Fishery in Newfoundland 
At the Star Chamber the 24th of January 1634 
Lord Archbishop of 
Canterbury  
Earle Marshall Mr. Treasurer 
Lord Keeper Earl of Dorset Mr. Comptroller 
Lord Archbishop of York Lord Viscount Wimbledon Mr. Vice Chamberlain 
Lord Privy Seal Lord Cottington Mr. Secretary Coke 
Lord Great Chamberlain Lord Newburgh Mr. Secretary Windebanke 
 
Whereas a humble petition was presented to his Majesty in the name of the merchants and 
owners of ships of Plymouth, Dartmouth and Barnstaple and other Creeks adjoining who use the 
fishing trade in Newfoundland complaining of several abuses committed by said Trade which 
petition was received by his Majesty the 14th of this instant month (under the hand of Sir John 
Coke Knight one of his Majesty’s principal secretaries) to the consideration of the Council Board 
where their Lords having heard the same were pleased to require Mr Attorney General to call 
before him some such persons belonging to the Western Ports as might give him true information 
of the said abuses and the estate of the said fishing trade, and having duly examined the 
circumstances thereunto belonging to certify his opinion what fit remedies might be applied to 
the inconveniences therein mentioned for the general good of his Majesty’s service, which he hat 
accordingly done in haec verba.  
May it please your Lordships 
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In this acquired Dominion I do conceive his Majesty may give Laws and some that may serve for 
the present I have presumed to present to your Honours to stand until it be otherwise ordained 
with power to certain Mayors of Townes to execute them and a command that they be published 
there which are humble submitted to your Honourable judgment and sent annexed. Signed 
William Noye. 
Preamble 
Whereas the region or country of Newfoundland hath been acquired to this Dominion of our 
progenitors which we hold and out people have many years resorted to those parts where and in 
the Coasts adjoining they employed themselves in fishing. Whereby a great number of our 
people have been set on work and the navigation and mariners of our realm have been increased 
and our subjects resorting thither one by the other and the Natives of those parts were orderly 
and gently entreated into of late some of our subjects of our realm of England planting 
themselves in that country and there residing and inhabiting upon conceit that for wrongs and 
injuries done there either on the shore or in the sea adjoining. They cannot be here impeached 
and the rather for that we or our progenitors have not hitherto given laws to the inhabitants there 
any by that example our subjects resorting thither injure one another and do all manner of excess 
to the great hindrance of the voyage and the common damage of this realm.  For the preventing 
such inconveniences hereafter we do hereby declare in what manner out people in Newfoundland 
and upon the sea adjoining and the bays, creeks or fresh rivers there shall be guided and 
governed doe make and ordain the laws following in the things after specified commanding that 
the same be obeyed and put in execution.  
1.  If any man on the land there shall kill another or if any shall secretly or forceably steal the 
goods of any other to the value of forty shillings he shall be forthwith apprehended and arrested, 
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detained and brought prisoners into England and the Crimes committed by him shall be made 
known to the Earl Marshall of England for the time being to whom the delinquent shall be 
delivered as prisoner and the said Earl Marshall shall take cognizance of the Cause and if he 
shall find by the testimony of two witnesses or more that the party had there killed a man not 
being at that time first assaulted by the part slain or that the killing were by misadventure or 
stolen such goods the delinquent shall suffer pain of death and all the company shall endeavor to 
apprehend such malefactors.  
2. That no ballast presstones or anything else hurtful to the harbours be thrown out to the 
prejudice of the said Harbours but that it be carried ashore and laid where it may not do 
annoyance.  
3. That no person whatsoever either fisherman or inhabitants do destroy, deface or any way work 
any spoil or detriment to any stage, cookroom, flakes, spikes, nails or anything else that belongs 
to the said stage whatsoever either at the end of the voyage when he hath done, and is to depart 
the country or to any such stage as he shall fall withal at his coming into the country. But that he 
or they content themselves with such stages only as shall be needful for them. And that for the 
repairing of such stages as he or they take they shall fetch timber out of the woods and not to do 
it with the ruining or tearing down of other stages.  
4. That according to the ancient custom every ship or fisher that first enter a harbour in behalf of 
the ship be Admiral of the said harbour wherein for the time being he shall reserve only so much 
beach and flakes or both as is needful for the number of boats that he shall use with an overplus 
only for one boat more than he need as a privilege for his first coming. And that every ship 
coming after content himself with what he shall have necessary ise for without keeping or 
detaining more to the prejudice of other next coming and that any that are possessed  of several 
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places in several harbours with intern to keep them all before they can resolve upon which of 
them to choose shall be bound to resolve and sent advice to such aftercomers in those places as 
expect his Resolution, and that within eight and forty hours if the weather so serve that the said 
aftercomers may likewise choose their places and so none receive prejudice by others delays. 
5. That no person cut out, deface or any way alter or change the marks of any boats or train vats 
whereby to defraud the right owners and that no person convert to his own use the said boats or 
train vats so belonging to others without their consents nor remove nor take them from the places 
where they be left by the owners except for cause of necessity and then to give notice thereof to 
the admiral and others, whereby the right owners may know what has become of them.  
6. That no person do diminish takeaway purloin or steal any of the fish or train of salt which is 
put in casks, train vats or cookrooms or other house in any of the harbours or fishing places of 
the country or any other provision belonging to the fishing trade or to the ships.  
7. That no person set fire in any of the woods of the country or work any detriment or destruction 
to the same by reducing of the trees either for the sealing of ships, houses or for rooms on shore, 
or for any other use except for the covering of roofs for cookrooms to dress their meat in and 
those rooms not to extend in length above sixteen feet at the most.  
8. That no man cast anchor or ought else hurtful which may breed annoyance or hinder the 
hauling of seines for bait in places accustomed thereunto. 
9. That no person rob the nets of any drift boat or drawers for bait by night nor take away any 
bait out of their fishing boats by their ships sides nor rob or steal any of their nets or any part 
thereof. 
10. That no persons do set up any taverns for selling of wine, beer, strongwater or tobacco to 
entertain the fishermen because it is found that by such means they are debauched neglecting 
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their labour and poor ill governed men not only spend most part of their share before they come 
home upon which the life and maintenance of their wife and children depend but are likewise 
hurtful in divers other ways as by neglecting and making themselves unfit for their labour by 
purloining and stealing from their owners and by making unlawful shifts to supply their disorders 
and which disorders they frequently follow, since those occasions have presented themselves.  
11. That upon Sundays the Company assemble themselves in meeting places and here divine 
service to be said by some of the Masters of the Ships or some other which prayers shall be such 
as are in the Book of Common Prayers.  
And because that speedy punishment may be inflicted upon the offenders against these laws and 
constitutions we do ordain that every of the Mayors of Southampton, Waymouth and Malcombe, 
Regis Lyme, Plymouth, Dartmouth, East Lowe, Fowey and Barnstaple for the time being may 
take cognizance of all complaints made by any offender any of these ordinances upon the land 
and by oath of witnesses examining the truth thereof award amends to the party grieved and 
punish the delinquents by fine and imprisonment or either of them and of their goods found in 
the parts of Newfoundland or in the sea cause satisfaction therof to be made by warrents under 
their hands and seals.  
And the Vice Admiral in our counties of Southampton, Dorset, Devon and Corwall upon 
complaint made of any of the premises committed upon the sea shall speedily and effectually 
proceed against the offenders.  
Also we will and ordain that these laws and ordinances shall stand in force and be put in due 
execution until we shall otherwise provide and ordain 
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 And we require the Admiral in every harbour in their next season ensuing calling together such 
as shall be in that harbour publicly to proclaim these presents and that they also proclaim the 
same on the shore in witness etc. 
Their lordships having perused and seriously considered the report and propositions, Mr. 
Attorney likewise being present, did fully approve, confirm and ratify the same in every 
particular. And did also order that the said propositions shall be remitted to Mr. Attorney who is 
hereby required to cause them to be forthwith engrossed for his Majesty’s Royal Signature in 
regard the fishing season is now at hand and then passed under the great seal of England and 
afterwards a sufficient number of the copies thereof printed to be published as well in several of 
the Western ports of this Kingdom as of the Newfoundland to the end that all men whom it may 
in any sort concern may take notice thereof and yield due obedience thereunto accordingly.  
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Appendix B: James Houblon, “Reasons for the Decay of the Trade at Newfoundland,” 
March 20, 1675, TNA, CO 1/34, 58-61. 
I most heartily bed your pardon that I did not wait upon the Lords. I fully intended because you 
desired it otherwise I am mightily unwilling to expose myself to talk in public. I was prevented 
by a business of necessity to be done that morning and which kept me till past 11 of the clock. So 
I hope that you will forgive me.  
I am altogether a stranger to the point in issues, though Mr. Secretary Williamson was pleased 
the other day to tell me that there was an intention to lead a Governor to Newfoundland and a 
Colony, and so to plant there, as a thing fit to be done to retrieve that trade.  
I shall so give toy the best account I can which hath of late years decayed that trade of fishing in 
England and then give you my opinion what possibility there is to retrieve it by this new way of 
planting in Newfoundland.  
The reasons of the decay of this trade are 
1. The infinite losses the English who have driven that trade have in all times sustained by taking 
at sea for want of protection (this trade being driven in small vessels of little defense) bit 
especially in the Spanish War in anno 1659 to 1660 in which years the loss to the Nation 1200 
sail of ships outright of which great number of fishing ships to the great impoverishment of 
Plymouth, Dartmouth, Poole and other fishing towns in the West of England, from this 
impoverishment they never recovered to this day and are forced to take up moneys upon 
bottomery at 20 and 22 percent to drive in their trade. So it in bad years more than all the profit 
goes to the usurers and in good years with such an interest they cannot get a step forward, and so 
in time all will dwindle to nothing.  
2. The mighty increase of the French in this trade of late years since the Pyrenean Treaty and 
Pease with Spain, to which employment their merchants have been mightily encouraged by the 
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French King and his ministers, have had moneys of the King’s Treasuries towards the building of 
ships and have had convoys allowed them by which means and for if their equipages are cheaper 
to them, both for wages and victuals as also for that their salt, shipping and materials of cordage 
and other fishing gears is to be had in French upon cheaper terms, and further for if the most 
mighty men of Saint Malo, Rouen, Dieppe, Nantes, Rochelle, Bordeaux and Bayonne do employ 
their stocks this way without taking up moneys at bottomery, which undertaking under these 
circumstances, and for that they perform it by good defensive ships from 12 to 24 pieces of 
ordinance, hath had good success and so by supplying the Spanish and Italian markets with better 
fish and upon cheaper terms than our people they increase and we dwindle. It being apparent that 
before the French had peace with Spain they were so far from being superior to us in this trade 
that except Bank fish (which they did even then supply themselves with) all the markets in 
France were supplied with dry fish caught by English and carried in English shipping whereas 
now they are grown so much upon use especially through the encouragement aforesaid and 
mighty good endeavors used amongst them for the whole curing their fish that they not only 
supply all their markets with take of the best quantity, but meet and mate the English in the 
several parts of Portugal, Spain and Italy, and generally sell at better rates. 
Now so I shall give you my opinion concerning the probabilities of retrieving of this trade by 
turning Newfoundland into a colony of fishers, with a governor, only first I shall let you believe 
that there seems to be a necessity for the state one way or other to provide that for necessary a 
trade (to increase the stock of the nation, shipping, seamen and letting poor people to work for 
the necessary apparatus to these voyages) be not lost. 
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The question is only of the modus, and hearing there must be in particularity, but all particular 
interest and even that of the West Country towns must not be in competition with the general 
good. 
I am afraid for if any new methods or orders and contrivances to continue it in the old way that is 
by sending ships and men yearly out which return after the fishing is over will not do the work, 
nor almost any superstructure upon this foundation, for the circumstance of their weakness in 
stock who are in possession will be the great hindrance, and no continuance which ever can 
counter such a mischief, for the business is quite otherwise then when we were the sole 
possessors of this trade. Now we are to contend with the French, who have those several 
advantages of us of greater stocks, cheaper shipping, salt and wages etc. and therefore nothing 
can in appearance make us hope to retain any share of this trade long, unless a proposition of a 
new project may give is a prospect to fish hereafter upon better terms then the French do as the 
goodness and cheapness now of those it proposed making a plantation of the Newfoundland for 
the trade of fishing do make this out, they would bring me their faction, nay of they by this way 
will but let is upon even ground with the French, it would be to the embraced before the old way 
at least we might hope that the Balance maybe on our side by reason we are also often, or ought 
not to be so often in war with our neighbors, as the French are.  
Also there are seeming advantages of a plantation in the Newfoundland, we may counterpoise 
the French. 
1. It may cause fish to be cheaper made than now it is, employing far less stock to do it with, for 
as its driven now a vessel setting to sea with all sorts of provisions for 60 or 80 men takes up 
near 1200 or 1500£ stock and sometimes more attending to the goodness or burthen of these 
vessels and these men spending in going and returning and there in building their stages and 
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catching of bait we are 5 months  of which the voyages takes up all which while they do nothing 
for their provisions, their fishing being over in 3 or 4 months at most. Which charge of sending 
of ships yearly to catching fish would be saved if only planters made fish and the ships that go 
yearly to fetch their fish would carry there salt from French and Portugal and Spain, and other 
necessaries for fishing together with other provisions for food and clothing, as either their wants 
or luxury would call for from England. 
2. This would cause fish to be made with much greater care, for every planter for fear of having 
his fish rejected would strive to outdo his neighbors to get customers, and so prevent it being left 
on his hands all the winter whereby he would be ruined if his fish were not cured in such 
perfection that is might keep and that a careless sort of making it might be go well for him in a 
scarce year of fish, when there is more to be bought than caught and ships will carry away almost 
anything rather than go empty, yet in a plentiful year he’ll sure to be undone, and it so happens 
that fish fall in more in one month of fishing than another, so that they can hardly tell till its 
almost over whether it will be a plentiful year or not, besides there being several Harbours for 
fishing and at a great distance one from another they cannot have frequent communication to 
know what one another do. 
3. Fish being by those ways better in value and cheaper in price, the merchants would be more 
suited to do all in it when formerly, when it was both bad and good, if the other would they 
adventure to trade in this commodity for that they would be upon more certainty or then in this 
old way (for the West Country men made contracts for fish before their ships go out, so that if 
they miscarry or have a bad fishing, all this contract is void, and the poor contractors bear all the 
damage of sending his ships to Newfoundland and back for nothing) it being more probable that 
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planters being proven at work and having also things fitted to their hand should by their industry 
there whole livelihood depending on catching shall catch more fish then now is done.  
But if this now meddle be, there much be mighty care in choosing this governorship, for if he be 
now a plain industrious man and cut out for this business, all will come to nothing, for such a 
trade will and [illegible] openness or encroachment or change, and truly if I were to give my 
judgment the planters should even choose them a governor amongst themselves and make their 
own laws and constitutions. For they would best understand their own interests, what will hurt or 
advance their fortunes. 
The main objection to this model may be the clamor of the West Country Corporations of 
Dartmouth, Plymouth, Poole and Barnstaple who by this means may plead that their wellbeing 
depending upon this trade, if this new way be prosecuted they cannot continue the old one and so 
will be put out of possession of a trade at once, while in certain in process of time would be lose, 
not only to them, but too the whole of the Nation. So the question is not of these men of the said 
corporations can made it evident that they can make first cheaper or as cheap as the French, if 
they can’t then it fit to think of this new way, of the whole will be lost. And the interest of local 
success most not come in competition with the whole, besides they, or their agents and servants 
may and will be of necessity the first planters and probably they may conceive much more profit 
by this undertaking than by the old. I am sure it will more answer their small stock.  
Another opinion in that this way creates seamen and employs more shipping, but if it comes to 
nothing then it will be a double loss for not only that shipping employed now to the fish will be 
lost, but all those sacks that go to fetch the fish every year will lose out employment and the 
nations stock will be impaired, for this fish trade get out of the sea and labout helps to pay for a 
great deal of foreign commodities for our luxury and truly if this new way were settle I am of the 
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opinion that it would be in process of time so far from causing us to have less shipping and 
seamen, it will should have the more, as being the only probably means left to get this trade from 
the French with out the doing of which effectually it will be in a few years given up to them and 
of which consequence that would be I am humbled to think of it, I have thus given you hastily 
my opinion of the matter and very foolishly I fear, having never heard anything of this matter in 
question, nor the arguments of both sides. Therefore I hope you will give me cause hereaver to 
be of another opinion when I am better informed  in being indifferent at the particular, which 
could give forward being of neither party, only I with such council may be taken as regard the 
whole. I most humbly beg you excuse for this impertinent story and am your most Humble 
servant 
          James Houblon 
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Appendix C: The Order to Evict English Inhabitants from Newfoundland 
Charles II to Joseph Williamson, May 5, 1675, TNA, CO 1/34, 151 
 
At the Court at Whitehall 
May 5 1675 
Present 
The Kings most Excellent Majesty  
In Council 
 
The Right Honorable the Lords of the Committee for Foreign Plantations having this day 
reported to his Majesty in Council their opinion touching the inconveniences of a colony and 
inhabiting of his Majesty’s subjects in Newfoundland. And his Majesty having thought fit for the 
several considerations in the said report mentioned to order the commander of his Convoy bound 
this year to the said place to admonish the inhabitants either to return home into England or to 
betake themselves to other of his Majesty’s Plantations; His majesty did at the same time think 
fit to order and it is hereby ordered accordingly, that the Right Honorable Mr. Secretary 
Williamson do prepare letters unto the several Governors of the said Foreign Plantations that in 
case any of the said Inhabitants of Newfoundland shall arrive within their respective 
governorships that they be received with favor, and all convenient help and assistance towards 
their settlement by afforded unto them. 
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Appendix D: John Berry’s report From Newfoundland 
TNA CO 1/34, 240-241 July 24 1675 
Right Honourable Sr. 
I arrived in St John’s Harbour in Newfoundland the 11th instant where I found his Majesty’s ship 
Swan with forth ships more; the greatest part bound to a market: I have sent two able person 
Northward as far as Cape Bonavista and the other to the southward as far as Cape de Raze and to 
call into all the respective harbours bays creeks etc: to take an exact account as is directed in my 
orders and farther to declare to his majesty’s will and pleasure to all the planters I have already 
done it in this Harbour they which all humility have promised to be obedient to it; but the 
greatest part of them being so poor that it is impossible for them to remove being not in a 
condition to pay their passages unless his majesty will be graciously pleased to send a ship for 
them and at last they must be put to the parish where ever they come. A poor labouring man will 
get in a summer season near 20 pounds for their daily food comes out of the sea; which were 
such a person in England he would not get 3 pounds. I have to the best of my judgement made 
delay out inquiry into all those things said to the planters charge by the merchant adventurers and 
found most of them to be false manifested in this single port. Two days since I summoned the 
admiral, vice admiral and rear admiral and all the rest of the commanders of ships about forty 
five where I told them the great evil it did befall those that did come here to make a fishing 
voyage when the stages flakes storehouses and all other conveniences were destroyed before 
they arrive and the labours and charge they were at in the building them to prevent which I 
thought it would be convenient to give strict charge and command that no stages flakes 
storehouses or anything also should be pulled down, but entirely preserved till the next season, 
several of the old and experiences commanders were for the preservation of all but ¾ of them 
were for taking them down making great many pretenders that they have at a great charge and 
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expense besides much labour to build them and why should another enjoy their goods the next 
year as pretended In conclusion I told them that his Majesty’s charter forbids that any spike or 
nail should be drawn but ever thing entirely preserved and that I would take particular notice of 
those that should offend acquainting his majesty therewith all those things are said to the planters 
charge that they destroy all this over the adventurers leave behind it is a common practice 
amongst those commodores that they brew beer wood their ships, and sell the remains of their 
stages and houses to the sack ships I have had former experience of it 29 years since in a voyage 
to this island. I having taken this in the very act of doing it since I came here. As for the charge 
they lay to the planters for enticing their men to stay behind whilst their families become 
burdensome to their parishes at home is as true as the former. When the voyage is ended to save 
30 or 40 shillings for their passage the commodores do persuade the planters to reeve them and 
seamen to stay behind made out by several witnesses nay some of the commodores have 
confessed as much to me they knew no order to the contrary. As to their buying wine and brandy 
from the people of New England in exchange for their fish; without depending on the ships of 
England I shall. Find the latter and both this season give you a particular account of it I having 
sent positive orders to all the inhabitants if they give me an account of all the wine brandy and 
other goods that they have bought this year specifying the ships name, masters name and place 
where they belong to, by which you will have reason to believe those planters are not so bad as 
the merchants makes them to his majesty some self-ended persons have a mind to engross all 
into their own hands and especially if the planters be removed I shall give you a perfectly 
account of what I am committed by of my orders and all things else that is consisting which his 
majesty service and good of his subjects It being opinion of several experienced commanders 
that have used this trade that in case these people should be removed out of this country his 
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majesty subjects in few years would find the ill effects of it for undoubtedly the yearly part of 
them will settle on the other side of Cape de Raze amongst the French they are already invited by 
the French to come unto them in promise of great advantages or else for New England They 
implore his majesty’s favour to continue and promise all dutiful obedience to what orders shall 
be given them here are several of those ships that their merchants have made are several of those 
ships that their merchant have made such a clamour for convoy that are scattered up and down in 
several ports going away without taking any value of us I having sent direction to them that his 
majesty’s subjects has been graciously pleases to commit there care of the convoy to me and 
their danger going without. We design to sail out of this port in August for the Bay of Bulls there 
to made up a fleet and to sail from thense the 10th of September of the 20 at farthest unless the 
ships going with us cannot be ready. The fisheries are liken to make an indifferent good voyages 
they have taken about 200 quintals per boat the capelin school of bait is gone which is a great 
detriment to them. 
This port of St. John’s is an excellent harbour large enough for above 100 sail but somewhat 
narrow coming in the land very high a small charge may fortify it to keep out a considerable fleet 
it being the opinion of several that in case those inhabitants be taken away the French will soon 
possess themselves of it to the loss of several advantages his majesty’s subjects yet enjoy being 
situated in the middle of the land whereas his majesty has been informed that New England 
vessels do furnish the planters with those goods before mentioned I have already made inquiry in 
this port and cannot find any that have been here but ion the contrary the people of New England 
have taken good quantities of those goods from here the product of which is commonly shipped 
in English vessels for a market and shoe the only person the supply the inhabitants. I shall 
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enlarge but hose by God assistance to give you a full account of what is required or heedful to be 
done from. 
 
Bristol frigate in St. John’s 
Harbour in Newfoundland 
The 24th July 1675 
 
Your Honours most humble and obedient servant 
John Berry 
 
I have likewise given an account to Mr. Secretary Coventry and Mr. Pepys to the same effect.  
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Appendix E: King William’s Act, 1699 
Anno Decimo & Undecimo 
Gulielmi III. Regis. 
An Act to Encourage the Trade to Newfoundland 
Whereas the Trade of and fishing at Newfoundland is a Beneficial Trade to this Kingdom, not 
only in the employing great numbers of seamen and ships, and exporting and consuming great 
quantities of provisions and manufactures of this realm, whereby many tradesmen and artificers 
are kept at work, but also in bringing into this nation, by returns of the effects of the said fishery 
from other countries, great quantities of wine, oil, plate, iron, wool and sundry other useful 
commodities, to the increase of his Majesties revenue and the encouragement of trade and 
navigation: be it enacted by the Kings most Excellent Majesty, by and with the advice and 
consent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and Commons in this present parliament 
assembled, and by the authority of the same, that from henceforth it shall and may be lawful for 
all his Majesty’s subjects residing within this realm of England or the dominions thereunto 
belonging, trading or that shall trade to Newfoundland, and the seas, rivers, lakes, creeks, 
harbours in or about Newfoundland, or any of the islands adjoining or adjacent thereunto,  
to have use and enjoy the free trade and traffic, and art of merchandise and fishery, to and from 
Newfoundland, and peaceably to have, use and enjoy, the freedom of taking bait and fishing in 
any of the rivers, lakes, creeks, harbours in or about Newfoundland, and the said seas, or any of 
the islands adjacent thereunto, and liberty to go on shore on any part of Newfoundland, or any of 
the said islands, for the curing, salting, drying and husbanding of their fish, and for making oil, 
and to cut down wood and trees there for building and making or repairing stages, shiprooms, 
train vats, hurdles, ships boats, and other necessaries for themselves and their servants, seamen 
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and fishermen, and all other things which may be useful or advantageous to the fishing trade, as 
fully and freely as at any time therefore hath been used or enjoyed there by and of the subjects of 
his Majesties Royal Predecessors, without any hindrance, interruption, denial or disturbance of 
or from any person or persons whatsoever; and that no alien or stranger whatsoever (not residing 
within the Kingdom of England, Domain of Wales or Town of Berwick upon Tweed) shall at 
any time hereafter take any bait, or use any sort of trade or fishing whatsoever in Newfoundland, 
or in any of the said island or places above mentioned. 
And for the preserving the said harbours from all annoyances, be it further enacted by the 
authority aforesaid, that from and after the twenty fifth day of march, one thousand seven 
hundred now next coming, no ballast, press stones, or anything else hurtful to or annoying any of 
the harbours there, shall be thrown out of any ship or otherwise, by any person or persons 
whatsoever to the prejudice of any of the said harbours, but that all such ballast and other things 
shall be carried on shore, and be laid where they may do no annoyance. 
And be it further enacted by the authority aforesaid, that no person or persons whatsoever 
shall (at his departure out of the said country, or at any other time) destroy, deface or do any 
detriment to any such stage or cookroom, or to the flakes, spikes, nails or any other thing 
whatsoever thereto belonging, as he or they shall fall into at his or their coming into the said 
country, but that he or they shall (during his or their stay there) content him and themselves with 
such stage or stages only as are needful for him or them, and shall also (at his or their departure 
thence) leave all such his or their stages or stages, without doing or causing to be done any 
willful damage to any of them; and that for the repairing of such stage or stages as he or they 
shall so take, during his or their abode there, the same shall be done with timber fetched out of 
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the woods there, and not by the ruining, breaking down, demolishing, prejudicing or any wise 
injuring the stage or stages of any other person or persons whatsoever.  
And be it further enacted by the authority aforesaid, that (according to the Ancient 
Custom there used) every such fishing ship from England, Wales or Berwick, or such fishermen 
as shall from and after the said Twenty fifth day of March, first enter any harbour or creek in 
Newfoundland, in behalf of his ship, shall be Admiral of the said harbour or creek during that 
fishing season, and that time shall reserve to himself only so much beach or flakes, or both, as 
are needful for the number of such boats as he shall there use, with an overplus only for the use 
of one boat more than he needs, as a privilege for his first coming thither; and that the master of 
every such Second fishing ship as shall enter any such harbour or creek shall be Vice-Admiral of 
such harbour or creek during that fishing season; and that the Master of every such fishing ship 
next coming, as shall enter any such harbour or creek, shall be Rear-Admiral of such harbour or 
creek during that fishing season; And that the master of every fishing ship there, shall content 
himself with such beach or flakes as he shall have necessary use for, without keeping or 
detaining any more beach or flakes, to the prejudice of any such other ship or vessel as shall 
arrive there; and that such person or persons as are possessed of several places in several 
harbours or creeks there, shall make his or their Election of such place as he or they shall choose 
to abide in; and shall also within Eight and Forty hours after any after-comer or after-comers into 
such place or places, shall demand such his or their resolution touching such his or their election 
(if the weather will so soon permit, or so soon after as the weather will permit) give or send his 
or their resolution to such after-comer, or aftercomers, touching such his or their election of such 
place as he or they shall so choose to abide in for the fishing season, to the end that such after-
comer or after-comers may likewise choose his or their place or places of his or their abode 
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there; and in the case any difference shall arise touching the said matters, the Admirals of the 
respective harbours where such differences shall arise, or any two of them, shall proportion the 
place to several ships, in the sever harbours they fish in, according to the number of boats which 
each of the said ships shall have.  
And whereas several inhabitants in Newfoundland, and other persons, have, since the 
year of our Lord, One Thousand Six Hundred Eighty Five, Engrossed and detained in their own 
hands, and for their own private benefit, several stages, cook-rooms, beaches and other places in 
the said harbours and Creeks (which before that time belonged to fishing ships) for taking of 
bait, and fishing and curing their fish, to the great prejudice of the fishing ships that arrive there 
in the fishing season, and sometimes to the overthrow of some of their voyages, and to the great 
discouragement of the traders there: be it further enacted by the authority aforesaid, that all and 
every such person and persons, as since the said year of our Lord, One thousand Six Hundred 
Eighty Five, have or hath taken, seized or detained, any such stage, cookroom, beach or other 
places, for taking bait, or fishing, or for the drying, curing or husbanding of fish, shall on or 
before the said Twenty Fifth day of March relinquish, quit and leave to the public use of the 
fishing ships arriving there, all and every the said stages, cook-rooms, beaches and other places, 
for taking bait and fishing, and for the drying, curing and husbanding of fish. 
 And for the preventing the engrossing and detaining of all such stages, cook-rooms, 
beaches, and other places by any person or persons for the time to come, be it enacted by the 
authority aforesaid, that no fisherman or inhabitants in Newfoundland, or any other person or 
persons whatsoevers, shall, at any time after the said Twenty fifth Day of March, seize, take up 
or possess any of the stages, cook-rooms, beaches, or other places which, at any time since the 
said year of our lord, One thousand six hundred eighty five, did (or at any time hereafter shall 
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belong to any fishing ship or ships) for taking bait or fishing, or for drying, curing or husbanding 
of fish, before the arrival of the fishing ships out of England, Wales and Berwick, and until all 
such ships be provided with stages, cook-rooms, beaches, and other places, for taking bait and 
fishing, and for drying, curing and husbanding of fish. 
 Provided always, that all such persons as since the Twenty fifth day of March, One 
thousand six hundred eighty five, have built, cutout or made (or at any time hereafter shall build, 
cut our or make) any houses, stages, cook-roomes, train-vats, or any other conveniences for 
fishing there, that did no belong to fishing ships since the said year, One thousand six hundred 
eighty five, shall and may peaceably and quietly enjoy the same to his or their own use, without 
any disturbances of or from any person or persons whatsoever. 
 And be it further enacted by the Authority aforesaid, that all and every person or persons 
whatsoever, that shall go over with their servants to Newfoundland, to keep boats on a fishing 
voyage, commonly called by-boat-keepers, shall not pretend to or meddle with any house, stage, 
cook-room, train-vat, or other convince, that did belong to fishing ships, since the year One 
thousand six hundred eighty five, or shall be cut out or made by ships, from and after said 
Twenty fifth day of March, One thousand seven hundred. 
 And be it further enacted by the Authority aforesaid, that every master of a by-boat, or 
by-boats, shall carry with him at least two fresh men in six (viz.) one man that hath made no 
more than one voyage, and one man who hath never been at sea before; and that every inhabitant 
shall be obliged to employ two such fresh men as the by-boat-keepers are obliged for every Boat 
kept by them; and further, that all masters of fishing ships shall carry with them in their ships 
company, at least one such fresh man that never was at sea before, in every five men they carry; 
and that the master of each such by-boat, and each such fishing ship, shall make Oath before the 
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Collector, or other Principal Officer of the Customs of the port or ports from whence such ships 
intends to sail, that each ship and by-boat company have such fresh men therein as this Act 
directs; and that the said Officer or Officers is and are hereby empowered and Required to 
administer the aforesaid Oath to the said masters of ships and by-boats, and give a Certificate 
thereof under his hand, without any fee, gratuity or reward for so doing. 
 And be it further enacted by the authority aforesaid, that every master or owner of any 
fishing ship, going to Newfoundland (after the said twenty fifth day of March) shall have in his 
ships Company every fifth man a green-man (that is to say) not a seaman, or having been ever at 
sea before. 
 And be it further Enacted by the authority aforesaid, that no person or persons 
whatsoever, shall at any time after the said twenty fifth day of March, Obliterate, expunge, cut 
out, deface or any wise alter or change the mark or marks of any boat or boats, train-vat or train 
vats, belonging to any other person or persons, whereby to defraud or prejudice the right owner 
or owners thereof, no convert to his or their own use any boat or boats, train-vat or train-vats, 
belonging to any other person or persons, without his or their consent and approbation, nor 
remove nor take away any such boat or train-vat, from the place or places where they shall be 
left by the owner or owners thereof, except in case of necessity, and also upon giving notice 
thereof to the Admiral of the harbour or place where such boat or train-vat shall be left by the 
owner or owners, to the end that the right Owners thereof may know what is become of them. 
 And be it enacted by the authority aforesaid, that no person or persons whatsoever, shall 
at any time after the said twenty fifth day of March, rind any of the trees there standing or 
growing upon any occasion whatsoever, nor shall by any ways or means whatsoever, set on fire 
any of the woods of the said country, or do or cause to be done, any damage, detriment or 
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destruction to the same, for any use or uses whatsoever, except only for necessary fuel for the 
ships and inhabitants, and for the building and necessary repairs of houses, ships, boats and train-
vats, and of the stages, cook-rooms, beaches and other places, for taking bait and fishing, and for 
drying, curing and husbanding fish there; and also that no person or persons whatsoever, shall at 
nay time after the said twenty fifth day of March, cast anchor, or do any other matter or thing, to 
the annoyance or hindering of the hauling of seine in the customary baiting places, or shoot his 
or their seine or seines within or upon the seine or seines if any other person or persons 
whatsoever; and also that no person or persons whatsoever, shall at any time after the said twenty 
fifth day of March, steal, purloin, or take out of the net or nets of any other person or persons 
whatsoever, lying a drift, or drover for bait by night, nor steal, purloin or take away any bait out 
of any fishing-boat or boats, or any net or nets belonging to any other person or persons.  
 And whereas several persons that have been guilt of thefts, robberies, murders and other 
felonies, upon the Land of Newfoundland, and the islands thereunto adjacent, have many times 
escaped unpunished, because the trial of such offenders hath heretofore been ordered and 
adjudged in no other court of justice, but before the Lord High Constable, and Earl Marshal of 
England for reformation thereof, and for the most speedy and effectual punishment of such 
offences for the time to come, be it enacted by the authority aforesaid, that all robberies, 
murders, and felonies, and all other capital crimes whatsoever, which at any time or times after 
the said Twenty fifth day of March, shall be done and committed in or upon the Land, in 
Newfoundland, or in any of the islands thereunto belonging, shall and may ne enquired or, tried, 
heard, determined and adjudged in any shire or county of this Kingdom of England, by virtue of 
the Kings Commission or Commissions of Oyer and Terminer, and goal delivery, or any of them, 
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according to the Laws of this land used for the punishment of such robberies, murders, felonies, 
and other capital crimes done and committed within this realm.  
  And be it further enacted by the authority aforesaid, that the Admirals of and in every 
port and harbour in Newfoundland, for the time being, be and hereby Authorized and Required, 
(in order to preserve peace and good government amongst the Seamen and fishermen, as well in 
their respective harbours as on the shore) to see the rules and orders in this present Act 
contained, concerning the Regulation of the fishery there duly put in execution; and that each of 
the said Admirals do yearly keep a Journal of the number of all ships, boats, stages and train-
vats, and of all the seamen belonging to and employed in each of their respective harbours, and 
shall also (at their return to England) deliver a true copy thereof under their hands, to his 
majesty’s most honorable Privy Council. 
 And be it further enacted by the authority aforesaid, that in case any difference or 
controversy shall arise in Newfoundland, or the Island thereunto adjoining, between the Masters 
of fishing-ships and the inhabitants there, or any by-boat-keepers, for or concerning the right an 
property of fishing-rooms, stages, flakes or any other building or convenience for fishing and 
curing of fish, in the several harbours or coves, the said differences, disputes and controversies 
shall be judged and determined by the fishing admirals, in the several harbours and coves; and in 
case any of the said masters of fishing ships, by-boat-keepers or inhabitants, shall think 
themselves aggrieved by such judgment or determination, and shall appeal to the Commanders of 
any of his Majesty’s ships of war, appointed as convoys for Newfoundland, the said Commander 
is hereby Authorized an empowered to determine the same, pursuant to the regulation in this Act. 
 And to the end, that the inhabitants, fishermen, seamen, and all and every other person 
and persons residing or being at Newfoundland, or any the said island, or other places, may with 
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all devotion join in their solemn prayers and Addresses to Almighty God, for the obtaining of his 
Blessing upon their persons and endeavors, be it hereby enacted that all and every inhabitant of 
Newfoundland, or the said islands or places adjacent near thereto, shall strictly and decently 
observe every Lords day, commonly called Sunday; and that none of the said inhabitants (who 
keep any tavern, alehouse or other public house for Entertainment) shall entertain or sell, vend, 
utter or dispose of to any fishermen, seamen or other person whatsoever, upon any Lords day of 
Sunday, any Wine, Beer, Ale, Cider, Strong Waters, or Tobacco, or any other Liquor or Liquors 
whatsoever.  
 And whereas by an Act of Parliament made in the Eighth and Ninth years of his 
Majesties Reign, entitled, An Act for Granting to his Majesty, a further subsidy of Tonnage and 
Poundage upon Merchandize Imported, for the Term of Two Years and Three Quarters, and an 
Additional Land Tax for One Year, for Carrying on the War against France; and by another Act 
made in the Ninth and Tenth Years of his Majesty’s reign entitled, An Act for Granting to his 
Majesty, a further subsidy of Tonnage and Poundage, towards the Raising a Yearly Sum of 
Seven Hundred Thousand Pounds, for the Service of His Majesty’s Household, and other uses 
therein mentioned, during his Majesty’s life, an additional duty of twelve pound on every twenty 
shillings value of all goods an merchandizes imported (all manner of fish English taken 
excepted) is granted to his Majesty, his heirs and Successors: and whereas some doubt hat arisen, 
whether oil, blubber and fins taken and imported by the Company of Merchants of London 
Trading to Greenland, were not, nor are intended to be Charged, or made liable to the Duty of 
Twelve Pence for every Twenty Shillings value of good imported, charged in the aforesaid acts, 
but that the Whale fins, Oil and blubber, Taken and imported, as aforesaid, and also all whale-
fins, oil and blubber of English fishing, taken in the seas of Newfoundland, or any of the seas 
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belonging to any of his Majesty’s plantations or colonies, and imported into this Kingdom by any 
of his Majesty’s subjects in English shipping, were, and are hereby declared to be free of the said 
Duties, as all fish of English taking; the aforesaid Acts, or anything therein contained to the 
contrary in any wise notwithstanding. 
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